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ABSTRACT 
 
LYNETTE MARIE HOLMAN:  
The Andrea Yates Effect:  
Priming of Mental Illness Stereotypes Through Exemplification  
of Postpartum Disorders 
(Under the direction of Rhonda Gibson) 
 
Postpartum depression is a common disorder that can occur after a woman has given 
birth. Unfortunately, many who suffer from postpartum depression do not seek treatment — 
one reason may be because of the stigma perpetuated by media accounts of women with 
postpartum psychosis who commit infanticide (Holman, 2009; Chewning, 2008). Although 
such incidents are incredibly rare — only 1 in 1,000 new mothers develops postpartum 
psychosis, and of these, only 4% commit infanticide (Parry, 1995) — women make the news 
when they kill their infants.  
This study sought to determine whether an exemplar of extreme maternal mental 
illness (i.e., Andrea Yates, the Texas woman who drowned her five children in 2001) is more 
likely to trigger, or prime, harsher judgments of a target character who suffered from 
postpartum depression than would a non-extreme exemplar. This study used a priming 
technique whereby participants — 40 pregnant women, 20 for each condition — were 
exposed to online slideshow stories, one about Andrea Yates and one about a woman who 
suffered from the milder postpartum depression. Later, their memory was triggered via a 
subliminal priming technique consisting of flashes of images from either slideshow. The 
participants then watched a video clip of the target character and were asked to evaluate her. 
This study sought not only to isolate a media effect, but also to determine how this effect 
  iv 
may be influencing behavioral intentions such as postponing speaking with their doctors 
about depression in order to avoid medication.  
The findings of this study suggest that the non-extreme prime triggered harsher 
judgments of the target character once that character’s sanity was called into question, 
whereas the extreme prime prompted participants to correct their judgments of the target 
character and to evaluate her more positively when her sanity was in question. The non-
extreme prime triggered higher perceptions of the risk of developing postpartum disorders 
than the extreme prime. However, in spite of harsher judgments and higher perceptions of 
risk, those in the non-extreme condition were more likely than those in extreme condition to 
engage their health care providers if they thought they were depressed. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
Journalists have long prided themselves on reporting the truth, not mired by personal 
prejudice and biases. At least, that is the ideal modus operandi for those who have been 
called into the news-gathering profession. However, social cognitive psychologists have 
shown in their research that prejudice can be invoked both explicitly and implicitly (Devine, 
1989; Bargh, 2006, 2008). This means that while individuals may be able to recognize and 
correct their explicit feelings of prejudice, stereotypical attitudes that are implicitly activated 
are beyond their awareness and control. For example, when an “elderly” concept was 
activated implicitly, participants responded by walking more slowly (Bargh, Chen, and 
Burrows, 1996). When an “African American” stereotype was implicitly activated, 
participants responded with more hostile behavior. These researchers showed that social 
behavior could be invoked non-consciously, as none of these participants were aware they 
were behaving differently and certainly didn’t know why such an effect occurred.  
So why should journalists and those who seek out the information that journalists 
provide be immune to such a phenomenon? This study will investigate whether media 
consumers are immune to the influence of implicitly activated stereotypes, and if not, 
whether consumers of medical information who are likely sensitive to information related to 
their condition — such as pregnant women who may struggle with mental illness1 — are 
particularly vulnerable to this influence. Women suffering from postpartum depression face a 
difficult obstacle of overcoming the stigma attached to mental illness, particularly if that 
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stigma has been perpetuated by media accounts of unhinged, mentally ill mothers who kill 
their children. In a content analysis of 202 newspaper and magazine articles about varying 
levels of postpartum disorders (“baby blues,” postpartum depression, and postpartum 
psychosis) from a sample spanning the years 1998 to 2008, Holman (2009) showed that 
mainstream print media continue to cultivate the stigma of mental illness. The fact that 31 out 
of 82 newspaper articles about cases involving postpartum psychosis incorrectly 
characterized the mental illness portrayed as a milder disorder called postpartum depression 
indicates that media outlets need to be more diligent in how they handle medical reporting. 
 Media scholars note that the stigma attached to mental illness is pernicious and is a 
significant obstacle to improving mental health care (Satorius & Schulze, 2005; Link et al., 
1992). The news media often depict only the most extreme representations of a given 
condition; this is simply the nature of news judgment and what is deemed “newsworthy.” It is 
often from such extreme portrayals that individuals draw their information about topics with 
which they may not have direct experience (Zillmann, 1999). In addition, the media, like 
many facets of society, perpetuate the stigma of mental illness, and there has been wide-
ranging research of mental illness stereotypes from a mass media perspective that support 
this assertion (Byrd, 1979b; Byrd & Pipes, 1981; Byrd & Elliott, 1985; Gerbner, 1959, 1961; 
Gerbner & Tannenbaum, 1960; Lang et al., 2006; Taylor, 1957; Wahl & Harman, 1989; 
Wahl & Kaye, 1992; Wahl, 1992, 1995; and Winick, 1978). For example, an extensive 
content analysis of 2,205 television programs by Lang et al. (2006) illustrates the pervasive 
nature of the stigma of mental illness. Slang terms for mental illness were heard in 43.8% of 
the study’s sample, and derogatory and slang terms were especially prevalent in children’s 
programming. MTV, for example, featured slang terms for mental illness in 65.5% of its 
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programs (Lang et al., 2006). Media scholars and observers have illustrated how mass media 
have long engendered social (Gerbner et al., 2002) and gender stereotypes (Faludi, 1991),  
and indeed how they are likely doing the same for stereotypes of mental illness, including 
postpartum depression (Barnett, 2005, 2006; Holman, 2009). 
Postpartum depression is a common and highly treatable disorder that can occur after 
a woman has given birth. Medical experts agree that as many as eight out of ten new mothers 
experience the “baby blues” after delivery (Luskin et al., 2008). The “baby blues” is a 
disorder that develops some two to three days after delivery and typically resolves within two 
weeks (Luskin et al., 2008). One in ten new mothers develops more severe postpartum 
depression (PPD); PPD’s symptoms are often overlooked because they are considered part of 
the usual difficulties new mothers face after giving birth — fatigue, difficulty sleeping, 
anxiety, excessive concerns about the baby or — alternatively —feeling detached from the 
baby, and feelings of inadequacy and being overwhelmed, for example (Luskin et al., 2008; 
Bernstein et al., 2008). Only about one in 1,000 new mothers develops postpartum psychosis, 
which pairs the symptoms of PPD with a woman’s losing touch with reality and experiencing 
such things as hearing voices or committing violent acts (Spinelli, 2009, Luskin et al., 2008; 
Viguera, Emmerich, & Cohen, 2008). Only 4% of women with postpartum psychosis commit 
infanticide (Parry, 1995); however, women make the news when they kill their infants, and 
their stories are often framed as violations of maternal myths (Barnett, 2006). So although 
postpartum depression is relatively common, it often goes untreated because women do not 
feel empowered to speak up if they think they are depressed — perhaps because of societal 
expectations of the new mother, or perhaps because of the stigma perpetuated by media 
accounts of women who commit infanticide (Chewning, 2008). In addition, many new 
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mothers do not even realize they are depressed. They do not know that is “normal” for new 
mothers and may avoid seeking help simply because they aren’t aware of what constitutes 
depressive symptoms (Meltzer-Brody, 2010). This avoidance behavior was illustrated in a 
clinical study in which only one third of women who had postpartum depression believed they 
suffered from the disorder and 80 percent had not reported to their doctors that they were 
experiencing symptoms (Whitton, Warner, & Appleby, 1996). 
The story of Andrea Yates exemplifies how a strong media antecedent can enable the 
stigma of mental illness. Yates was a former nurse and stay-at-home mother living in suburban 
Texas with her husband and five young children. On June 20, 2001, she filled a bathtub with 
water and drowned each of her children, one by one. What followed was a whirlwind of media 
coverage that thrust this woman — and the issue of postpartum disorders — into the country’s 
collective conscience (Barnett, 2005, 2006). Andrea Yates was tried and convicted for the 
murders of three of her children, a common legal practice in cases of multiple murders. The 
conviction allowed prosecutors to have her stand trial for the deaths of the other two children at 
a later date. Yates was sentenced to life in prison in 2002; in 2005, however, her murder 
conviction was overturned on appeal. Yates was retried, and in 2006 she was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity. Yates is confined to Vernon State Mental Hospital in North Texas and 
will be held there for an indeterminate amount of time, subject to reviews by the court (Parker 
& Kasindorf, 2006; Holman, 2009). 
Communication theories such as cultivation theory (Gerbner et al., 2002) and theories 
of the social construction of reality (Potter, 1991) help to elucidate the ways in which mass 
media shape individuals’ impressions of the world. Past work in these streams of research 
indicates that those who are mentally ill have often been portrayed negatively and have been 
  5 
stigmatized (Gerbner, 1998; Wahl, 1992). While many of these researchers have shed light on 
the “big picture” effects of a media culture, scholars in the areas of media priming and 
exemplification research have investigated the underlying psychological mechanisms that 
drive the individual perceptions resulting from various phenomena. It is this work that 
informs the theoretical framework of this study. 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, Klinger, and Roskos-Ewoldsen’s (2007) meta-analysis of 63 
media priming studies concludes that the media can act as a prime, or stimulus, that can 
activate concepts stored in memory upon which individuals base their assessment of a target. 
Classic semantic priming manipulations were first used in cognitive psychology to 
investigate the “structure and representation of information within network models of 
memory” (Anderson, 1983, as cited in Roskos-Ewoldsen et al, 2007, p. 55). Derived from 
schema theory (Bartlett, 1932), which explains how individuals’ look at, categorize, and 
respond to the world based on past experience (Anderson, 1977), network models of memory 
predict that a stimulus can activate a concept that is stored in the memory as a node (Roskos-
Ewoldsen et al., 2007, Roskos-Ewoldsen, Klinger, and Roskos-Ewoldson, 2009). Once one 
node is activated, it can spread to other related nodes and reach an “activation threshold” 
(Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2009, p. 79). Once this threshold is reached and the stereotype is 
primed, it is predicted that this will lead to respondents’ attitude activation toward members 
of that stereotyped group (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2007). A prime usually results in an 
automatic, unconscious judgment effect that is often short-lived. This brief effect is 
evidenced by prior studies that have manipulated the delay between priming and of the 
stimulus presentation (Srull & Wyer, 1980). Most research on the influence of priming on 
subsequent judgments involves a maximum delay of 15 to 20 minutes (Roskos-Ewoldsen et 
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al. 2007, Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2009). Media priming researchers have used music videos 
to prime gender stereotypes (Hansen & Hansen, 1988; and Hansen & Krygowski, 1994), 
stereotypical newsletter information to prime judgments of African Americans and women 
(Power, Murphy, & Coover, 1996), and even media to prime rape myths (Beaver, Gold, & 
Prisco, 1992; and Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Gorman, 1985).  
While media priming researchers have shown that the media can function as a prime, 
exemplification theorists study the circumstances under which the shaping or amendment of 
beliefs about a given phenomenon, such as postpartum depression, are based on samplings of 
occurrences — in the case of this study, the media coverage of postpartum disorders 
(Holman & Carpentier, 2009, Holman, 2009, Zillmann & Brosius, 2000; Zillmann, 1999, 
2006). These samples of a known (or unknown) phenomena come in the form of exemplars, 
or examples, used to illustrate a news story. Ideally, these examples should truly represent 
the issue at hand. In statistical terms, this means that the distribution of examples in a story 
should be representative of the statistical distribution of phenomena as it exists in our society. 
However, this is not the way that journalism is practiced. Journalists tend to seek out 
exemplars — which can manifest structurally in pull-quotes, photographs, double-edits, as 
well as in specific events — that are extreme in nature (Brosius, 2003; Daschmann & 
Brosius, 1997). Media scholars have pointed out that it was valuable for research on priming 
to shift from attempting to prove that media priming exists to testing specific theories 
(Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2002). The goal of this study was to 
test the notion that a prime in the form of an extreme exemplar of postpartum disorders 
would yield a stronger effect than a non-extreme exemplar. 
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Exemplars are powerful in that they tend to conjure strong emotional reactions and 
offer concrete examples of phenomena. Two variables control access to exemplars: the 
recency and frequency of exposure. Accessibility from frequent exposure is called chronic 
accessibility and its effects are usually more dominant than those of recency of activation 
(which occurs in priming) (Zillmann, 2006, p. 223). Simply defined, chronic accessibility 
refers to what Shrum’s (2002) accessibility model describes as the assumption that people 
rely on “cognitive shortcuts” such as ease of access to information in order to form their 
judgments (Shrum, 2007, p. 249). And a construct that is chronically accessible is even easier 
to access once it has been triggered by a prime because one has encountered that particular 
construct “more often and thus [has] more relevant memories available for retrieval and 
evaluation” (Shrum, 2007, p. 251). 
Exemplification researchers have found that because exemplars promote the chronic 
accessibility effect, exemplars exhibit a disproportionate influence on risk and safety 
assessments, and that effect is not short-lived, as in priming (Zillmann, 2006). Indeed, 
researchers have found “sleeper” — or long-term — effects of exemplars, some lasting as 
long as two weeks (Zillmann & Gan, 1996; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). In order to 
demonstrate that this “exemplification effect” is not short-lived, Zillmann and Gan’s (1996) 
study about the perceived risk of contracting Melanoma from sun exposure included delay 
conditions whereby the time between exposure to the stimulus and the measurement of risk 
perception was extended by two weeks. In the extreme condition, where participants were 
exposed to the most graphic images of skin cancer, the perception of risk grew over time. 
“The observed absolute sleeper effect is consistent with the proposal that threatening images 
in particular continue to impose themselves in memory, whereas the accessibility of 
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alternative information, especially of comparatively abstract forms, diminishes over time” 
(Zillmann & Brosius, 2000, p. 100). 
Aust and Zillmann’s (1996) studies about the perceived threat of random shootings in 
fast-food restaurants and the dangers of Salmonella poisoning, have shown that news 
exemplars featuring victims of these unfortunate happenings increased respondents’ 
perceptions of their own risk of being victimized. Gibson and Zillmann’s (1994) 
investigation on carjacking also confirmed that as the manipulated level of risk and 
victimization increased in the exemplars presented, respondents’ assessments of their own 
risks increased. This model of risk perception can be assimilated and transferred to other 
groups as well. Gibson and Zillmann’s (2000) study that manipulated how a news report on 
an Appalachian tick disease was illustrated produced an effect on how the risk for particular 
ethnic groups was perceived by respondents. Pictorial presentations of either all white 
victims or all black victims, particularly when coupled with pictures of ticks, increased the 
overestimation of that group’s risk of contracting the disease. Therefore, the assessment of 
the participants’ own risk or their judgment in the evaluation of another’s risk level is based 
on an affective heuristic and not necessarily a rational one (Slovic et al. 2004, p. 4). 
Like network models of memory, exemplification theory also utilizes schema theory 
(Zillmann and Brosius, 2000). Schema theory is a learning theory that regards knowledge as 
an intricate network of mental structures representing one’s view of the world (Anderson, 
1977). Roskos-Ewoldsen et al. (2009) have defined schema as very abstract mental 
representations of constructs. The researchers have stated: “although there may be temporal 
or spatial information about events within a schema, the schema itself is not contextualized 
within a specific time or place in the same way that a situation or mental model is situated” 
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(Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2009, p. 85). In contrast to the highly abstract schema, Roskos-
Ewoldsen et al. (2009) have placed mental models at the mid-point along a theoretical 
continuum of abstractness, with situation models being the least abstract representations of 
experienced phenomena. With this framework in mind, it could be argued that (1) one story 
about postpartum disorders represents a situation model; (2) a long-running series of stories 
about a woman who has killed her children could create a mental model of postpartum 
disorders; and (3) one’s view of mental illness could represent the abstract notion of a 
schema.  
And while Zillmann and Brosius (2000) criticize schema theory as perhaps not 
providing enough predictive power to show when specific influences have an effect, they 
admit that, because of the cyclical nature of news, schemata are rather common. This is 
where exemplification theory may provide more predictive power than schema theory. 
Specifically, Zillmann and Brosius (2000) agree that there is a degree of commonality in 
what is presented in the media and what the audience reports as salient, or chronically 
accessible, to them. This notion likely describes Price and Tewksbury’s (1997) assumption 
about the power of media to prime constructs in people’s minds — namely, that media 
portrayals increase the chronic accessibility of the constructs that, in turn, “result in the 
media effects that are being studied” (Roskos-Ewolden et al., 2009, p. 84).  
Exemplification theorists point out that exemplars of a particular phenomenon 
provide media consumers with mental shortcuts for processing complex information and are 
therefore easier to process than base-rate, or statistical data (Zillmann and Brosius, 2000; 
Brosius, 2003). Beyond their affective, or emotional, reactions to information as it is 
presented to them, individuals use three heuristics in their shaping of beliefs about the 
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allocation of exemplar properties within samplings — the quantification heuristic or 
utilization of comparative assessments, the representative heuristic or the devaluation of 
base-rate information, and the availability heuristic or the intake of judgments about the 
population that are “cognitively obtrusive” (Zillmann, 2006, pp. 222-223). This simply 
means that, for this study, a pregnant woman who is considering her own risk for postpartum 
depression may subconsciously compare her possible outcome with news portrayals of 
women who have suffered from the more severe postpartum psychosis and then committed 
infanticide or filicide. Because of past media coverage, negative attitudes toward this topic 
are likely to be chronically accessible (Roskos-Ewoldson et al., 2009); therefore, the same 
pregnant woman would not be as likely to take into account the statistical unlikelihood that 
she would suffer the same fate (Brosius, 2003). 
This study investigated whether a media exemplar, which conjures strong emotional 
reactions and is easier to process and remember than base-rate data, is likely to provide a 
stronger prime, or activation of accessible information in an individual’s memory, in terms 
her risk perception (Zillmann, 2006; Holman & Dillman Carpentier, 2009) than would a 
simple prime of a stereotype (see Djiksterhuis et al., 1998). This effort follows in the 
footsteps of previous work by Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009), who successfully 
primed stereotypes of mental illnesses through media exemplars presented in online news 
slideshows.  
This study investigated the relationship between a primed stereotype and the reactions 
of a highly involved group of subjects — pregnant women — against a target character who 
suffered from postpartum depression. This was accomplished by investigating the effects of 
two types of subliminal or implicit primes on these pregnant women: a non-extreme image 
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prime and an extreme image prime utilizing images related to the Andrea Yates case. These 
stimuli were presented to participants under the guise of a computer diligence task in which 
the subjects were exposed to the stimuli for 16 milliseconds each and then asked to determine 
where the “flashes” had occurred on the screen (see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996 for a review of 
the procedure). Very brief, discrete exposures of images have previously been utilized to 
prime goals (Fitzsimmons, Chartrand, & Fitzsimmons, 2008). Fitzsimmons et al. (2008) 
exposed participants to 13 millesecond exposures of the Apple Computer or IBM logos in 
order to prime creativity, for example. Exposures of 13 to 16 milliseconds are far too fast an 
exposure time for participants to be able to consciously assess what they have seen. In 
addition, participants were asked to focus on the center of the computer screen while the 
stimuli were flashed in their parafoveal view.  
While social cognitive psychologists have long employed this method in priming, 
none have utilized a specific media exemplar (e.g., Andrea Yates) to prime a closely related 
construct (maternal mental illness). It was predicted that the Yates exemplar condition would 
result in harsher evaluations of the target character than the non-extreme condition. The aim 
of the subliminal prime was to eliminate any demand effects on these women and to assure 
that they couldn’t correct for the influence of the prime, as would be possible in the case of a 
supraliminal prime that did not remain outside of their awareness. In addition, the subliminal 
prime directly accessed concepts that are likely chronically accessible in this audience (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 1999). 
This research marks a step in assessing the effects of media coverage of an issue that 
is highly salient to a particular audience. By doing so, this study contributes to media effects 
and social cognitive psychology literature in its effort to deconstruct the influence of primes 
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in real-world situations. Social cognitive psychologists have primed implicit attitudes, goals, 
and behaviors in controlled lab experiments, focusing on effects on a micro, individualized 
level (see Bargh, 2006 for a review). More recently, however, automaticity researchers are 
moving their research in the direction of assessing downstream, macro effects of external 
stimuli. For example, in their effort to demonstrate that brands can cause people to “think 
different,” Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons (2008) conducted experiments that primed 
“creativity” and “honesty.” Just by flashing the Apple computer brand versus the IBM brand 
to participants subliminally, those in the Apple condition felt and behaved more creatively 
than those in the IBM or neutral conditions. They also used the Disney brand versus the E! 
brand to prime honesty. Many media priming researchers, particularly those who study 
political priming, have also focused on the macro level, showing how the salience of media 
items (stories about the president of the United States, in particular) can influence subsequent 
judgments made by a large audience. The trouble is that many of these political priming 
studies have not controlled for the exposure of the media antecedent as a stimulus (Roskos-
Ewoldson, Klinger, Roskos-Ewoldson, 2007). The other two streams of media priming 
research — violence priming and stereotype priming — have offered up supportive findings 
with greater internal validity (see Roskos-Ewoldson, Klinger, & Roskos-Ewoldson, 2007 for 
a review). Few scholars, however, have produced controlled laboratory experiments using 
media antecedents as the primes and specifically testing not only exemplification theory, but 
network models of memory, which identify priming intensity and recency as key factors in 
determining the strength and endurance of a priming effect (Roskos-Ewoldsen et al., 2009; 
Dillman Carpentier, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2008; Holman & Dillman 
Carpentier, 2009). Taking these two assumptions of network models into account, this study 
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tested the ability of two media exemplars of varied intensity to implicitly “tap into” what is 
likely a chronically accessible construct (see Zillmann & Brosius, 2000, p. 47) of maternal 
mental illness and then to prime subsequent judgments of a target character. 
The specific goal of this study was to follow in the footsteps of social cognitive 
psychologists and media priming researchers and attempt to demonstrate causality between a 
negative exemplar of postpartum disorders drawn from the national news media and 
subsequent stereotypes of mental illness that individuals may hold against those who suffer 
from such disorders. The importance of establishing a causal link is far-reaching, extending 
beyond simply educating journalists to take greater care in their medical reporting. Indeed, 
this study is part of a stream of research into the highly affective area of medical decision-
making, where a new mother’s goals, attitudes, and emotions all come into play to possibly 
deter them from seeking out the medical attention they need.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA IN A MEDIATED CULTURE 
It is reasonable to assume that most new mothers have the conscious desire to maintain a 
healthy pregnancy and give birth to a healthy child. Being healthy could be considered a 
proximal goal and is therefore intentional (Moors & De Houwer, 2007). What is more difficult to 
pinpoint is how individual women define “healthy” and whether seeking treatment for prenatal or 
postpartum depression would necessarily violate that definition — and if so, why that is. Why 
would new mothers feel shamed into suffering with postpartum depression in silence? There 
could be many antecedents to the activation of what could be a nonconscious desire, or what 
Moors & De Houwer (2007) termed a remote goal, of being the “perfect” mother (or conversely, 
NOT being the imperfect mother) — from news stories of mothers who have killed their children 
(Barnett, 2005, 2006; Holman, 2009) to a desire to please others, such as one’s doctor, by 
transitioning easily into motherhood (Chewning, 2008). Following such a causal model, the 
remote goal could trigger the proximal goal to be healthy (Moors & De Houwer, 2007). Later, a 
new mother might engage in avoidance behavior in terms of her own health care (Luce, 1998). 
For example, she may avoid telling her doctor about her depressive symptoms because she does 
not want to give up breastfeeding in order to take medication for her depression. This trade-off, in 
her mind, might represent the only two options, though today there are medical options whereby 
women can continue to breastfeed while on antidepressant medication (Chewning, 2008). This 
subsequent behavior of avoidance is goal dependent, but unintentional (Moors & De Houwer, 
2007). And as Wenger (2003) points out, our intentions are not necessary to cause our actions. 
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Indeed, automaticity researchers have pointed to various antecedents to nonconscious goal 
activation and subsequent behavior, including situations (e.g. threats to self-image, see Spencer et 
al., 1998; associating power to sex, see Bargh et al., 1995), temptations (Fishbach, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2003), goal contagion (Aarts, Gollwitzer, & Hassin, 2004), significant others 
(Fitzsimmons & Bargh, 2003, Chartrand, Dalton, & Fitzsimons, 2007), and environmental 
features (e.g. novel situations, see Eitam, Hassin, & Schul, 2008) such as the mass media (see 
Berkowitz, 1984, 1990, 1994, 1997).  
A wide range of research has been done on mental illness-related content in mass 
media, including content analyses of primetime dramatic programming (Signorielli, 1989), 
daytime television serials (Fruth & Padderud, 1985), other television programming (Taylor, 
1957; Lang et al., 2006), popular magazines (Taylor, 1957; Gerbner, 1961; Byrd, 1979b; 
Wahl & Kaye, 1992), and films (Winick, 1978; Byrd & Pipes, 1981; Byrd & Elliott, 1985; 
Gerbner, 1959, 1961; Gerbner & Tannenbaum, 1960). Many of these studies have noted not 
only the extensive use of mental illness in storylines but also the perpetual portrayal of 
mental illness stereotypes (see Wahl, 1992 for a review of the literature). For example, Fruth 
& Padderud’s (1985) study of 14 daytime serials, or soap operas, found that half of them 
featured at least one mentally ill character and 11.4 percent of the programming time was 
devoted to a mental illness topic. Wahl & Harman (1989) cite a survey of members of the 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (an alliance of patients and their families) stating that 
media sources — films and news stories about mentally ill individuals, and particularly those 
who kill others — as key contributors to the mental illness stigma. Indeed, as evidence of the 
media’s contribution to the perniciousness of the mental illness stigma, Wahl (1995) points to 
a 1990 telephone poll of 1,300 adults (representative of the U.S. population) that sought to 
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assess their attitudes toward people with mental illness. Most of the respondents pointed to 
the mass media as providing most of their knowledge concerning mental illness. According 
to social scientist Robert P. Snow: 
“It is no exaggeration to say that we live presently in a media culture. It means that 
nearly every institution — including religion, government, criminal justice, health 
care, education, and even the family — is influenced by the mass communication 
process” (as cited in Wahl, 1995, p. 90). 
 
A media culture — or to be more specific — a mediated culture simply refers to the 
notion that often in our society we do not experience things firsthand. Many of our first 
encounters with a phenomenon such as mental illness are mediated through other means, 
whether it is through the personal stories of our friends and neighbors or through our 
interaction with mass media. Mass communication theories such as cultivation theory (e.g., 
Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002) and theories of the social 
construction of reality (e.g., Hawkins & Pingree, 1982; Potter, 1991) explain how mass media 
have played an important part in influencing individuals’ views of the world. However, some 
media scholars note that these theories may be going too far in explaining how and why 
individuals process and are influenced by mass media. Many, such as Shrum (2007), sought 
to understand macro media effects such as cultivation through a psychological lens. Such an 
“approach provides at least two important services: (a) It provides convergent validity for 
the theory, and (b) it provides an understanding of conditions that facilitate and inhibit the 
effect” (Shrum, 2007, p. 245). By drawing from a rich tradition of social cognitive 
psychology, therefore media priming theorists such as Berkowitz (2002) were instrumental in 
devising experiments to investigate how individual exposure to media stimuli can 
automatically lead to affective and behavioral responses. It is this stream of automaticity 
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research, and others like it in the realm of social cognitive psychology (see Bargh, 1989, 2007, 
for a review) that informed this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
AUTOMATICITY OF STEREOTYPING AND IMPLICIT PREJUDICE 
Automaticity as a concept is nothing new. William James (1890) wrote about the 
principle of ideomotor action, a term describing the notion that merely thinking about an 
action will likely lead to that action. Bargh (1989) pointed out that while many earlier social 
and cognitive psychologists saw behaviors as either “automatic” or “controlled,” the 
dichotomy is actually less clear-cut. He argued that just because an action did not fulfill all of 
the criteria for an automatic action, it wasn’t by default a controlled action. In addition, far 
more of our day-to-day activities are automatic than controlled. Indeed, Bargh (1989) has 
suggested a gradual view proposing three divisions into which most automatic processes fit: 
preconscious, postconscious, and goal-dependent. The predominant view of automatic 
processes also embraces a feature-based approach assigning the following qualities to 
automatic processes: unintentional, involuntary, effortless, autonomous, and occurring 
outside of awareness (Moors & De Houwer, 2007; Bargh, 1989).  
In addition to the gradual view of and the feature-based approach to automatic 
processes, Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, and Aarts (2007) note that in order to explain experiments 
on automaticity in social behavior, one must keep five important concepts in mind: an input 
system, an output system, and three mediating items. The input system can include 
perception of external stimuli (such as the media) or one’s own thoughts. The output system 
includes motor programs, which are in charge of our behavior. Finally, the “effects of 
perception or thought on the activation of motor programs, and ultimately behavior, are 
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usually mediated by either traits or goals and by behavioral representations” (p. 57). 
“Traits” is defined as an abstract term designating associated concrete behaviors (e.g., the 
politeness trait is associated with saying “thank you”).  
Goals are “positively valued behavioral endstates,” and unlike traits, they include a feedback 
mechanism whereby one can monitor his or her progress toward a goal (Djiksterhuis, 
Chartrand, & Aarts, 2007, p. 57, citing Custers & Aarts, 2005a). Finally, behavioral 
representations are learned from infancy by mapping verbs onto concrete behaviors. It is the 
activation of these behavioral representations that mediate the effects of both traits and goals 
on subsequent behavior.  
Zajonc (1980) calls Freud the father of the unconscious, and while cognitive 
psychologists have discredited much of Freud’s work, social cognitive psychologists have re-
embraced his notions that elements in ourselves (e.g. goals) as well as in our environment 
(e.g., situations, significant others, brands, temptations) are strong determinants of our 
behavior (Spencer et al., 1998; Bargh et al., 1995, Fishbach et al., 2003, Fitzsimmons & 
Bargh, 2003, Chartrand et al., 2007, Eitam et al. 2008). Zajonc (1980) further argues that 
these unconscious processes are adaptive, beneficial, and functional for us. They save us 
energy, protect us from harm, and take care of much of the effort of day-to-day activities. 
They have served us far longer than our higher-order thought processes and can lead us to 
normative decision-making (see Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006) even 
though there are boundary conditions (see Payne, Samper, Bettman, & Luce, 2008).  
Certainly, these automatic processes can, at times, be dysfunctional. “Action slips,” or 
complex behaviors we engage in without intending to, are examples of dysfunction, as they 
do not save us time (Bargh, 1989). There are times when our automatic processes are 
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maladaptive and aren’t beneficial. For example, Spencer et al. (1998) put participants under 
cognitive load and demonstrated that those who were given negative feedback (to lessen their 
self-esteem) showed stereotyping against a member of a stereotyped group even under 
conditions where stereotyping doesn’t occur. However efficient, automatic stereotypes are 
maladaptive in modern society; stereotyping is not reflective of the situation at hand, but 
merely of previous memory structures (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
Blair et al. (2001) defined implicit stereotypes as social category associations that 
become active via category cues. And in keeping with Bargh’s (1989) explication of 
automatic processes, it is key that implicit stereotype activation occurs outside of the 
individual’s awareness. Researchers who are assessing social judgments made about targets 
based on the trigger of related constructs in an individual’s memory network make great 
effort to avoid events that would allow an individual to possibly correct for the judgment 
effect. They have utilized priming procedures…  
…which cause the activation of various complex knowledge structures — for 
example, representations of social groups, significant individuals in our life, 
stereotypes and role concepts, stock situations — in a passive, unobtrusive manner, 
with the researchers then assessing the covert influence of these activated 
representations (Bargh, 2007, p. 4).  
 
These priming procedures have allowed automaticity researchers to pinpoint 
accessible traits or concepts that produce effects in a controlled fashion (e.g. Devine, 1989, 
experiment 2), without having to rely on self-reported data in which individuals may be less 
honest in sharing their prejudicial views. In their efforts to pinpoint mechanisms of 
subsequent attitudes and actions, many researchers have focused on the “four horsemen” of 
automaticity: awareness, intent, efficiency and control (Bargh, 1994). 
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Awareness 
Awareness implies consciousness, and automaticity researchers want to “tap into” the 
unconscious. The methods used to assess automatic stereotype activation (and other 
automatic processes) have certainly improved since the experimenters of the “New Look 1” 
era who often contaminated assessment of unconscious processes with conscious ones 
(Bargh, 1989). Current automaticity researchers have taken great care in activating trait 
concepts, stereotypes, and goals outside of participants’ awareness. They often use 
supraliminal tactics such as “scrambled” sentences, word searches, and other “language” 
tests in order to semantically trigger a concept. They also utilize subliminal methods that 
flash these semantic primes (as well as images) very briefly in either a participant’s foveal or 
parafoveal view. This process is often described to participants as a “diligence task” where 
they are to assess where different “flashes” occur on the computer screen by pressing a key 
on the keyboard. In addition, researchers often employ “funneled debriefing” methods at the 
ends of experiments to probe for any awareness of the true nature of the experiment (Bargh 
& Chartrand, 1999, 2000).  
Devine (1989) really set the standard for research on automatic stereotype activation. 
She divided automatic stereotypes into two processes, stereotype activation and stereotype 
application. In her three experiments she was able to activate African-American stereotypes 
in low- and high-prejudice individuals (as assessed through the Modern Racism Scale). In the 
first experiment, Devine had participants list slang terms for African-Americans. From this 
exercise, she was able to assess that both low- and high-prejudice individuals were aware of 
African-American stereotypes. In her second experiment, the now-primed participants 
evaluated an individual of ambiguous race. From that experiment, Devine was able to 
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demonstrate that both low- and high-prejudice individuals could be influenced to judge a 
target individual more harshly, as a reflection of the hostility element of the African-
American stereotype. She also showed that this was done outside of their awareness.  
 
Intent 
Intent implies that a behavior or action was planned. Devine’s (1989) experiments 
certainly illustrate that participants (particularly low-prejudice individuals) don’t intend to 
stereotype others. Chen and Bargh’s (1997) “Password” study primed the hostility concept of 
the African-American stereotype and had participants play the game with a confederate. 
When the confederate wasn’t performing well, the participants in the hostility-prime 
condition expressed more hostility than did neutrally-primed participants. As they were not 
aware of the true nature of the experiment, it wasn’t their intent to act with hostility. 
However, their hostile behavior illustrated a “self-fulfilling prophecy,” whereby encountered 
hostility tends to be countered with further hostility (Chen & Bargh, 1997, p. 542). As these 
researchers have illustrated, these behaviors can happen without the intention of the parties 
involved. 
 
Efficiency 
Evidence gathered by automaticity researchers indicates that automatic behaviors are 
quite efficient — in other words, resourceful and proficient. Zajonc (1980) points out that our 
automatic behaviors have evolved through millennia, and that in addition to being quick, they 
are adaptive and useful. Lower-order animals have the ability to quickly assess whether to 
approach or avoid dangerous situations. In much the same basic way, humans have adapted 
an automatic avoidance or shunning response to mental illness. Automaticity researchers 
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have assessed this automatic approach-avoid behavior in people with the use of a lever in a 
lab setting. Participants react to positively valenced words more quickly when they are asked 
to pull the lever toward them and react to negatively valenced words more quickly when they 
are asked to push the lever away (Chen & Bargh, 1999). 
 
Control 
Not only does control imply awareness, which is not necessary to activate 
stereotypes, it implies the notion of power over a situation. This is also the concept of most 
concern to legal practitioners, since if it were proven that individuals don’t have control over 
their stereotyping behavior, there could be extreme legal ramifications. Loftus and Klinger 
(1992) addressed this issue by asking the question, “Is the unconscious smart or dumb?” 
They described a case in which a musical band was sued by the parents of two teenagers who 
claimed that subliminal messages in a particular song drove the teens to suicide. The judge in 
that case ruled against that notion; for the most part, the legal system tends to be more 
aligned with the causal self theory (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), whereby our executive 
processes are in charge of our behavior (Loftus & Klinger, 1992).  
In her final experiment, Devine (1989) illustrated that low-prejudice individuals could 
then suppress activated stereotypes and offer more positive assessments of African-
Americans. This result demonstrated the possibility that outward expressions of implicit 
stereotypes can be controlled (at least when one is aware of the stereotype). However, in 
Bargh, Chen, and Burrows’ (1996) series of three experiments, the researchers showed that 
behaviors were beyond the individuals’ control. In the first experiment, they primed 
“rudeness,” and participants in the primed condition were more likely than their neutral 
counterparts to interrupt the experimenter. In the second experiment, they primed the 
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“elderly” stereotype; afterwards, they found that those in the primed condition walked more 
slowly down the hall once the experiment was seemingly over. Finally, in their third 
experiment, Bargh et al. (1996) primed the African-American stereotype and noted that those 
participants in the primed condition behaved with greater hostility toward a request made by 
the experimenter. In funneled debriefing, the participants in these three experiments were not 
only unaware of the primes, but didn’t even realize they were behaving in the described 
fashion. 
Research by Dasgupta & Greenwald (2001), Blair et al. (2001), and Wittenbrink et al. 
(2001), among others, have claimed effects in reducing implicit prejudice and stereotypes; 
however, as Devine (2001) points out, the theoretical explanation for their results is still “up 
for grabs,” so to speak (p. 759). Wittenbrink et al. (2001) primed participants with pictures of 
positive and negative African-American stereotypes (e.g. a picture of a street corner in a bad 
neighborhood, a picture of a family barbecue) and were able to show a lessening of implicit 
negative stereotypes in the positive condition. In addition, Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) 
primed participants with pictures of both admired and disliked African-American and White 
individuals. Those in the admired African-American, disliked White condition demonstrated 
lowered implicit African-American stereotypes. Stereotypes are often maladaptive in modern 
society; fortunately, there is now proof that they can be moderated or even suppressed (see 
Devine, 1989, experiment 3). In addition, current research has demonstrated that when those 
low in prejudice were primed with the African-American stereotype, they specifically sought 
out articles that portrayed African-Americans in a positive light –this is an example of a 
negative automatic process yielding a positive result (Petty et al., 2009).  
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Bargh (1999) likens controlling stereotypes to breaking bad habits and has reviewed 
some of the research being done to moderate stereotype activation. For example, Blair et al. 
(1991) attempted on moderating stereotype activation by having participants use counter-
stereotypical mental imagery. Bargh (1999) critiqued this paper (among others) and argued 
that Blair et al.’s findings actually provided support for the inevitability of automatic 
stereotypes. Although Bargh critiqued Blair et al.’s effort, however, he does indicate that he 
sees the value in continuing this line of research. He stated that automaticity researchers have 
come to childhood’s end as evidenced by the successful activation of trait constructs, 
behaviors, and goals, and that future research needs to tackle the problems of how the same 
prime can activate two separate responses and which one wins in a given situation. He points 
to the need to study how primes play out serially and in real time (Bargh, 2006). While Bargh 
(2006) argues that little can be done to control stereotypes on an implicit level, previous 
research has shown that they are controllable on the explicit level (Devine, 1989) — and it 
certainly behooves individuals to control them in order to better acclimate to social 
situations. Automaticity researchers have successfully demonstrated the influence that one’s 
memory structures have on the formation of stereotypes against particular groups. At the 
heart of the effort to control the influence of stereotypes is the recognition of antecedents to 
these stereotypic memory structures, such as the media, and with this recognition comes the 
ability to break these memory structures — an effort rather like unto breaking a bad habit.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
MEDIA PRIMING AND EXEMPLIFICATION 
 
The Influence of Knowledge Accessibility in Social Cognition and Social Judgment 
 
Both media priming and exemplification effects rely on the accessible knowledge 
structures of the audience. There are two bodies of literature investigating the effects of 
accessible knowledge or memory structures on perceptions of one’s social world: social 
cognition research and social judgment research. As Stapel and Koomen (2001) point out: 
… social cognition researchers often conclude that the standard knowledge 
accessibility effect is assimilation, whereas social judgment researchers often concur 
that the most natural effect of contextually activated information is contrast. (p. 230) 
 
The mechanism by which assimilation or contrast effects occur “is essentially the 
same in nature” (Herr, 1986, p. 1107). It is in part a function of the number of common 
characteristics between the attributes of the primed category and the target to be evaluated. 
Simply put, social cognition researchers argue that, when primed with an accessible trait 
concept or category, most individuals will transfer that trait concept or category to an 
ambiguous target character and will ascribe such attributes to that character, as well (see 
Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979). On the other hand, social judgment 
researchers argue that accessible knowledge structures more likely lead to a contextual 
comparison of a trait concept or category to the target character. If that trait concept or 
category is extreme enough, a contrast effect occurs, resulting in impressions shifting away 
from the activated knowledge and a judgment of the target character that is opposite the 
primed trait or category (e.g., assumed intelligence of professors and supermodels versus 
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exemplars of a professor and a supermodel, see Dijksterhuis, A., Spears, R., Postmes, T., 
Stapel, D.A., Koomen, W., Knippenberg, A., Scheepers, D., 1998). But as Herr (1986) points 
out, assimilation effects are most likely to occur in cases where moderate categories are 
primed and ambiguous targets are judged. On the other hand, contrast effects are more likely 
occur when extreme categories are primed, and it wasn’t until the early 1980s that 
researchers began manipulating extremity (see Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). Priming 
studies prior to this time often used stimuli such as sentence-completion tasks (see Srull & 
Wyer, 1978, 1979), where manipulation of extreme social categories might have been 
difficult (Herr, 1986). 
But how does one determine whether an assimilation or contrast effect occurs beyond 
attempting to control for the extremity of the exemplar of a particular construct in priming 
either effect? In pointing out the plethora of individual differences that can influence how 
people form impressions, Stapel and Koomen (2001) stated that: 
… Accessible cognitive structures such as trait concepts (adventurous, friendly), 
social categories (professors, introverts), scripts (going to a restaurant, getting a 
Ph.D.), procedures (solving problems, considering alternatives), goals (I want to 
become rich), specific event memories (an accident in Chicago, a trip through the 
southwest), specific person exemplars (Richard Nixon, Marilyn Monroe), specific 
object exemplars (a tennis ball, an apple), expectancies (Gordon is a nice guy), 
attitudes (I like Ike), stereotypes (women are from Venus, men are from Mars), and 
actual (I am achievement oriented) and desired (if only I could be like Serena) self-
states may all be applied when forming an impression or constructing a judgment of a 
target stimulus. In other words, accessibility is an important theoretical construct in 
many of social psychology’s subdomains (for reviews, see Eiser, 1990; Higgins, 
1989c; 1996; Schwarz & Bless, 1992a; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1991; Stapel, 1997; 
Strack, 1992a; Wyer & Srull, 1989). (p. 230) 
 
Most importantly, Stapel and Koomen (2001) ask: “What role do these accessible knowledge 
structures play in the perception of our social worlds?” (p. 230). Social cognition researchers 
and social judgment researchers have long investigated this question by two different 
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approaches: accessible knowledge either leads to a natural tendency toward assimilation or a 
natural tendency toward contextual comparison. Martin, Crelia, and Seta (1990) have argued 
that assimilation is the most natural effect because its process involves fewer cognitive steps, 
while that of contrast involves more steps. Assimilation effects have been found in classic 
trait priming experiments where adventurous or reckless traits (Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 
1977) and friendly or hostile traits (Srull & Wyer, 1979) were transferred to an ambiguous 
“Donald” character. Assimilation effects have also been found in priming stereotypes (Kunda 
& Thagard, 1996; Sagar & Schofield, 1980), but only within boundary conditions. For 
example, accessible and pertinent stereotype knowledge is used in the evaluation of a target 
only if the social category of the target is congruent with the activated stereotype (e.g. 
dependence in women or aggression in men, see Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993). In 
addition, a stereotype must be activated prior to participants’ encoding of information about a 
target’s behaviors in order for assimilation effects to occur (Park & Hastie, 1987). 
On the social judgment side, Eiser (1990) argued that no judgment is ever made 
without some comparison, either implicit or explicit. Pointing to the Sherif and Hovland 
(1953) model, Eiser (1990) has stated that for those who hold strong attitudes, said attitudes 
likely serve as an extreme standard with which new, relevant information is contrasted. 
Support for the influence of strong attitudes in fostering contrast effects is apparent, for 
example, in the results of a study about pro-Israeli versus pro-Arab views of the 1984 Beirut 
Massacre, where partisan groups from each side both thought that identical samples of news 
coverage were biased against their respective sides (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985).  
Two classic studies point to the perceived extremity of activated information as the 
main factor in the explanation of knowledge accessibility effects beyond the attitudes held by 
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individual participants (Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Herr’s (1986) Ghandi/Robin Hood 
exemplar study found that assimilation is more likely to occur when the primed exemplars 
are moderate. Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) concurred with this result. They found that subjects 
primed with the “professor” stereotype performed better on a knowledge task than did those 
primed with the “supermodel” stereotype. Interestingly, however, the researchers also found 
contrast effects when participants were primed with extreme exemplars of professors and 
supermodels: participants primed with Albert Einstein performed poorly on the knowledge 
task, while those primed with Claudia Schiffer (a supermodel from the 1980s) performed 
well. In their final experiment, Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) found both assimilation and contrast 
effects for intelligence traits when self-referent words (I, me, my) were primed in 
conjunction with the Einstein exemplar. The Einstein prime, therefore, when coupled with a 
self-referent prime led to the activation of both the “intelligent” category and the “stupid” 
category being activated. More specifically, the respondents in this condition “tapped into” 
the intelligent concept via the professor stereotype as well as the unintelligent concept via 
self-comparison with the Einstein exemplar. 
 
Media Priming of Stereotypes 
How does an exemplar, or an example in the form of a photograph, pull-quote, 
headline, or some other illustrative or narrative element used to enhance a news story, work 
as a prime? How does such a thing “prime” — or activate — an individual’s attitudes, 
thereby affecting subsequent judgments or evaluations, much in the manner that priming a 
well affects subsequent water flow (Roskos-Ewoldson et al., 2009)? Fiske and Taylor (1984) 
define cognitive priming as the use of prior knowledge or long-term memory to process new 
stimuli. In that context, a person who has been previously exposed to related information 
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automatically uses prior knowledge to evaluate new information. The study of media priming 
endeavors to explain the power of suggestion posed by particular stimuli and is rooted in top-
of-mind accessibility, or the individual activation of concepts and the manner in which those 
concepts can influence judgments on an individual level (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Klinger, & 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2007; Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Dillman Carpentier, 
2009). According to Olson and Fazio (2009), “it is with [the] basic cognitive phenomena of 
attention, perception, and categorization that a relatively spontaneous attitude-behavior 
process begins” (p. 21). Indeed, journalists have long used exemplars to attract the attention 
of an audience, to draw readers into stories, and to maintain their sense of involvement in the 
stories. Journalists know that their stories are competing with myriad of other stimuli, and 
that exemplars are powerful allies in winning the viewership of their audiences (Zillmann & 
Brosius, 2000). Unfortunately, exemplars can also be used to misdirect the audience’s 
perceptions of various phenomena (Aust and Zillmann, 1996; Zillmann and Gan, 1996; 
Gibson and Zillmann, 1994) and to perpetuate stereotypes (Holman & Dillman Carpentier, 
2009) — all without the audience being aware of this exemplification effect. In the realm of 
health, the literature on stereotype priming includes several studies indicating that 
commercials can prime stereotypes (Roskos-Ewoldson et al., 2009). Indeed, Pechmann and 
Ratneshwar (1994) used magazines to deliver anti-smoking messages that utilized the 
negative stereotypes of smokers (e.g., that they smell bad) to elicit a judgment effect directed 
at a target character who either smoked or did not smoke. Pre-exposure to the anti-smoking 
messages using these negative stereotypes resulted in a harsher judgment effect toward the 
target. 
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While media priming researchers have been successful in employing a variety of 
media such as advertisements (Pechmann and Ratneshwar, 1994), newsletters (Power, 
Murphy, & Coover, 1996), and music videos (Hansen & Hansen) to prime various 
stereotypes, none have focused on behavioral manifestations in the way that social cognitive 
researchers have. As Roskos-Ewoldsen et al.’s (2009) updated overview of media priming 
literature pointed out, however, Pechmann and Ratneshwar (1994) did suggest that their 
priming manipulation actually affected the participants’ intentions to smoke or to refrain 
from smoking. 
By contextualizing the media prime within exemplification theory, the present study 
contributes results beyond simply triggering a judgment effect based on a mental illness 
stereotype. This study has investigated the downstream effects on participants’ perceptions of 
risk as well as on their behavioral intentions. 
 
Exemplification Theory 
Exemplification theory is a mass communication theory in the sense that scholars in 
this stream of research have investigated how the exemplification effect — or the mistaken 
assumptions that media consumers may harbor about an issue — can be traced to the mass 
media (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). Exemplars are utilized in all forms of communication, 
including the news media (Sharkey, 1993), political advertising (Johnson-Cartee & 
Copeland, 1991), and fiction (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). Exemplification theorists (e.g., 
Brosius, 2003; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000) have pointed out that the theory shares certain 
notions with cultivation theory in that fictional exemplars of victims of violence in television 
entertainment shows may be cultivating a more violent view of the world in the television 
  32 
audience. Exemplars are often used because they have the ability to make abstract concepts 
more understandable; however, therein lies a problem: 
Exemplars of typical murderers, typical sports fans, typical neurotics, typical Type A 
persons, typical feminists, and so forth, are likely to be rather nontypical in that they 
tend to be drawn from among the more extreme and memorable cases rather than 
from among the most frequently occurring ones. (Zillmann, 1999 p. 87) 
 
As Brosius (2003) pointed out, journalists tend to select exemplars that support their 
arguments. This tendency was demonstrated in an extensive content analyses carried out by 
Gibson, Hoffman, and Seigler (1994) in the United States and by Daschmann and Brosius 
(1997) in Germany. These content analyses revealed that media feature significantly more 
pro-exemplars, or exemplars illustrating the controversy at hand, than counter-exemplars. For 
example, 96% of the 3,425 German exemplars were classified as claim-confirmatory, as 
opposed to claim-contradictory or ambiguous. This 96:4 ratio confirms the one-sidedness of 
issue exemplification in German television news magazine shows (Daschmann & Brosius, 
1997).  
While it has already been established that media exemplars can take the form of 
structural elements of a news story (i.e., headlines, pull-quotes, or photographs), an exemplar 
of a larger issue can also be represented by a single event (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). 
Daschmann and Brosius (1999) also asked the question, “can a single event create an issue?” 
Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009) and Holman (2009) argue that it can, particularly for 
the issue of postpartum depression and the manner in which it has been tied to the Andrea 
Yates case and to the images of this catatonic woman who killed her children. Guided by the 
findings of prior priming studies utilizing human exemplars (Herr, 1986; Dijksterhuis et al., 
1998) to achieve both assimilation and contrast effects, the present study hypothesizes that 
both outcomes are possible; however, considering the assimilation findings of Holman and 
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Dillman Carpentier (2009) regarding this same topic, it seems likely that this study will 
produce similar results. This assimilation outcome is key in exemplification studies where 
risk perception comes into play.  
After all, Gibson and Zillmann (2000) have already demonstrated that threatening 
images, or extreme exemplars, result in increased perceptions of risk that study participants 
hold for a target group. In their experiment, the researchers manipulated the images 
accompanying a story about a fictitious disease carried by ticks that had infected children. 
The story did not indicate the race of those at risk. The four conditions included: (1) a control 
condition (a story with no images), (2) a condition that juxtaposed the story with images of 
threatening-looking ticks and three pictures of black children, (3) a condition that juxtaposed 
the story with pictures of ticks and three pictures of white children, and (4) a condition that 
juxtaposed the story with pictures of ticks and two pictures of white children and one picture 
of a black child. The researchers found that in the conditions that featured only white or 
black children, participants showed increased perceptions of risk for that group.  
As for the issue of postpartum depression, Barnett (2005, 2006) and Holman (2009) 
argue that news exemplars are perpetuating mental illness stereotypes and cultivating a more 
negative view of those who suffer from such disorders. Indeed, Barnett (2005, 2006) pointed 
out in her content analyses of women who have committed infanticide and filicide that many 
of the exemplars used by journalists were framed as violations of maternal myths, such as the 
ideal of the perfect mother. In addition, Holman’s (2009) content analysis of 11 years of 
newspaper and magazine coverage of postpartum disorders points to the media’s consistent 
misrepresentation of postpartum psychosis as the milder disorder of postpartum depression as 
a clear example of how the media have misled audiences about this issue. As there is 
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evidence that the media often cover the most extreme examples of postpartum disorders, this 
likely leads media audiences to associate that concept with negativity (Holman & Dillman 
Carpentier, 2009). As such, and in classic connectionist fashion, future exposure to a 
manifestation, or exemplar, of postpartum disorders might automatically lead to a negative 
evaluation of a target that is associated with that stereotyped group. 
In order to test an exemplar’s ability to prime prejudice against those suffering from 
postpartum depression, Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009) manipulated the intensity of 
the supraliminal prime an exemplar can provide as well as how closely each exemplar 
embodied a given mental health/illness concept (e.g., Andrea Yates exemplified the maternal 
mental illness concept). As such, the exemplars — examples of mental illness, in the case of 
this experiment — tapped into the postconscious process of automaticity (Bargh, 1989). In 
the first part of the experiment, participants were told that they would be watching online 
slideshows about individuals who committed crimes. Then, by working on a sudoku puzzle, 
their short-term memory was cleared. In the second, seemingly separate, part of the 
experiment, the participants were asked to watch a health communication video about 
postpartum depression and to evaluate the woman in the video who had suffered from the 
disorder.  
Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009) utilized online slideshows, which also 
“tapped into” the vividness element that many exemplars possess, to serve as a vehicle for 
the study’s exemplars. The first of these featured a slideshow about Andrea Yates —the 
Houston woman who drowned her five children in a bathtub in 2001 — and served as a high 
intensity prime in that this mentally ill woman killed five children here in the United States. 
The medium intensity prime featured a mentally ill Australian man who raped and murdered 
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his daughter. Since the participants in this experiment were American students, this prime 
was less intense than the Yates case because it occurred outside of the United States and 
involved the death of only one person. The researchers reasoned that a mother killing her 
young children would be more disturbing to the study’s participants than would a man killing 
his daughter. Finally, the low intensity condition involved a carjacking in which nobody was 
killed. The medium and high conditions triggered the mental health/illness concept, with the 
high condition making the issue of postpartum disorders more salient to participants, who 
were then asked to evaluate a target in a subsequent health communication video about 
postpartum depression. These researchers also included a condition featuring a simple 
semantic prime that directly tapped into the mental health/illness concept. This stimulus 
resulted in the strongest affective response to the target character, suggesting that individuals 
most likely have automatic stereotypes against those who have suffered from mental illness. 
However, Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009) also found that the Andrea Yates exemplar 
served as the strongest prime for participants’ negative overall evaluations of the target 
character’s well-being. This finding suggests that perhaps the Andrea Yates exemplar tapped 
into participants’ schema as drawn from past media coverage of the case, which, in turn, 
activated their judgments on the related issue of postpartum depression. 
 
The Exemplification Effect 
Dual-processing theories such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981), the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980), and the MODE model 
(Fazio, 1990) indicate that people process persuasive information in two different ways: they 
can either deliberate over it or they can rely on heuristics (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). 
Exemplification theory is built upon this notion of heuristic processing.  
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Dolf Zillmann developed exemplification theory in order to explain how traditional 
news practices and procedures could be misleading audiences (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000; 
Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Cantor, 2003). According to Zillmann, individuals base their 
judgments about an issue on samplings of occurrences and that exemplars in news reports 
provide cognitive shortcuts that individuals use to group information into easy-to-process 
pieces (Zillmann, 2006). Researchers have looked to exemplification theory in order to 
understand how audiences select and retain information in terms of risk perception (Aust & 
Zillmann, 1996; Gibson & Zillmann, 1994) and health risk perception (Zillmann, 2006). 
Slovic et al. (2004) pointed out that according to modern theories in cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience, people develop understanding of risk in two ways — in an analytic, logical 
way, or in experiential, intuitive way. These can be differentiated by risk as feelings, or 
intuitive reactions to danger, and risk as analysis, or the reasonable reactions to threats 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Ultimately, exemplification theory predicts that when you have an 
exemplar, it is easier for people to react emotionally to, encode, and then process the 
information linked to that exemplar. Therefore, such information is often easier to remember 
than mere base-rate data (Zillmann, 1999) — like that women have only a one in 1,000 
chance of suffering from postpartum psychosis. In summary, exemplars exhibit a 
disproportional influence on risk and safety assessments. In using this influential power for 
good, however, journalists can harness exemplars to draw attention to important health issues 
and create a greater readiness for protective and corrective action in media audiences 
(Zillmann, 2006). 
Previous studies, however, have not found such noble use of exemplars in the 
spreading health information. In Barnett’s analysis of 52 articles about Andrea Yates 
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published in the Houston Chronicle and Newsweek between June 2001, the month the 
murders occurred, and March 2002, the month of Yates’ first sentencing, the researcher 
found little coverage of postpartum illness (Barnett, 2005). While many of the seven articles 
in Newsweek allowed that Andrea Yates suffered from some sort of mental illness, the 
Chronicle’s 45 articles all portrayed a woman who was using a postpartum disorder to cover 
up her own immorality. Only one article in that local newspaper of record looked into the issue 
of depression. However, the reporter underestimated the impact of postpartum disorders by 
characterizing Yates’ illness as postpartum depression instead of the more devastating 
postpartum psychosis. Barnett concluded that journalists might approach stories of infanticide 
“from the angle of what medical experts know and do not know, how families can recognize 
warning signs that may indicate violence, and where families can turn for help, if such places 
exist” (Barnett, 2005, p. 23). However, in a textual and content analysis of 250 national news 
stories published over a 12-year period that covered Andrea Yates and nine other cases of 
infanticide and filicide, Barnett found that journalists often relied on police officers to supply the 
facts of the case and relied on attorneys, relatives, and neighbors to explain the women’s actions. 
Journalists often failed to seek out medical experts to explain why these mothers killed their 
children (Barnett, 2006). 
Martinez et al.’s (2000) content analysis of 19 years of magazine coverage of 
postpartum disorders spanning from 1980 to 1998 consisted of two studies; the first assessed 
nineteen articles about postpartum depression and the second examined eight articles about 
“the baby blues.” The articles in both studies were analyzed for their attention to etiologies 
— origins of the disorders — as well as to symptoms, treatments, resources, and 
demographic assumptions about the audience. The findings in both studies indicate a strong 
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bias toward the use of the medical model (Dalton, 1980; Stowe & Nemeroff, 1995; Johnston-
Robledo, 2000) in explaining these disorders, as opposed to the stress and coping (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1980; Stern & Kruckman, 1983) or feminist models (Martinez et al., 2000). 
In Barnett’s (2006) textual analysis of media coverage of the Andrea Yates’ arrest 
and murder trial,2 as well as in her later analysis of media coverage of women who have 
committed infanticide, she describes how journalists perpetuate the myth of the “perfect 
mother” through their biased use of narrative. She found that most of the analyzed stories 
utilized at least one of four particular narratives: (1) the “perfect/imperfect mother” narrative, 
or stories that position the woman who committed infanticide as insane or evil; (2) the “good 
mother” narrative, or stories of women who claimed to have loved their children but who 
admitted to harming them; (3) the “accountable mother” narrative, or stories that illustrate the 
fact that women are held to higher standards of parenting than are fathers, and which position 
men and the community at large as victims; and (4) the “wounded community” narrative, or 
stories that portray the community as the victim of a deceitful mother (Barnett, 2003, 2006). 
According to Barnett, “narratives help us construct the irrational as rational, the illogical as 
sensible, and the tumultuous as safe. They provide a way for us to establish cause and effect 
and explain to ourselves and others the reasons why events transpired at they did” (Barnett, 
2005, p. 13).  
More important here, narration aggregates events that exhibit sufficient phenomenal 
similarity to warrant their being classified as manifestations of the same kind. Such 
grouping implies that each and every grouped event, to the extent that it shares all 
essential attributes with the remaining grouped events, is capable of representing the 
group at large – meaning that it is capable of providing reliable information about all 
other events in this group and thus about the group itself. It is this capacity of 
individual events that defines them as exemplars of an event group.” (Zillmann and 
Brosius, p. 3)  
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Journalistic norms perpetuate the use of both narratives and exemplars to support 
those narratives (Barnett, 2005, 2006). These conventions provide an easier route to 
compelling reporting. However, in terms of medical reporting, the use of exemplars may not 
be serving the public in a constructive way (Zillmann, 2006).  
The first exemplification studies were published in the early 1990s; among them was 
Zillmann, Perkins, and Sundar’s (1992) study on the use of exemplars in magazine reports on 
dieting. The researchers manipulated how closely the exemplars, or examples of people who 
did or did not regain weight after dieting, matched the base-rate data presented in the stories. 
They employed three conditions: (1) a condition that included interviews with those who had 
regained weight; (2) a condition that included two interviews with people who had not 
regained weight and one interview with a person who had regained weight — this 
presentation was representative of the base-rate information in the story; and (3) a condition 
that presented an even mix of those who had regained weight and those who had not. The last 
condition reflects the journalistic practice of presenting both sides of a story. The researchers 
found that those participants in the condition presenting examples only of those who had 
regained weight did in fact overestimate the percentage of people who typically regain 
weight after dieting (even though they were given the base-rate data in the story). No sleeper 
effect was detected in the delay conditions’ result — an effect which later exemplification 
studies were successful in achieving. The authors’ stated that the likely reason why they 
found no sleeper effect was that participants most likely returned to their prior notions of 
weight loss phenomena. 
Exemplification researchers have not only looked at how the distribution of 
exemplars in relation to base-rate data influence the impressions and evaluations of issues, 
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they have also looked at the effect of the intensity of the exemplars. This line of inquiry taps 
into the affective heuristic and how people are drawn to and remember emotionally evocative 
information more than pallid information (Zillmann, 2000). Gibson and Zillmann (1994) 
tested the intensity and precision of exemplars in an article that resulted from Gibson’s 
dissertation research. Like many of the exemplification studies, the experimental conditions 
incorporated a story that was manipulated in various ways and was then embedded with other 
news stories to disguise the nature of the experiment. This supraliminal manipulation is key 
to exemplification research — for it is important that the effect occur outside of the 
participant’s awareness. It is important for exemplification researchers to rule out demand 
effects in their experiments in order to give these studies external validity and prove that 
these are true media effects. Gibson and Zillmann (1994) sought to measure the impact that 
manipulating exemplars in reports about a relatively novel issue, carjacking, had on 
participants in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. They manipulated precision of the base-rate data with 
four specific percentages of the risk of bodily injury and death as opposed to imprecise base-
rate data (i.e. Most escape with no injury, some get injured, a few get seriously injured, it’s 
rare to get killed in a carjacking). Then they manipulated the intensity of the exemplars in 
four conditions ranging from exemplars with no injuries to exemplars of those who were 
killed. Participants in the extreme-exemplar conditions overestimated the frequency that 
carjackings result in serious injury or death. These researchers did find a sleeper effect in this 
study, where the impressions of risk to themselves and others increased after a delay. This 
simply means that these researchers still witnessed an exemplification effect, even after a 
time delay. Some researchers have found exemplification effects even after a 10-day delay 
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(Zillmann, Gibson, & Sargent, 1999). Indeed, Daschmann (2001) concurs that 
exemplification effects are stable over time. 
Aust and Zillmann’s (1996) study of the portrayal of two experimental conditions — 
one was a story about salmonella in fast-food restaurants and the other was about gun 
violence — looked at the differences in the exemplification of victims on TV newscasts. Like 
in all exemplification studies, there was a control condition without any interviews of victims 
and relatives. Then there was a condition that had victims and relatives recount their stories 
calmly. Finally, the third condition had victims and relatives recount their stories with a lot of 
emotion. The extreme condition resulted an increase in participants’ assessments of risk to 
their safety. 
Zillmann and Gan’s (1996) study on skin cancer exemplars investigated the impact 
that intense exemplars in the form of threatening images can have on perceptions of health 
risks garnered from TV news reports. They presented a news report embedded in other 
reports that presented a story about the risks of sun exposure. The story included base-rate 
data about the risk. The first experimental condition included an image of a sunburned 
shoulder with a small melanoma, while the other condition exposed participants to images of 
someone with a large melanoma, as well as a surgical procedure removing a cancerous 
growth. They, too, found that participants overestimated personal risks of skin cancer as well 
as the risk to the public. This study also included delay conditions and found a sleeper effect 
for those in the extreme condition.  
Daschmann’s (2001) extensive series of nine experiments on more than 1,300 
participants have shown that extreme exemplars have more of an impact than pallid ones, 
with the more extreme selectiveness of the exemplars corresponding with more extreme 
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judgments. In addition, he found that exemplification effects are independent of prior 
opinions and involvement of participants. Researchers have also shown that the distribution 
of exemplars affect how issues are perceived (Brosius, 1999), and have also shown how little 
the base-rate data has an impact on subsequent judgments (Daschmann, 2001; Gibson & 
Zillmann, 1994). The content analyses by U.S. and German researchers have also shown how 
prevalent exemplars are in news reports (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). In addition, findings of 
these extensive content analyses show that most exemplars support the controversy being 
reported (despite its possible misrepresentation of base-rate data).  
Indeed, Holman’s (2009) content analysis of 11 years of media coverage of 
postpartum disorders found that exemplars overall were decidedly negative (58.4%) with 
70.9% of newspapers and 33.8% of magazines presenting negative exemplars. This study’s 
first hypothesis predicted that in their coverage of postpartum disorders, journalists would 
use exemplars of women who have committed violence against their children significantly 
more than exemplars of women who are simply suffering from a disorder. Out of the 202 
magazine and newspaper articles about postpartum disorders, 50.5% of the articles featured a 
story about a mother who killed her children or husband (one case), 3% featured stories about 
suicide, 12.9% featured a story about a celebrity who either suffered from postpartum 
depression or commented on the disease, 13.3% featured stories about regular mothers who 
suffered from postpartum disorders, 15.8% of the stories did not use an exemplar, and 4.5% 
featured some other commentator.  
Chi-square analysis supported this hypothesis, even when the file was split to compare stories 
before the Andrea Yates case and those written after the June 20, 2001 murders. Of the 37 
stories about postpartum disorders before Andrea Yates murdered her children, 22 featured 
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women who killed and only 3 were stories about regular mothers who suffered from a 
postnatal disorder, and 7 were stories general stories about postpartum disorders (χ2 = 
52.351, p < .001). Of the 165 stories about postpartum disorders written after Yates drown 
her five children, 80 were stories about women who had committed violence against their 
children or husband, 24 were about regular mothers, and 25 were general stories about 
postpartum disorders (χ2 = 173.164, p < .001). This is despite statistics that say only 4% of 
the .01% of new mothers who suffer from postpartum psychosis actually go on to commit 
infanticide (Parry, 1995). 
Holman (2009) argues that the case of Andrea Yates served as a focusing event, 
where many were introduced to the issue of postpartum disorders for the first time. 
Unfortunately, many reports misrepresented this story as a case of the much more common 
postpartum depression, and as such, this case has served as an exemplar of that particular 
postpartum disorder. Unfortunately, it appears that those who fear they are suffering from 
postpartum depression could be associating their perceptions of risk to the outcome of the 
Andrea Yates’ case. Perhaps the media portrayals of mental illness (and not just this issue), 
along with individuals’ automatic stereotypes against mental illness, are contributing to the 
fear that new mothers have in seeking treatment for a very treatable, but serious condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING AND AVOIDANCE 
Dual-process theories have been devised to explain how individuals attend to, 
evaluate, and then react to incoming information. Theories have been devised to explain 
person perception (Brewer & Srull, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), attibutional inference 
(Trope & Gaunt, 1999), attitude access (Fazio et al., 1986), and persuasion (Chaiken, 1980, 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). Some have given more weight to the two processes working 
together simultaneously (Chaiken, 1980) while others posit that they occur separately (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1981). Petty, Brinol, & Priester (2009) have stated that the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model best explains attitude change that is influenced by the mass media.   
In addition to testing the notion that a particular media exemplar can prime prejudice 
of maternal mental illness, this study investigated how past experience with media portrayals 
of postpartum disorders may be influencing pregnant women’s downstream medical 
decision-making behavior. This study asked these pregnant participants to evaluate a health 
communication video seeking to persuade her to monitor herself for symptoms of postpartum 
depression and to speak to her doctor about it. Previous research has suggested that later in 
time, women are engaging in avoidance behavior instead (Whitton, Warner, & Appleby, 
1996). This is despite the notion that medical professionals (considered expert/attractive 
sources) may be telling them to do so, or that there are strong logical arguments supporting 
the fact that new mothers who are depressed need to seek medical intervention. The health 
communication video in the second part of this study features two strong arguments and one 
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expert source. The first argument simply shows the viewer how rare postpartum psychosis is 
when compared with “baby blues” and postpartum depression. The second argument is made 
on camera by an OB/GYN, a medical expert who explains that research has shown that 
infants of depressed mothers can experience developmental delays (Chewning, 2008). The 
video ends with a list of symptoms of postpartum depression and a statement that if the 
woman is experiencing any of these symptoms, that she should contact her doctor. This study 
sought to find out whether these pregnant women would counter a negative subliminal prime 
by processing two strong arguments — one being made by an expert source — in their 
subsequent evaluations of their own risk perception and likelihood of engaging in avoidance 
behavior. 
Deciding on one’s best course of treatment is a complex emotional experience for 
many individuals, where many important decisions come into play. For example, women 
who are diagnosed as depressed during pregnancy are burdened with weighing the benefits 
that medication will have on their own health against the risks2 for their unborn child (Siegel, 
2005). However, there are many downsides3 to a woman who chooses not to seek treatment 
during pregnancy, not only for the mother, but for the baby as well (Colino, 2002). For 
example, a study from Emory University in 2001 found that infants whose mothers had been 
depressed during pregnancy showed higher than normal levels of the hormone cortisol in 
their blood, which is an indicator of stress (Siegal, 2005). In addition, if the new mother is 
diagnosed with postpartum depression after giving birth, she may feel like she has to weigh 
choosing to continue to breastfeed against taking medication for her condition, even though 
there are medication options for some that allow the woman to continue to breastfeed 
(Chewning, 2008). Certainly, if they are actively involved in monitoring these women for 
  46 
depressive symptoms, medical professionals can help clarify these options and help new 
mothers negotiate the choices they have and persuade them to do what is best for themselves 
and their babies. However, this is not always the case. Busy obstetricians may be avoiding 
pressing the issue of treating prenatal and postpartum depression with their patients in an 
effort to keep their office on schedule (Chewning, 2008). Dr. Shaila Misri, a clinical 
professor of psychiatry and obstetrics and gynecology at the University of British Columbia 
in Vancouver concurs: “In an obstetrician’s or family practitioner’s office, most women 
don’t get more than 15 minutes for a prenatal checkup. Women are embarrassed to report 
these negative symptoms to their doctors — and often they don’t know why they’re having 
them. And the doctors don’t usually ask” (Colino, 2002, p. F1). 
 
Attractive Sources: Influence of Medical Professionals 
 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) was devised as a 
response to earlier cognitive response approaches to persuasion research that didn’t account 
for decision-makers who may be low in ability or low in the need for cognition. It is a model 
that sought to account for those who do not actively attend to or deliberate over persuasive 
messages. Instead of relying on the central, cognitive route, these individuals turn to the 
peripheral, more automatic, route to processing incoming messages. Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986b) realized that individuals cannot possibly think actively about every piece of 
information that they encounter. Instead, when they are cognitively overloaded or low in 
ability to process a message for some other reason, they rely on heuristics instead. Zajonc 
(1980) suggested that people operate under two systems, but that the affective (System 1) system 
is more important. ELM is a dual-process model that gives the cognitive (System 2) system more 
weight (Petty et al., 2009). 
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According to the ELM, attractive sources, such as a good-looking spokesperson or 
celebrity, serve as a heuristic for those who aren’t deliberating over the persuasive message, 
or rather, those taking the peripheral route to persuasion. However, in their book chapter on 
media effects, Petty et al. (2009) have noted that those who are low in the need for cognition 
and who find a source not to be trustworthy (e.g. The National Enquirer) then tend to 
elaborate more on the message, thus moving over to the central route to persuasion. 
Attractive sources may also include expert sources such as a medical professional. According 
to ELM, expert sources serve two purposes and are functional in both the central route and 
peripheral route to persuasion. They can provide a heuristic for those who are low in ability to 
process a persuasive message (i.e. experts must know what they are talking about, so I’ll follow 
their advice). Experts can also add weight or credibility to a strong argument for those who are 
involved in processing a persuasive message. 
 
Strong Logical Arguments: Possible Path for Persuasive Health Messages 
 
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, strong logical arguments serve to 
persuade those who are high in ability to take in a persuasive message and follow the central 
route to persuasion. In addition, ELM posits that people want to hold correct attitudes, so 
certainly when there are elements like trustworthy, expert testimony or strong statistical 
support in a persuasive argument, individuals have more confidence in the argument. Petty et 
al. (2009) argue that the changes in attitudes that result from those who deliberate over a 
message are more enduring and are less resistant to counter-arguments than those attitudes 
changed via the peripheral route. However, Zajonc (1980) asserts that thoughts enter feelings 
at various points of the affective process, and the reverse can be true of cognitions. Affective 
responses can come up at any time during registration, encoding, retrieval, or inference. One 
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of these responses can be one’s confidence in his or her thoughts toward the message. Petty, 
Brinol, and Tormala’s (2002) self-validation theory states that the relationship between an 
individual’s thoughts and attitudes should be greater when people have confidence in those 
thoughts (Petty et al., 2009). A strong logical argument — like the fact that a clinicians have 
found that untreated depression in mothers can cause slower development in their babies 
(Chewning, 2008) — may give new mothers the confidence to seek medical intervention if 
they already have positive attitudes toward the messages they are receiving from their health 
care providers. Petty et al. (2002) found that when thoughts are favorable toward a message, 
boosting confidence in their validity increased persuasion, but injecting doubt decreased 
persuasion. On the other hand, when individuals’ thoughts toward a message were unfavorable, 
increasing confidence resulted in decreased persuasion, while decreasing confidence in those 
thoughts increased persuasion.  
So, this research on cognitive responses suggests that generating positive or negative 
thoughts to a persuasive message is an important aspect in producing attitude change, but it’s 
not the only one. People need to have confidence in those thoughts if those thoughts are to 
have an effect in the “yielding” to a persuasive message. Once again, a strong argument can 
give them that. Interestingly, Brinol and Petty (2003) have been able to manipulate the 
confidence level of participants outside of their awareness. By having participants nod their 
head (to raise confidence) or shake their head (to lower confidence), these researchers found 
similar effects to earlier explicit confidence manipulations and subsequent responses to 
persuasive messages. This raises the question as to how much a pregnant woman’s condition 
is influencing her confidence and how environmental triggers can undermine it. 
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Non-conscious Paths to Persuasion and Decision-making 
So while the Elaboration Likelihood Model puts more weight on the thoughtful 
process (the central route) that people engage in when exposed to a persuasive message, 
Zajonc’s (1980) declaration that “preferences need no inferences” has given rise to research 
streams that posit that most individuals are not deliberating over decisions, but are relying 
more on automatic processes (p. 151). Indeed, Bargh (2002) points to the persuasive power 
that lies in non-conscious processes. He agrees that the most influential social cognition 
models are the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) and the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980). He also points out that the predominant paradigm of 
decision research is an information-processing model. In addition, most of these information-
processing models have treated non-conscious influences as “hedonistic impulses” (Bargh, 
2002, p. 280). Yet, there is growing evidence that individuals are making choices without 
conscious awareness and guidance. He criticizes models that assume that individuals 
deliberate over their choices or behaviors as likely missing “much of the character and flavor 
of consumer behavior in situ” (Bargh, 2002, p. 281). 
Non-conscious primes can trigger implicit attitudes, emotions, and goals (Bargh, 
2006). All of these can serve as mediators in the persuasion and decision-making processes 
on a conscious level and very likely can lead to “yielding” on a non-conscious level as well. 
Automaticity researchers have shown that implicit attitudes, emotions, and goals can all lead 
directly to behaviors that are aligned with their consciously triggered counterparts (Bargh, 
2006). Fazio, Powell, & Williams (1989) have noted that when a relevant attitude comes to 
mind, this can lead to a consistent behavior. Automaticity researchers point out that these 
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attitudes can be non-conscious and serve as important influences to behavior (See Bargh, 
2007 for a review).  
Moving beyond attitudes, Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and Fitzsimons, (2007) were able 
to prime implicit emotions. Their work was a reaction to previous work that was priming 
simple differences in valance. Instead they wanted to see what would happen by priming 
emotions of similar valance. They were able to subliminally prime “guilt” and “sadness” 
which are similar in negative valance, but evoke different feelings and behaviors. In 
particular, they were able to evoke more “helping” behavior from those in the guilt prime 
condition than those in the sadness prime condition. They not only controlled for the 
individual difference of guilt-proneness, but assessed participants’ emotional states 
immediately after the subliminal primes were conducted. They found no explicit differences 
in the emotional states of the participants, thus proving that the emotions were activated 
implicitly. Winkielman & Berridge’s (2004) commentary on unconscious emotion cited two 
of their own studies that subliminally primed individuals with pictures of happy and sad 
faces. In seemingly separate experiments where participants were asked to evaluate a new 
drink, those in the happy condition poured and drank more of the beverage and evaluated it 
more positively. Of course, participants’ goals (whether they needed to quench their thirst or 
not) influenced the results. There was no difference between conditions for those who were 
not thirsty (a “goal” that was both measured and manipulated in their experiments). 
A person’s goals are also important mediators to his or her acceptance of a persuasive 
message. For the most part, persuasion researchers who have taken the cognitive response 
approach have assumed that people go around consciously aware of their goals in their 
decision-making processes. However, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) were able to prime health 
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goals outside of their participants’ awareness.  In particular, when participants were primed 
with a “progress” goal toward a healthy lifestyle through a weight-loss comparison scale that 
was smaller (thus resulting in the illusion of more progress being made), these participants 
were more likely to accept the chocolate bar as a parting gift over the healthy snack. In 
addition, those who were asked if they wanted to indulge in a delicious, albeit fatty, meal (at 
a later time) just before they began their workout were more likely to agree than those asked 
after their workout. Thus, they were “borrowing” from their perceived progress toward their 
goal of being healthy. Chartrand et al. (2008) were able to prime “thrift” and “prestige” goals 
outside of participants’ awareness as well. In addition, Chartrand and her colleagues were the 
first to show that brands could prime individuals’ behavior and that non-conscious goals 
behave much like consciously activated goals. In particular, once the non-conscious goal was 
satiated with a goal-congruent choice (like socks or a watch), the goal was no longer active.  
 
Avoidance Behavior 
Luce (1998, 2001, 2005) and her colleagues’ work on emotion, trade-offs, and 
avoidance in health decision-making (Luce & Kahn, 1999) is also illustrative of the 
importance of emotion in persuasion. Luce and Drolet (2004) has shown that those under 
cognitive load (and as a result would be low in ability and would be taking the peripheral 
route to persuasion according the Elaboration Likelihood Model) produced more normative 
decision-making behavior. These researchers argue that the cognitive load lessened the 
impact that the self-referent element had on the person’s decision-making process. Usually 
when one is dealing with an emotionally charged decision (like weighing the safety of a car 
against its price, or the safety of an apartment against other factors, see Luce, 1998), one 
tends to avoid making trade-offs that could result in more negative emotion (Luce, Bettman, 
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& Payne, 2001). Often these emotions are evoked beyond a person’s awareness, yet are still 
quite powerful influences in the decision-making process. Luce and her colleagues have 
pointed out in their research that people who feel more emotion tend to avoid difficult 
choices by choosing avoidance behaviors instead as a coping mechanism (Luce, Bettman, & 
Payne, 2001; Luce, 2005).  
One might argue, according to previous medical decision-making studies (Luce, 
2005; Whitton, Warner, & Appleby, 1996), that pregnant women who are weighing decisions 
that could affect their proximal goal of being healthy and having a healthy child are likely in 
an emotionally charged state. As such, they may avoid making trade-offs, like possibly 
having to give up breastfeeding4 (a possibility, at least in their mind) in order to take 
medication for depression. They may inhibit the goal to maintain their own (mental) health in 
order to ensure the health of their child (e.g., by breastfeeding). This inhibition of conflicting 
goals is one of the seven principles of goal activation (Forster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007) 
and could be illustrative of the “healthy” goal further mediating behavioral intentions.5 
Postpartum, a new mother may want to avoid making the trade-off of appearing less than 
healthy, or less than perfect. As a result, she may just avoid telling their doctor that she is 
experiencing depressive symptoms. The thought of one’s intention to be a good mother or a 
healthy mother could mediate subsequent behavioral intentions in this experiment (See 
Figure 2). Luce (1998) has pointed out that mediation is said to exist when (1.) the 
independent variables (prime condition) influence the potential mediator (“healthy” goal; 
“good mother” goal), (2.) the potential mediator influences the dependent variables 
(vulnerability, avoidant choice) and (3.) the relationship between the independent and 
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dependent variables is weakened when the mediator is used as a covariate. These criteria also 
assume that the independent variables influence the dependent variables. 
So are pregnant women consciously deliberating over their choice to be healthy or 
not? Sure. For example, are they deliberating over their choice to eat organically during their 
pregnancy? Yes, most likely. Are they deliberating consciously over their choice NOT to talk 
to seek medical intervention despite experiencing symptoms of postpartum depression? Not 
likely, and this study intended to be a first step in showing why they may not be by (1.) 
investigating whether their associative networks are likely connecting the concept of 
maternal mental illness to psychotic, criminal behavior; and (2.) investigating whether a goal 
prime is mediating a persuasive effect (which was held constant in this experiment) on 
subsequent intended behaviors. As such, it was predicted that their perceived risk perception 
would be increased as well as the likelihood to engage in avoidance behavior, despite the 
presence of strong arguments and an expert source in the health communication video. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This investigation provides the opportunity to move beyond the findings that Holman 
and Dillman Carpentier (2009) achieved with college students and test these hypotheses on a 
highly involved audience, pregnant women. The results of this priming study bring attention 
to medical decision-making, specifically of those seeking treatment for depression where the 
decision could intimately affect another person (the unborn child if the mother is depressed 
while pregnant, or the newly born child where treatment options and the decision to 
breastfeed come into play for a woman who is experiencing postpartum depression). The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (see Petty et al., 2009) may provide a framework for 
investigating the process involved in persuading a woman to evaluate herself as potentially 
suffering from postpartum depression and then having the courage to talk to her doctor about 
it. Her motivation to scrutinize issue-relevant information may be high, but her ability may 
be low.  
There are certainly other medical decisions that parents have to make on behalf of 
children and have to weigh risks versus benefits. Consider all the parents of young children 
who fear that inoculating their children against diseases such as polio and small pox could 
cause autism. There are also parents who are considering whether to inoculate their daughters 
against HPV with a new medication, or whether to treat a child with Attention Deficit 
Disorder with medication or not. These are all situations where parents are on the high-
elaboration end, but conversely, their ability to know or understand all of the data may not be 
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high and therefore, they may be more likely to seek out peripheral cues, such as a media 
report that employs exemplification, in making medical decisions when they are accountable 
for someone else’s health 
Dissonance theory comes into play here as well. Petty, Unnava, and Strathman’s 
(1991) state in Theories of Attitude Change: 
…the dissonance paradigm most relevant to consumer attitudes involves the 
consequences of choice among alternatives (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984b) … a person 
must accept the negative features and consequences of the chosen alternative, and 
must forgo the positive features and consequences of the rejected alternative” (p. 
256). 
 
Many new mothers want to do everything right for their babies. They may suddenly 
feel at odds with their societal and self-perpetuated obligations to their baby if they also find 
that they may be suffering from postpartum depression. They may feel like they have to 
make a trade-off in deciding to treat themselves and forgoing their idealized vision of their 
motherhood experience as well as overcoming their perceptions of the stigma of mental 
illness. On the one hand, a risk-benefit analysis would show that improving a mother’s 
mental health is important in the child-rearing process, particularly when studies have shown 
that the children of mothers with untreated depression can suffer from developmental delays 
(Lusskin et al., 2008). However, in addition to a treatment option (antidepressants) that may 
be going against her beliefs (providing an all-natural experience for her and her baby), her 
decision-making ability may be altered by her state of mind, resulting in low ability.  
That said, what this study aimed to accomplish was to take the first step in unpacking 
what is likely a very complicated medical decision-making process. This study sought to 
ascertain whether a media exemplar can prime a stereotype of mental illness in a highly 
involved audience. More importantly, this study investigated whether the influence of the 
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prime would affect whether respondents consider themselves at greater risk of being a victim 
of this condition and whether they intended to do something about it if they become victims. 
And so the literature leads us to the following hypotheses and research questions. 
First of all, social cognition researchers assert that assimilation, or transfer, of traits from an 
exemplar to the target character is most likely to occur.
H1:  A treatment prime that exemplifies a concept of extreme maternal mental illness will 
make a stronger contribution to perceptions of hostile trait characteristics of a target 
character in a video clip about postpartum depression compared to a non-extreme 
prime.  
Conversely, social judgment scholars posit that contextual comparison is most likely to occur 
between the exemplar and the target character; therefore, a contrast effect will occur where 
the traits of the exemplar will not be transferred to the target, but will instead provoke a 
judgment that is opposite than what the traits necessitate.  
H1a: A treatment prime that exemplifies a concept of extreme maternal mental illness will 
lower perceptions of hostile trait characteristics of a target character in a video clip 
about postpartum depression compared to a prime of a non-extreme prime.  
Again, assimilation may occur, so the following hypothesis is warranted.  
H2:  A treatment prime that exemplifies a concept of extreme maternal mental illness will 
lessen pregnant women’s perceived overall well-being of the target character compared 
to a non-extreme prime. 
Conversely, contextual comparison may occur, so the following hypothesis is also supported 
by the literature (see Stapel & Koomen, 2001, for a review). 
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H2a:  A treatment prime that exemplifies a concept of extreme maternal mental illness will 
make a stronger contribution to pregnant women’s perceived overall well-being of the 
target character compared to a non-extreme prime. 
Exemplification literature (Zillmann & Brosius, 2000), and its findings that exemplars 
lead to misperception of risk, provides support for the third hypotheses. 
H3: A treatment prime that exemplifies a concept of extreme maternal mental illness will 
make a stronger contribution to a pregnant women’s perception of risk of suffering 
from all three postpartum disorders — the “baby blues,” postpartum depression, and 
postpartum psychosis — compared to a non-extreme prime.  
 Automaticity scholars, with their findings that implicit goals can provide powerful 
influence on attitudes and behaviors, provided inspiration for the following research 
questions. 
RQ1: What is the relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal 
mental illness and pregnant women’s perceived likelihood of developing postpartum 
disorders if that prime is further mediated by a woman’s goal to be healthy?  
RQ2: What is the relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal 
mental illness and pregnant women’s perceived likelihood of feeling empowered to talk 
to her doctor about her depressive symptoms if that prime is further mediated by a 
woman’s goal to be healthy? 
RQ3: What is the relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal 
mental illness and pregnant women’s perceived likelihood of avoiding medication if 
that prime is further mediated by a woman’s goal to be healthy? 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
METHOD 
Overview 
In an experimental design testing effects of a priming event (extreme prime, non-
extreme prime) on judgments and behavioral intentions, pregnant women participated in a 
research session that included a pretest questionnaire and evaluation of a website about 
postpartum disorders that exposed all participants to the two exemplars for the first time. 
Upon meeting with the researcher, participants were exposed subliminally to one or the other 
exemplar and asked to judge a target character in a video clip. Following this, participants 
viewed a persuasive health communication video and answered questions about their 
behavioral intentions. Finally, the presence or absence of activated goals was assessed 
implicitly through a word-stem completion task.  
Participants first completed a preliminary questionnaire delivered via an e-mail link 
to the Qualtrics survey website. This questionnaire included individual difference measures 
for measuring empathy and sympathy (Tamborini & Mettler, 1990), Health Locus of Control 
(Walston et al., 1976), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), Need for 
Orientation (Matthes, 2005), and depression (CES-D Scale, Radloff, 1977) as well as 
preliminary measures for risk perception and behavioral intentions. These served as control 
measures. The independent variable was manipulated according to the subliminal prime’s 
exemplification or representation of the maternal mental illness concept. The subliminal 
prime was delivered in the form of 16 millisecond exposures of images of each exemplar via 
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a laptop computer with DirectRT software. The subsequent video clips featuring the target 
character and full-length persuasive health communication video were also presented via a 
laptop computer. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions in an 
alternating fashion. Attitudes toward a subsequent target character, perceptions of their own 
risk to succumbing to a postpartum disorder, as well as behavioral intentions served as the 
dependent variables. 
 
Participants  
Participants in the study were comprised of pregnant women (N = 40) recruited from 
obstetrician offices in the Daytona Beach, Florida area. The Daytona Beach area is home to 
more than 64,000 people. The median age is 38 years, the median income is $29,312. More 
than 80% of Daytona Beach residents are high school graduates, nearly 8% have some 
college education, 13.1% hold a bachelor’s degree, and 6.3% hold a graduate degree. 
Families with children make up 8% of the population. More than 43% of those living in 
Daytona Beach are married, and more than 56% are single. (Yahoo! Real Estate).  Recruiting 
pregnant women was deemed appropriate due to their likely high level of involvement with 
the issue of postpartum disorders as compared to college students who were used as 
participants in a previous, related study (Holman & Dillman Carpentier, 2009). Participants 
received $50, $75, or $100 (depending on the wave of recruitment) for volunteering an hour 
of their time to take part in this study. There was no attempt to obtain a range of ages or 
ethnicities for this first-time study. 
Most of the participants (77.5%, n = 31) were Caucasian, 17.5% (n = 7) were African 
American, and 5% (n = 2) listed their race as other. Two participants did not answer this 
question. Three participants (7.5%) also indicated that they were Hispanic or Latino. Ages of 
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the participants ranged from 18 to 36. The average age was 27. Nearly half of the participants 
(57.5%, n = 23) were carrying their first child. On average, the participants were 26 weeks 
pregnant, but ranged from 10 weeks to nearly full term at 38 weeks. 
Most of the participants were married (77.5%, n = 31), 12.5% (n = 5) were in a 
relationship, and 10% (n = 4) indicated that they were single. A small percentage, 5% (n = 2) 
of the participants reported an annual household income of $100,000 or above. Most of the 
participants (30%, n = 12) indicated that they had an income of $50,000 – $99,999; 12.5% (n 
= 5) reported $40,000 – $49,000; 10% (n = 4) indicated that their household income was 
$30,000 – $39,000; 7.5% (n = 3) reported their income in the $20,000 – $29,999 range; 7.5% 
(n = 3) recorded an income of  $10,000 – $19,999; and 12.5% (n = 5) stated that their 
household income was $9,999 or below. 15% (n = 6) of the participants opted out of the 
question. Most (40%, n = 16) of the participants reported either 3 or 4 individuals in their 
households (20%, n = 8, respectively). Many (37.5%, n = 15) said that there were 2 
individuals in their households. 10% (n = 4) of the participants reported a household of one, 
while another 10% (n = 4) reported 5 individuals in their households. One (2.5%) participant 
reported 7 individuals in her household. Most of the participants (40%, n = 16) had a 
bachelor’s degree. 7.5% (n = 3) reported that they had a graduate or professional degree. 
17.5% (n = 7) of the participants indicated that they had some college education, but no 
degree. 10% (n = 4) were high school graduates. 5% (n = 2) had some high school, but no 
diploma, while one (2.5%) participant indicated she had only a middle-school education. 
Seven participants refused to answer the question.  
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About a third, (35%, n = 14) of the participants indicated that they knew someone 
who had experienced postpartum depression and 86% (n = 12) of those women indicated that 
their acquaintance had shared her experience with them.  
 
Experiment Procedure 
All participants were asked to sign an informed consent form before taking part in the 
study. Prior to their participation in the experiment, all participants filled out a pretest 
questionnaire featuring individual difference scales (see Appendix A). They were also asked 
a series of behavioral intention questions that are meant to provide a baseline to assess the 
persuasive effect of the health communication video.  
The only inclusion/exclusion criterion for this study was that women who expressed 
interest in participating in the study were screened with two depression scales. First, the 
prospective participant answered the questions to the two-item PRIME-MD PHQ scale (see 
Appendix A). If a prospective participant answered “yes” to either question, this indicated 
that she may be suffering from a depressive disorder. In addition, an Edinburgh Postnatal 
Depression Scale (EPDS) (Cox, Holden, & Sagovsky, 1987, see Appendix A), a 10-item 
depression scale was included in this study’s pre-measures. If a participant answered “yes” to 
both questions in the PRIME-MD PHQ scale or scored a 11 or above (out of 30) on the 
EPDS scale, she was also be excluded from the study and her OB/GYN was notified of her 
status (if she signed the waiver permitting the principal investigator to do so). 
Included participants were then be asked to peruse a faux website about maternal 
depressive disorders (http://multigraphy.org/stimulus/postpartumnet/postpartumnet.asp) that 
featured slideshows about Andrea Yates, who suffered from postpartum psychosis, and 
Heather Harrison, who suffered from postpartum depression. In order to control for 
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presentation and order effects, participants were randomly assigned to either a version with 
the Andrea Yates story on the left side of the Web page or a version with that story on the 
right side. It was assumed that the participant viewed the website and answered pre-test 
questions in the privacy of their own home.  
Following this, each participant met with the researcher at an appointed time. A 
registered nurse took the participant’s baseline blood pressure reading and was present during 
the entire experiment to assess the participant for stress and to answer any medical questions. 
All participants took part in a “vigilance task” where they were exposed to either subliminal 
prime. First the participants practiced with 10 trials of exposure to neutral prime words: 
building, coffee, chalkboard, alarm clock (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). Following this, half (N 
= 20) of the participants were assigned to the extreme prime condition and were exposed to a 
subliminal prime with images of Andrea Yates drawn from the news media. Following the 
procedure described by Chartrand & Bargh (1996), each stimulus image was flashed in one 
of four quadrants on the computer screen positioned in the parafoveal region (see Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000, p. 260) for 75 trials of 16 milliseconds each followed by a gray mask where 
the image had appeared. This mask prevents an extension of the intended prime exposure that 
can persist in a participant’s visual iconic memory store (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 262). 
Participants were led to believe that this part of the experiment was a separate vigilance task 
that would record how quickly they notice and respond to the stimuli. They were asked to 
push the F and J computer key indicating the left and right side of the central fixation point. 
The participants were told to focus on centrally positioned asterisks (***) throughout the 
session, preventing them from fixating on the parafoveal stimuli.  
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The other half (N = 20) of the participants served as the non-extreme prime group and 
were exposed to the corresponding images of Heather Harrison gleaned from the website 
slideshow to which the participants were previously exposed. Another blood pressure reading 
was taken after the priming manipulation. Each participant was then asked to view and 
evaluate a video clip featuring a woman who has suffered from postpartum depression. After 
they answered the posttest questionnaire evaluating the target character in the video clip, the 
participants viewed the full-length health communication video. They were led to believe 
that the woman in the video clip was being tested for inclusion in the health communication 
video that was going to be utilized by doctors for their OB patients (see Holman & Dillman 
Carpentier, 2009 for use of a similar procedure). After viewing the full video, the participants 
were asked to complete a posttest questionnaire that gathered demographic data and assessed 
behavioral intentions, including possible avoidance behavior (Luce 1998, Luce, Bettman & 
Payne, 2001, 2005; Luce & Kahn, 1999). Finally, participants were debriefed using a 
“funneled debriefing” technique to probe for any inklings of knowledge of the prime 
manipulation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996).  
 
Study Administration and Ethical Issues 
A prior history of mental illness was not assessed for this study. The researcher did 
not have access to patient records. In addition, participants were not excluded based on the 
stage of their pregnancy. 
Some participants may have become emotionally involved with the online slideshows 
and health communication video as the subject matter may be particularly important to them.  
The researcher both verbally debriefed them and provided a written debriefing form for the 
participants. A registered nurse was present during the participants’ sessions with the 
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researcher. In addition to monitoring the participants’ blood pressure for physical signs of 
stress, debriefing questions assessed their emotional well-being. These were assessed on a 
daily basis by the registered nurse who was involved in this study. If a prospective or 
involved participant required mental health intervention, she was put in touch with Dr. James 
Moore, a clinical psychiatrist with Halifax Health Behavioral Services. If an individual 
required acute mental health intervention, she was referred to the emergency room at Halifax 
Health Medical Center in Daytona Beach. Halifax Health Medical Center has a mental health 
intervention program in place in its emergency room, so evaluations for acute cases are 
available 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Halifax Health Medical Center emergency 
room has three (3) mental health screening rooms where Registered Nurses assess the needs 
of incoming patients and determine the appropriate course of action. None of the prospective 
or involved participants needed these services. 
Protocol for Responding to Depression Prescreen Measures. Participants were 
prescreened for depressive symptoms twice. First they filled out a PRIME-MD PHQ two-
item questionnaire: During the last 2 weeks, have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? Have you often been bothered by feeling down, depressed, or hopeless? Have you 
often been bothered by little interest or pleasure in doing things? If they answered “no” to 
both of these questions (and signed the study consent form), they were then able to begin the 
first part of the study. It is during that part that they completed the 10-item EPDS 
questionnaire (see Appendix A). If the participant scored a 11 or lower on the EPDS 
questionnaire, she was allowed to continue to participate in the study. 
If the participant answered “yes” to both of the PRIME-MD PHQ questions they were 
released from the study and received a telephone call from the registered nurse. They were 
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also released from the study if they passed the PRIME-MD PHQ prescreen, but scored an 11 
or higher on the EPDS questionnaire. Upon reaching the participant on the telephone, first 
the nurse identified herself to the woman as a Registered Nurse associated with the study. 
The nurse reminded the woman that she filled out a PRIME-MD PHQ two-item 
questionnaire (or Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale (EPDS)) as part of her recruitment 
into the study. The nurse informed her that this questionnaire is designed to prescreen 
individuals for depressive symptoms and that she may have been suffering from these 
symptoms. The nurse was very careful NOT to make a diagnosis over the telephone. If she 
had signed the waiver for her doctor, the nurse informed her that her doctor’s office had been 
contacted he had been informed of the results, and that she should make an appointment with 
the doctor to further discuss her symptoms. If she hadn’t signed the waiver, the nurse 
requested verbal permission to contact the doctor. The nurse gently asked her in what ways 
she was feeling down, depressed or hopeless. The nurse asked her how she was being 
bothered by little interest or pleasure in doing things. If she expressed any suicidal ideations 
the nurse acted on it immediately. The nurse made a point of asking her directly if she is 
having suicidal thoughts / ideas. 
e.g.      “Are you thinking about killing yourself?” 
“Have you ever tried to hurt yourself before?” 
“Do you think you might try to hurt yourself today?” 
“Have you thought of ways that you might hurt yourself?” 
“Do you have pills/weapons in the house?” 
 
These questions do not increase a person’s suicidal thoughts if she was having them. 
It gave the nurse information that indicated how strongly the woman has thought about 
killing herself, especially if she indicated that she has attempted suicide in the past.  
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If the situation had warranted it, the nurse would have acted under the guidance of the 
Baker Law that allows medical professionals to have individuals who may be a danger to 
themselves to be held for observation for 72 hours. This was not necessary for the 
prospective participants in this study. 
If the woman did endorse depressive symptoms, but the situation did not warrant 
calling the police and having her taken to a psychiatric facility, the nurse contacted Dr. 
Moore for his immediate intervention and contacted the woman’s obstetrician to follow 
through with a scheduled appointment. It was likely that more subjects would fall in a gray 
area of not needing to be hospitalized, but not scoring low on the depression scale. For the 
three ranges of possibilities in a participant’s responses to the EPDS, the following is a more 
detailed of this study’s at-risk protocol: 
Low on the EPDS. If the participant scored a 10 or below, she was allowed to 
continue to participate in the study. During the debriefing, the nurse informed her that her 
score indicated that she may be experiencing mild depressive symptoms (if she had a score of 
9 or 10) and encouraged her (as well as all participants) to speak to her doctor about how she 
is feeling and encouraged her to ask for a referral for counseling. 
“Gray” area on the EPDS. If the participant scored an 11 to 13 on the EPDS and 
only a follow-up discussion with her doctor was warranted, the nurse urged her to make an 
appointment with her obstetrician. She also encouraged her to contact Dr. Moore, who would 
have assisted her in arranging to see a mental health professional through Halifax Health. She 
was informed that she was released from the study and then was sent a follow-up e-mail. 
High on the EPDS. If the participant scored higher than 13 points or indicated any 
suicidal ideation — that is she scored a 1 or higher on question #10 of the EPDS Scale — she 
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would have been referred immediately for a follow-up. The nurse would have contacted Dr. 
Moore for his immediate intervention as well as the woman’s obstetrician. If the nurse 
determined that the woman may have been a danger to herself, she would have contacted the 
police and have had the woman hospitalized. Fortunately, none of the prospective 
participants fell into this category. 
 
Stimulus Material 
 Subliminal primes have been successfully used in social cognitive psychology to 
activate implicit attitudes (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Ferguson, Bargh, & 
Nayak, 2005), emotions (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and 
Fitzsimons, 2007), goals (Chartrand et al., 2008), and behaviors (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 
1996). Bargh and Chartrand (2000) note that it behooves researchers to follow a supraliminal 
priming experiment (see Holman & Dillman Carpentier, 2009) with a subliminal one that 
tests the same hypotheses. Therefore, the extreme treatment prime stimulus for this study 
incorporated media images of Andrea Yates. The non-extreme priming stimulus incorporated 
images of Heather Harrison, who suffered from the more common disorder of postpartum 
depression and better exemplified the base-rate data of postpartum disorders. 
 All participants were first exposed to the same website (See Appendix A for a 
screenshot) that included two slideshow stories that were produced using Soundslides, a 
popular Web application that is utilized by many online news outlets. Filler stories included an 
update on the national health care reform law that went into effect in early 2010, a general 
information piece that described the symptoms and the statistical likelihood of the three 
postpartum disorders: “baby blues,” postpartum depression, and postpartum psychosis, and a 
piece on how maternal depression is linked to sleep disturbance in infants. 
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The postpartum depression video was 1 minute and 37 seconds long and not only 
included a 13 second clip of the target character who described her experience with 
postpartum depression, it also included a message to persuade pregnant women to talk to 
their doctor if they are experiencing depressive symptoms (See Appendix A). The message 
included two strong arguments. One being that postpartum psychosis is rare when compared 
to postpartum depression and the milder “baby blues.” An expert, an OB/GYN, who points 
out that the children of depressed mothers can experience developmental delays, made that 
second strong argument. 
 
Primary Independent Variable 
 
Exemplar extremity. The focus of this study was on determining how the extremity of 
an exemplar of maternal mental illness influenced participants’ view of a target character that 
represented the base-rate or more normal distribution of maternal depressive disorders. The 
Andrea Yates prime represented the extreme exemplar or maternal mental illness, while the 
Heather Harrison prime represented the non-extreme exemplar. The exemplar prime was 
coded 0 for the non-extreme prime and 1 for the extreme prime. 
 
Primary Dependent Variables 
 
Perceived hostility, perceived depression, and perceived overall well-being of the 
target character. Like in the previous supraliminal study conducted by Holman & Dillman 
Carpentier (2009), participants were asked about their perception of hostile traits attributed to 
the target character featured in a heath education video about postpartum depression. This 
study included a two-item index for Perceived Hostility of Samantha (“I think Samantha is 
selfish,” “I think Samantha is a drama queen”). They were also asked about their perceptions 
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of “Samantha” in terms of depression (“I think Samantha is depressed,” and “I think 
Samantha is overwhelmed”). In addition, other personality measures have been derived from 
Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, (1992) to create a Perceived Overall Well-being Scale, 
including a ten-item index for stability (“I think Samantha seldom gets mad”); a ten-item 
index for happiness (“I think Samantha seldom feels blue); a ten-item index for calmness (“I 
think Samantha rarely gets irritated”). The means and standard deviations for all continuous 
variables are presented in Table 1. 
Unlike in Holman & Dillman Carpentier’s (2009) study, the hostility statements in 
this study did not correlate (r = -.036, p = .413) and were analyzed separately. The 
depression statements did correlate (r = .529; p < .001) and were combined to create a two-
item depressive traits scale.  
All 30 items data of the Perceived Overall Well-being Scale were screened and there 
were no missing values on any items. Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 1. 
There were no violations in terms of normality. Skewness did not exceed + or – 2. Kurtosis 
did not exceed + or – 7. All 30 items were entered in a linear regression to obtain 
Mahalanobis distance and were screened for outliers. Cases fell between a minimum of 6.089 
and maximum of 37.760. Mahalanobis distance did not exceed the critical value of X (X2 (.001, 
30) = 59.70306426), so none of the cases had to be deleted. 
As this scale was derived from the Abridged Big Five-dimensional Circumplex model 
(Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992), it was assumed that the factors were related to each 
other. A Principal Axis analysis of the 30 measures in the Perceived Overall Well-being 
Scale (KMO = .576) revealed there were 7 factors of eigen values more than 1 (see Table 3). 
They explain 81% of the variance. However, Cattell’s  (1966) criterion for the scree plot 
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suggests there are three factors. The 30 measures were then factor analyzed on a fixed 
number of three factors using Principal Axis Factoring with Direct Oblimin rotation. The 
results indicate that 14 statements loaded on one factor, 11 statements loaded onto a second 
factor, and the remaining five statements loaded onto a third factor. Total variance was 
explained as follows: Factor 1 = 9.092; Factor 2 = 9.231; Factor 3 = 4.263. The first factor 
indicated an emotional control dimension, or emotions derived from a positive or negative 
control situation. The 14 items were averaged to create an emotional control scale (α = .904). 
The second factor suggested a dimension where emotions are related to cognition. The 11 
items were averaged to create an “emotion related to cognition” scale (α = .940). Finally, the 
third factor suggested an emotional reactance dimension where extreme reactions to threats 
are fostered. The five items were averaged to create an emotional reactance scale (α = .822) 
(see Table 4). 
In addition to these scales, the original subscales (with 10 measures each for 
calmness, happiness, and stability) and the 30-item overall well-being scale were tested for 
sample adequacy and reliability (stability, KMO = .736 α = .839; happiness, KMO = .759, α 
= .824; calmness, KMO = .811, α = .917). All 30 measures of the “wellness” traits also 
proved to be reliable (α = .944). The 30 measures were averaged to create an index that is 
called the well-being scale. However, all seven “wellness” scales were further tested as 
dependent variables using regression analyses. The three new factors could simply be 
reflecting a sample idiosyncrasy, but also could be pointing out important differences in how 
pregnant women react to the target character in comparison to how college students react — 
and how the original scales, which have long been tested on college students, have captured 
those judgments in this sample. The target character may have become an extension of 
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themselves — unlike it would with college students — and the three new subscales may be 
better at parsing out effects for this phenomenon. 
Exemplification effect. In order to assess the exemplification effect, or the 
disproportionate assessment of personal risk, participants were asked to rank their perceived 
vulnerability of suffering from “baby blues,” postpartum depression, and postpartum 
psychosis (How vulnerable do you feel to possibly experiencing postpartum “blues” / 
depression / psychosis after giving birth to your baby?) as well as their perception of risk 
(How likely do you think you will experience postpartum “blues” / depression / psychosis 
after giving birth to your baby?) Prior to the experiment, all participants answered these six 
questions to determine their perceptions of risk in terms of succumbing to one of the three 
postpartum disorders. They were asked these questions again in the posttest. As these were 
newly created scales, each of the two 6-item scales was subjected to a factor analysis using 
Principal Components factoring to see if the six statements loaded onto one factor. In the 
case of the six pretest measures, they loaded onto one factor that explained 85.996% of the 
variance (KMO = .694, α = .905, Table 5). The six posttest measures were similarly analyzed 
and loaded onto two factors that explained 75.930% of the variance (KMO = .709, α = .845, 
see Table 6). The statements that loaded on both factors in the pre- and posttest scales were: 
“I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing ‘baby blues’ after giving birth,” “I think it’s likely 
that I will experience postpartum depression after giving birth.” However, due to their high 
reliability as complete scales, these measures were averaged to create two scales, a pre-
exemplification effect scale and a post-exemplification effect scale. 
Priming. Participants were also asked to rate the target character, “Samantha.” using a 
Perceived Sanity Scale that consists of the following evaluative descriptors: Competent, 
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loving, sane, careful, honest, trustworthy, responsible, reliable, safe, nurturing, hopeful, 
stable, friendly, expressive (Tamborini & Mettler, 1990). All items were assessed on a 9-
point Likert-type scale (“1” means the adjective describes the target character very poorly, 
while “9” means the adjective describes the target character very well). The measures were 
factor analyzed using Principal Components factoring and found that the 14 statements 
loaded onto four factors (KMO = .624; α = .836, see Table 7). However, because of the 
reliability of the scale, it was kept intact for further analysis. The perceived sanity of the 
target character indicated the direct addition of the prime and was entered into regression 
analyses to test for interactions with the prime condition and primed goals. 
Behavioral intentions. Participants were also given a series of 9 behavioral intention 
questions in order to assess, among other things, their likelihood of feeling empowered to 
speak to their doctor if they were experiencing depressive symptoms, their likelihood of 
postponing speaking to their doctor if they thought they were experiencing symptoms, or 
their belief that their doctor would recommend medication to treat their depressive 
symptoms. These questions were asked in the pretest as well to provide comparison and the 9 
pre- and posttest items were subjected to exploratory factor analyses. These questions were 
created for this study and have not been tested as a scale prior to this investigation, so it was 
appropriate to assume that the factors were unrelated. Therefore, a Principal Components 
analysis of the 9 intended behavioral pretest measures (KMO = .562, α = .211) revealed there 
were 4 factors of eigen values more than 1. They explain 74% of the variance. The same 
measures were administered posttest to gauge the effects of the health communication video. 
These posttest measures were factor analyzed using Principal Components factoring and 
found that the 9 statements loaded onto four factors (KMO = .606, α = .497). The low 
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reliability of the overall scale and subsequent analyses of possible subscales resulted in 
exploring correlations between statements. Two correlations were significant: The pretest, r 
= .565, p < .01, and posttest measures, r = .519, p < .01, matching the statements that 
assessed how likely the participant would discuss their depressive symptoms with a parent 
and/or a partner. The final analyses were done using the two 2-item measures 
(communication scale) and other pretest and posttest statements as individual dependent 
variables. 
Assessing the possible mediation of activated goals. All participants were asked to 
complete a series of word-stems in order to assess the activation of the implicit goals to be 
healthy and/or to be a good mother. Ten of the words were related to the healthy goal and ten 
were related to the good mother goal. If these goals were present, they were dummy coded (0 
= not present; 1 = goal present) to assess their possible mediation in the effect of the 
persuasive message on behavioral intentions.  
Assessing posttest involvement. Personal involvement with the issue of postpartum 
depression was measured with five items after the participants had viewed the health 
communication video. All statements were measured on a Likert-type scale where “1” meant 
“strongly disagree” and “9” meant “strongly agree.” The first statement assessed their 
familiarity with the content of the health communication video. The second measured their 
interest in topics related to the health of new mothers. The third rated their level of concern 
about postpartum depression. The fourth measure assessed how important the issue of 
postpartum depression is to them. Finally, the participants were asked to rate the perceived 
direct effect on themselves that postpartum depression will likely have. These measures were 
factor analyzed using Principal Components factoring and found that the five statements 
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loaded onto two factors that explained 68% of the variance (KMO = .685, α = .588). The low 
reliability of the overall scale and subsequent analysis of possible subscales resulted in the 
creation of a 3-item scale that loaded on the first factor that consisted of items that named 
postpartum specifically in their assessment of a particular involvement dimension. The other 
two items that first assessed participants’ familiarity with the content of the health 
communication video, and second, measured their interest in topics related to the health of 
new mothers, did not address postpartum depression specifically. They also did not correlate 
as a scale in and of themselves (r = .071, p = .662) and were therefore dropped from the final 
posttest involvement scale. The final 3-item scale proved reliable (KMO = .693, α = .799). 
The overall well-being scales, the two-item depression scale, risk perception 
measures, measures of hostile traits, and posttest involvement were normally distributed (see 
Table 1). Correlations between the independent and dependent variables are shown in Table 
2. The full measurement instrument appears in Appendix A.  
 
Manipulation Checks and Control Variables 
Control variables. Individual differences were taken into account, including measures 
for sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, 
depression, and impressions of the health communication video.  All continuous control 
variables were normally distributed (see Table 1 for descriptives). 
Manipulation checks. In order to ensure completion of the pretest measures and 
viewing the faux website prior to the prime manipulation, the participants were given a 
unique identifying number to code in when they logged on to the Qualtrics questionnaire site. 
In addition, the Qualtrics survey site collected the participant’s unique IP address. The faux 
website pages and two slideshow stories were also tagged using ASP programming code that 
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generated a “hit” file for each. These “hit” files also collected the IP addresses and recorded 
the timestamps of the participants once they viewed the online material. These IP addresses 
were matched and the codes were kept separate from the participants’ identifying 
information. In the final stage of the experiment, participants were probed for an inkling of 
what was presented to them during the prime manipulation. In a funneled debriefing, they 
were asked whether they recognized the images and to please describe them if they could.  
 
Analysis Used in the Results Section   
Hypotheses and research questions. After all preliminary analyses, the data were 
analyzed to test the five hypotheses and the three research questions. To test for priming 
effects, t-tests and hierarchical regression analyses were performed to answer Hypotheses 1 
and 1a, whether individuals in the extreme prime condition will make a stronger contribution 
to their perceptions of hostile trait characteristics of the target character or, conversely, 
whether those individuals will lower their perceptions of hostile trait characteristics of the 
target character. T-tests and hierarchical regression analyses also helped to answer 
Hypotheses 2 and 2a, whether individuals in the extreme prime condition will lessen, or 
conversely, strengthen their perceptions of the target character’s overall well-being. 
Hierarchical regression analyses also helped to address Hypothesis 3. However, in 
order to test for changes in exemplification effects, a one-way ANOVA and t-tests were 
utilized to determine if, according to Hypothesis 3, an extreme exemplar of maternal mental 
illness will make a stronger contribution to a pregnant participant’s perception of risk of 
suffering from all three disorders — the “baby blues,” postpartum depression, and 
postpartum psychosis — compared to a non-extreme prime. This was done by comparing the 
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extreme and non-extreme prime conditions in terms of pretest measures of risk perceptions of 
developing postpartum disorders, as well as in terms of posttest measures of risk perceptions.  
In order to test for a mediation effect and address the three research questions, the 
healthy goal measure, the posttest exemplification effect measure, each of two of the 
behavioral intention measures (“I would feel empowered to talk to my doctor if I were to 
experience depressive symptoms after the birth of my baby,” and “If I were experiencing 
depressive symptoms after the birth of my baby, I would postpone telling my doctor so I 
could avoid medication”), and the prime condition were entered into regression analyses as 
the independent and dependent variables in an alternating fashion. The three research 
questions were poised to determine the influence of the prime condition on subsequent 
behavioral intentions if the participant’s prime condition was further mediated by the 
woman’s goal to be healthy. Research Question 1 sought to determine the relationship 
between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal mental illness and pregnant 
women’s perceived likelihood of developing postpartum disorders. Research Question 2 
sought to determine the relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal 
mental illness and pregnant women’s perceived likelihood of feeling empowered to talk to 
her doctor about her depressive symptoms. Research Question 3 sought to determine the 
relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal mental illness and 
pregnant women’s likelihood of avoiding medication.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
RESULTS 
Priming 
As a manipulation check to ensure that those who were exposed to the extreme prime 
were, in fact, primed by the extreme mental illness concept, eleven regression analyses tested 
the effects of exemplification and prime addition of the maternal mental illness concept on 
overall evaluations of the target character as well as posttest perceptions of their own risk. 
Individual difference pretest measures (education category (1 = low: Up to some high school, 
but no diploma; 2 = medium: High school diploma to some college; 3 = high: College, 
graduate or professional degree), income category (1 = low: $19,999 and below; 2 = 
medium: $20,000 – $39,999; 3 = high: $40,000 and above), age category (low = 18-22; 
medium = 23-31; high = 32-36), race (white = 1, other = 0), sympathy, empathy, need for 
cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, and depression) were entered in the 
first block. The exemplification condition and prime addition (measure of the mental illness 
concept: Sanity) were entered in the second block to test for main effects. The interaction 
between exemplification condition and measure of sanity was entered in the third block. A 
significant interaction would confirm a priming effect, provided that the measure of the target 
character’s sanity was a stronger predictor among those in the extreme exemplification 
condition, rather than those in the non-extreme exemplification condition. 
For initial hypotheses testing, the independent variables of exemplification condition 
and prime addition (sanity) and all of the control variables (race, age, income, education, 
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sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, and 
depression) were entered into the regression models. All of the continuous independent 
variables were centered for analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). All continuous variables were 
normally distributed and t-tests confirmed the assumed equal variances between the exemplar 
conditions in showing that there were no differences due to presentation order (whether 
participants viewed the pretest Web page with the Andrea Yates story on the left or the 
right). 
Priming perceptions of hostile traits. Comparison of means illustrate that those 
participants in the extreme condition judged the target character more harshly than did those 
in the non-extreme condition. In judging whether “Samantha is selfish,” participants in the 
extreme condition were more likely to agree (M = 4.50, SD = 1.14), than those in the non-
extreme condition (M = 3.95, SD = 1.73). In judging whether “Samantha is a drama queen,” 
participants in the extreme condition were more likely to agree (M = 4.65, SD = .98), than 
those in the non-extreme condition (M = 3.90, SD = 1.29). In terms of the “drama queen” 
trait, a t-test confirmed that those in the extreme exemplification condition did evaluate the 
target character significantly more harshly, t(38) = -2.060, p = .046, than those in the non-
extreme condition.  
Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses were performed to evaluate how well 
the key variables predicted the overall evaluations of the target character in terms of 
perceived hostile traits. Individual difference pretest measures of sympathy, empathy, need 
for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, depression, as well as 
demographic data, were entered in the first block. The exemplification condition and prime 
addition (sanity) were entered in the second block to test for main effects. The interaction 
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between condition and sanity was entered in the third block. The final model for the first 
hostility measure (“Samantha is selfish”; M = 4.23, SD = 1.48) was significant, R2 = .386, 
F(13,  20) = 2.597, p = .027, (see Table 8) with measures of need for cognition, β = -.499, 
t(33) = -2.855, p =.010, and participant depression, β = -.519, t(33) = -2.904, p =.009, offering 
significant predictive contributions to the final model. However, there was no significant 
interaction between the condition and prime addition (see Figure 1).  
The most parsimonious model for the second hostility measure (“Samantha is a drama 
queen”; M = 4.27, SD = 1.20) was significant in predicting the negative evaluation of the 
target character, R2 = .302, F(12,  21) = 2.387, p =.039 (see Table 9). There was a main effect 
for the prime addition (sanity), β = -.733, t(33) = -3.427, p =.003 predicting that as 
participants’ perceptions of the target character’s sanity lowered, their negative evaluation of 
her increased. Participant age, β = .596, t(33) = 2.355, p =.028, also made a significant 
contribution in predicting the evaluation of the target character. While the full model failed to 
produce a significant interaction (see Figure 2), again, a t-test confirmed that those in the 
extreme condition did judge the target more harshly, t(38) = -2.060, p = .046, than those in 
the non-extreme condition. Also, the older participants judged the target character more 
harshly than younger participants (see Figure 3). These findings would suggest support for 
Hypothesis 1, or that the extreme exemplar of maternal mental illness would contribute to 
individuals’ negative evaluations of the target character. This is tentative support, in that it 
cannot be established that the exemplar condition alone primed the mental illness concept, 
which, in turn, contributed to the judgment effect.  
Priming perceptions of depressive traits. Comparison of means of the two-item 
measure assessing the perceived depressive traits of the target character illustrate that those 
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participants in the extreme condition again judged the target character more harshly than did 
those in the non-extreme condition. In judging whether “Samantha is depressed” and 
“overwhelmed,” participants in the extreme condition were more likely to agree (M = 6.98, 
SD = 1.25), than those in the non-extreme condition (M = 6.55, SD = 1.62) —  
a t-test did not indicate that this difference was significant, t(38) = -.928, p = .359. 
Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses were performed to evaluate how well 
the key variables predicted the overall evaluations of the target character in terms of 
depressive traits. Individual difference pretest measures (race, age, income, education, 
sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, and 
depression) were entered in the first block. The exemplification condition and prime addition 
(measure of the mental illness concept: Sanity) were entered in the second block to test for 
main effects. The interaction between exemplification condition and measure of sanity was 
entered in the third block. The final model failed to produce significant effects in terms of the 
2-item depressive traits measure (“Samantha is depressed,” “Samantha is overwhelmed”), R2 
= .036, F(13,  20) = 1.094, p = .416. 
In order to test for interactions with activated goals of being “healthy” and a “good 
mother” and how these interactions affect the evaluation of the target character’s depressive 
traits, these terms were entered into a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis. In 
order to avoid a saturated model, fewer individual difference pretest measures (sympathy, 
empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, depression, and 
age) were entered in the first block. The exemplar condition, prime addition (Sanity), healthy 
goal, and “good mother” goal were all entered in the second block to test for main effects. 
The 2-way interactions between the four terms were entered in the third block. The 3-way 
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interactions among the four terms were entered in the fourth block, and the 4-way interaction 
was entered in the fifth block. 
The most parsimonious model for the 2-item depressive traits measure (M = 6.76, SD 
= 1.45) was significant in predicting the negative evaluation of the target character, R2 = 
.510, F(17, 22) = 3.383, p =.004 (see Table 10). There was a main effect for the prime 
addition (sanity), β = -1.769, t(39) = -3.569, p =.002, predicting that as participants’ 
perceptions of the target character’s sanity lowered their evaluation of her depressive traits 
increased. The presence of a healthy goal in participants also predicted the evaluation of the 
target character’s depressive traits, β = -4.260, t(39) = -2.435, p = .023. The interaction 
between the prime addition (sanity) and presence of a healthy goal was also significant, β = 
4.232, t(39) = 2.558, p =.018, suggesting that the activation of the mental illness concept 
interacted with the participant’s own health goals to produce a judgment effect (see Figure 4).  
After splitting the file according to condition, further regression analyses revealed 
significant results in the extreme exemplar condition. Individual difference pretest measures 
(sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, and 
depression) were entered in the first block. The prime addition (sanity), healthy goal, and 
“good mother” goal were all entered in the second block to test for main effects. The 2-way 
interactions between the three terms were entered in the third block. The 3-way interaction 
among the three terms was entered in the fourth block. The final model for the non-extreme 
condition approached significance, R2 = .583, F(12, 7) = 3.217, p =.065. The final model for 
the extreme exemplar condition was significant, R2 = .681, F(13, 6) = 4.120, p =.046, with 
significant coefficients for the need for cognition, β = -.829, t(19) = -4.505, p = .004, need for 
orientation, β = .638, t(19) = 2.849, p = .029, prime addition (sanity), β = -3.864, t(19) = -4.630, 
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p = .004, presence of the healthy goal, β = -8.743, t(19) = -3.715, p = .010, and the prime 
addition and healthy goal interaction, β = 10.613, t(19) = 3.830, p = .009 (see Figure 5). The 
presence of the “good mother” goal approached significance, β = -11.2110, t(19) = -2.343, p = 
.058, as did the prime addition and good mother goal interaction, β = 12.032, t(19) = 2.131, p = 
.077. 
Priming perceptions of well-being traits. While t-tests failed to produce significant 
differences in the wellness scales between the two exemplar conditions, comparison of means do 
indicate notable differences between the two experimental conditions. Participants in the non-
extreme condition perceived the target character to command a greater sense of well-being than 
did those participants in the extreme condition on all well-being measures For the overall 30-item 
well-being scale, the non-extreme group (M = 4.67, SD = 1.07) judged the target character less 
harshly than did the extreme group (M = 4.56, SD =  .715). The same trends were found for the 
target character’s measure of stability (non-extreme: M = 4.83, SD = .945; extreme: M = 4.63, SD 
= .686), happiness (non-extreme: M = 4.43, SD = 1.25; extreme: M = 4.39, SD = .812), calmness 
(non-extreme: M = 4.77, SD = 1.29; extreme: M = 4.65, SD = .778), well-being traits related to 
control of situations (non-extreme: M = 4.54, SD = 1.13; extreme: M = 4.44, SD = .611), well-
being traits related to cognitions (non-extreme: M = 4.89, SD = 1.40; extreme: M = 4.70, SD = 
1.02), and well-being traits related to emotional reactance (non-extreme: M = 4.59, SD = 1.42; 
extreme: M = 4.56, SD = .993). 
Hierarchical multiple linear regression analyses were performed to evaluate how well 
the key variables predicted the overall evaluations of the target character in terms of well-
being traits. Individual difference pretest measures (race, age, education, sympathy, empathy, 
need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of control, and depression) were entered 
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in the first block. Income was excluded because by not doing so, it would exclude six cases 
listwise. The exemplification condition and prime addition (sanity) were entered in the 
second block to test for main effects. The interaction between exemplification condition and 
measure of sanity was entered in the third block. In testing the effects of the extreme or non-
extreme exemplar primes, regression analyses were performed on all seven scales of well-being 
traits — the three well-being scales derived from this study (see Table 4) as well as the original 
overall well-being scale and its subscales for calmness, happiness, and stability.  
The final model for the 30-item well-being scale was significant, R2 = .270, F(12, 27) = 
2.205, p =.043 (see Table 11), and produced main effects for education level, β = .629, t(39) = 
2.984, p = .006, race approached significance, β = -.348, t(39) = -1.940, p = .063, and the main 
effect for the prime addition (sanity) approached significance, β = .437, t(39) = 1.931, p = 
.064. The final model for the 10-item stability subscale was significant, R2 = .462, F(12, 27) = 
3.789, p =.002 (see Table 12), with main effects for education level, β = .710, t(39) = 3.923, p 
= .001, race, β = -.334, t(39) = -2.164, p = .039, and the prime addition, β = .751, t(39) = 3.867, 
p = .001. The main effect for condition approached significance, β = 1.928, t(39) = 1.927, p = 
.065; however, the interaction between condition and prime addition was significant, β = -2.036, 
t(39) = -2.055, p = .050 (see Figure 6). The final model for the 10-item happiness subscale was 
not significant. The final model for the 10-item calmness subscale was significant, R2 = .295, 
F(12, 27) = 2.357, p =.031 (see Table 13), and produced main effects for education level, β = 
.635, t(39) = 3.063, p = .005, and the main effect for sympathy approached significance, β = 
.371, t(39) = 1.946, p = .062. The final model for the well-being traits related to control of 
situations was significant, R2 = .280, F(12, 27) = 2.263, p =.038 (see Table 14), produced main 
effects for education level, β = .632, t(39) = 3.019, p = .005, race, β = -.530, t(39) = -2.972, p = 
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.006, and the prime addition (sanity), β = .466, t(39) = 2.072, p = .048. The final model for the 
scale for well-being traits related to cognitions approached significance, R2 = .226, F(12, 27) = 
1.949, p =.073, with a significant main effects for education, β = .487, t(39) = 2.246, p = .033, 
and the prime addition, β = .541, t(39) = 2.325, p = .028. The contributions of the exemplar 
condition, β = 2.249, t(39) = 1.875, p = .072, and the prime addition and exemplar condition 
interaction, β = -2,275, t(39) = -1.916, p = .066, both approached significance. The final model 
for the scale of well-being traits related to emotional reactance was not significant.  
The findings for the well-being traits suggest that the prime manipulation is producing 
assimilation as well as contrast effects. The data are indicating that the extreme exemplar of 
maternal mental illness is capable of contributing both to individuals’ negative and positive 
evaluations of the target character. In other words, once the target character’s sanity was 
more seriously called into question, those in the extreme exemplar condition corrected their 
judgment and found her to be in a more positive state of well-being (see Figure 6). 
In order to test for interactions with activated goals of being “healthy” and a “good 
mother” and how these interactions affect the evaluation of the target character’s well-being 
traits, these terms were entered into a hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis. 
Individual difference measures (sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, 
health locus of control, depression, race, education, and age) were entered in the first block. 
The exemplar condition, prime addition (sanity), healthy goal, and “good mother” goal were 
all entered in the second block to test for main effects. The 2-way interactions between the 
four terms were entered in the third block. The 3-way interactions among the four terms were 
entered in the fourth block, and the 4-way interaction was entered in the fifth block. 
Significant final models predicting evaluation of the target character’s well-being were found 
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for the 30-item well-being scale, the two 10-item scales assessing the target character’s 
stability and calmness, as well as for the 14-item scale of well-being traits related to control 
situations. The final model for the 30-item well-being scale was significant, R2 = .457, F(23, 
16) = 2.426, p =.036 (see Table 15), with significant contributions in terms of sympathy, β = 
.519, t(39) = 2.252, p = .039, exemplar condition, β = 12.884, t(39) = 3.221, p = .005, prime 
addition, β = 1.941, t(39) = 2.951, p = .009, the condition and prime addition interaction, β = -
12.876, t(39) = -2.968, p = .009 (see Figure 7), and the condition and health goal interaction, β 
= -11.065, t(39) = -2.542, p = .022 (see Figure 8). The main effect for the presence of a health 
goal approached significance, β = 5.395, t(39) = 2.106, p = .051.  
The most parsimonious model predicting the outcome of participants’ assessment of the 
target character’s stability was significant, R2 = .371, F(19, 20) = 2.212, p =.043 (see Table 16), 
with a significant coefficient in terms of education level, β = .719, t(39) = 3.152, p = .005. The 
exemplar condition, as a contributor to the final model, approached significance, β = 2.551, t(39) 
= 2.005, p = .059, as did the interaction between condition and prime addition, β = -2.304, t(39) 
= -1.922, p = .069.  
The final model predicting the outcome of participants’ evaluation of the target’s 
calmness was significant, R2 = .572, F(23, 16) = 3.266, p =.009 (see Table 17), with main 
effects for sympathy, β = .531, t(39) = 2.597, p = .019, participant depression level, β = -.384, 
t(39) = -2.307, p = .035, prime addition, β = 1.654, t(39) = 2.832, p = .012, and exemplar 
condition, β = 13.014, t(39) = 3.665, p = .002. There were significant interactions for the 
condition and prime addition, β = -13.257, t(39) = -3.443, p = .003 (see Figure 9), the condition 
and healthy goal, β = -10.157, t(39) = -2.629, p = .018 (see Figure 10), as well as a 3-way 
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interaction between the condition, prime addition, and healthy goal, β = 10.249, t(39) = 2.435, p 
= .027. 
Finally, in a scale derived from this study, a 14-item scale assessed well-being traits 
related to control. The final model was significant, R2 = .548, F(23, 16) = 3.059, p =.012 (see 
Table 18), with significant contributions in terms of prime addition, β = 2.356, t(39) = 3.929, p = 
.001, and healthy goal, β = 6.498, t(39) = 2.782, p = .013. The exemplar condition coefficient 
approached significance, β = 7.350, t(39) = 2.015, p = .061. The interaction between the healthy 
goal and prime addition was also significant, β = -5.654, t(39) = -2.474, p = .025 (see Figure 11). 
 
Exemplification Effect  
In order to test for the exemplification effect, or the increased (mis)perceptions of risk 
due to the primed exemplar condition (extreme vs. non-extreme), the data were recoded into 
pretest and posttest condition terms to reflect each primed exemplar group’s pretest, or 
baseline score, and its posttest score. These data were entered into a one-way ANOVA and 
the data suggest significant differences between the groups, F(3, 66) = 3.03, p < .05, with 
post hoc tests confirming a significant difference between the extreme condition’s pretest 
score and the non-extreme condition’s posttest score (Tukey HSD = 1.599, Std. Error = .541, 
p = .035). The means for the pretest and posttest scores illustrate that both conditions 
increased their perceptions of risk of developing postpartum disorders (Non-extreme 
condition pretest: M = 3.06, SD = 2.00 and posttest: M = 3.81, SD = 1.67; Extreme condition 
pretest: M = 2.22, SD = 1.40 and posttest: M = 2.77, SD = 1.17).  T-tests were performed to 
determine an exemplification effect for both the non-extreme and extreme exemplar 
conditions. First of all, comparing the pretest conditions did not yield significant results, thus 
confirming a similar baseline, t(33) = 1.429, p = .162. However, comparing the posttest 
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conditions between the two groups did yield significant results, t(33) = 2.119, p = .042 (see 
Figure 12), with the extreme condition group reporting significantly lower perceptions of risk 
when compared with the non-extreme condition. After splitting the data file into the two 
exemplar prime conditions, t-tests comparing pre- and posttest scores did not yield a 
significant change within each group’s perception of their own risk (Non-extreme condition: 
t(34) = -1.234, p = .226; Extreme condition: t(32) = -1.262, p = .216).  
In order to test if the prime manipulation was responsible for this effect and address 
Hypothesis 3, hierarchical multiple regression analyses were performed with posttest 
perceptions of risk as the dependent variable. Individual difference pretest measures of race, 
age, education, income, sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health 
locus of control, depression, and the pretest risk perception measure were entered in the first 
block. The condition and prime addition (sanity) was entered in the second block to test for 
main effects. The interaction between the terms was entered into the third block. The final 
model was significant, R2 = .639, F(14, 16) = 4.797, p =.002 (see Table 19), and produced a 
main effect for pretest perceptions of risk, β = .742, t(30) = 3.745, p = .002. 
After splitting the file according to exemplar condition, individual difference pretest 
measures of race, age, education, income, sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for 
orientation, health locus of control, depression, and the pretest risk perception measure were 
again entered in the first block. The prime addition (sanity) was entered in the second block 
to test for its interaction with the exemplar condition. The results show clearly that there is an 
exemplification effect, or misperception of risk, in the non-extreme condition, while 
suppression, or a correction, occurs in the extreme condition. The final model in the non-
extreme condition is significant, R2 = .865, F(11, 4) = 9.739, p =.021, with significant 
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contributions for sympathy, β = 1.002, t(15) = 3.824, p = .019, need for orientation, β = .768, 
t(17) = 3.835, p = .019, health locus of control, β = -.557, t(15) = -2.914, p = .044, and the pretest 
perceptions of risk score, β = .941, t(15) = 3.971, p = .017. But what is most telling is, after 
controlling for all other variables, there is a significant contribution from the prime addition 
(sanity) measure, β = -.666, t(30) = -3.069, p = .037, which indicates that once the participants in 
the non-extreme condition called the target character’s sanity into question coupled with the 
triggered memory of the non-extreme exemplar, they judged the target more harshly. It appears 
that this judgment, in turn, contributed to their increased perceptions of risk when compared with 
the extreme exemplar group. The extreme exemplar condition did not produce a significant 
model, nor did the split-file regression result in significant contributions by any of the variables. 
This suggests support for Hypothesis 3, in an unexpected way, but in a way that is supported by 
the social judgment literature, if not the exemplification literature. There appears to be an 
assimilation effect occurring in the condition with the moderate exemplar, but a contrast effect 
occurring in the condition with the extreme exemplar (see Figure 13). 
In order to determine the effects of activated “healthy” and “good mother” goals on 
the participants’ posttest perceptions of risk and to address Research Question 1, another 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed. Individual difference pretest 
measures (sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need for orientation, health locus of 
control, depression, and the pretest risk perception measure) were entered in the first block. 
The exemplification condition, prime addition (sanity), healthy goal, and good mother goal 
were entered in the second block to test for main effects. The 2-way interactions between 
exemplification condition, measure of sanity, health goal, and good mother goal were entered 
in the third block. The 3-way interactions among the goals, prime addition and condition 
  89 
were entered in the fourth block and the 4-way interaction among the terms was entered in 
the fifth block. The final model was significant, R2 = .477, F(21, 13) = 2.477, p = .048 (see 
Table 20), and produced a main effect for the pretest score for perceptions of risk, β = .715, 
t(35) = 2.698, p = .018. Coefficients approached significance for the good mother goal, β = 
15.460, t(35) = 2.061, p = .06, the interaction between the good mother goal and prime 
addition (sanity), β = -15.674, t(35) = -2.021, p = .064. The interaction between the good 
mother goal and healthy goal, β = -15.609, t(35) = -2.143, p = .052 (see Figure 14), and 3-way 
interaction between the prime addition (sanity), good mother goal, and healthy goal, β = 
16.523, t(35) = 2.144, p = .052, also approached significance.  
Finally, in order to further determine how activated health goals could be affecting 
their perceptions of risk, particularly if their own depressive traits offered predictive value, 
another hierarchical multiple regression was performed. This time, individual difference 
pretest measures (education, income, age, race, sympathy, empathy, need for cognition, need 
for orientation, health locus of control, and the pretest risk perception measure) were entered 
in the first block. The participants’ measures of depression (CES-D scale) and presence of a 
healthy goal were entered into the second block to test for main effects. The 2-way 
interaction between the participants’ depression score and health goals was entered in the 
third block. The final model was significant, R2 = .609, F(13, 17) = 4.243, p = .002 (see Table 
21). Participants’ need for orientation was a significant predictor of the posttest perceptions 
of risk of developing postpartum disorders, β = .365, t(30) = 2.281, p = .036. The coefficient 
for pretest perceptions of risk scores was significant, β = .597, t(30) = 2.976, p = .008, as was 
the coefficient for participant depression, β = -.826, t(30) = -2.247, p = .038. The 2-way 
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interaction between the participants’ depression score and healthy goals was also significant, 
β = .993, t(30) = 2.153, p = .046 (see Figure 15). 
 
Behavioral Intentions  
In order to address Research Questions 2 and 3, hierarchical regression analyses were 
performed to determine how key variables were influencing the choices that participants intended 
to make in terms of speaking to her doctor if she were experiencing depressing symptoms, or 
conversely, postponing speaking with her doctor in order to avoid being placed on medication. In 
order to address the two research questions and determine the effects of the prime condition and 
activated “healthy” as well as “good mother” goals on the participants’ posttest behavioral 
intentions, individual difference measures (education, income, age, race, an evaluation of the 
health communication video, and the pretest behavioral intention measure) were entered in the 
first block. The exemplification condition, prime addition (sanity), healthy goal, and good mother 
goal were entered in the second block to test for main effects. The 2-way interactions between 
exemplification condition, measure of sanity, health goal, and good mother goal were entered in 
the third block. The 3-way interactions among the goals, prime addition and condition were 
entered in the fourth block and the 4-way interaction was entered in the fifth block. The analyses 
failed to produce significant results for predicting participants’ sense of empowerment to speak 
with their doctor if they are experiencing depressive symptoms. However, on the second 
measure, whether participants will postpone speaking to their doctor, the analysis did yield 
significant results, R2 = .645, F(10,  23) = 6.999, p < .001 (see Table 22), with the most 
parsimonious model producing main effects for the video score, β = -.347, t(33) = -2.651, p = 
.020, and pretest score of the participant’s intention toward avoidance, β = .764, t(33) = 6.889, p 
< .001. There were no significant interactions nor even a significant t-test to indicate that the 
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prime condition is having a significant predictive influence, t(38) = -.887, p = .380, and Figure 16 
illustrates why this likely occurred. Clearly, the extreme prime manipulation is producing a 
correction or contrast effect, while the non-extreme condition is producing an assimilation effect. 
In order to see what direction the data were going in terms of prime condition, the data were 
recoded into pretest and posttest condition terms to reflect each primed exemplar group’s pretest, 
or baseline score, and its posttest score. These data were entered into a one-way ANOVA and the 
data suggest no significant differences between the groups, F(1, 78) = 1.64, p = .204. The means 
for the pretest and posttest scores did illustrate that both conditions increased their intention to 
postpone speaking to their doctor in order to avoid medication, despite watching the educational 
health communication video (Non-extreme condition pretest: M = 2.55, SD = 2.417 and posttest: 
M = 2.70, SD = 2.13; Extreme condition pretest: M = 2.25, SD = 1.682 and posttest: M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.773).  T-tests were performed to determine if the changes in the pretest and posttest scores 
approached significance, while it did not in the non-extreme condition, t(38) = -.208, p = .836, it 
did in the extreme exemplar condition, t(38) = -1.830, p = .075. 
 
Mediation of Activated Goals on Behavioral Intentions 
In order to determine how behavioral intentions were influenced by exemplars of 
maternal mental illness and activated health goals, mediation analyses were performed to 
address Research Questions 1, 2 and 3 and to evaluate how well the key factors influenced the 
participants’ choices. These analyses determined the influence of the prime condition on 
subsequent behavioral intentions by showing that the participant’s prime condition was further 
mediated by the woman’s goal to be healthy. Research Question 1 sought to determine the 
relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal mental illness and 
pregnant women’s perceived likelihood of developing postpartum disorders. Research 
  92 
Question 2 sought to determine the relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme 
maternal mental illness and pregnant women’s perceived likelihood of feeling empowered to 
talk to her doctor about her depressive symptoms. Research Question 3 sought to determine the 
relationship between the activation of a concept of extreme maternal mental illness and 
pregnant women’s likelihood of avoiding medication.   
For the women’s perception of risk, a regression analysis indicated that there was not a 
significant link between condition as the independent variable and posttest perceptions of risk 
for the dependent variable, B = -.650, p = .181. Similarly, for the first behavioral intention, a 
regression analysis revealed that there was not a significant link between condition as the 
independent variable and the empowerment behavioral intention as the dependent variable, B = 
-.300, p = .653. According to Baron & Kenny (1986), this direct effect must be significant 
before mediation can be established. Finally, for the second behavioral intention, a regression 
analysis showed that condition alone was not a significant predictor of downstream avoidance 
behavior, B = .550, p = .380. No further analyses were done and a mediation effect was not 
established for the posttest perception of risk, or for either behavioral intention. 
 
Posttest Involvement 
Personal involvement with the issue of postpartum depression was measured with a 
three-item scale. A simple t-test for the equality of means approached significance in 
indicating a difference between the non-extreme cohort (M = 5.02, SD = 1.66) and the 
extreme condition cohort (M = 4.02, SD = 1.62), t(38) = 1.832, p = .075. This indicated that 
the non-extreme cohort were more involved posttest, than those in the extreme condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
DISCUSSION 
Automaticity scholars have produced evidence that external stimuli can elicit an 
automatic response in participants. In the past 20 years, researchers have sought to determine 
how primes work in real time and influence downstream behaviors. The current study 
assessed how pregnant women are influenced by exemplars of postpartum disorders 
presented via online news slideshows, their memories of which were then triggered to be 
accessible via a subliminal priming technique. 
Social cognition researchers have hypothesized that accessible knowledge leads to a 
natural tendency toward assimilation. In other words, when primed with an exemplar 
participants tend to assimilate whatever impressions they form of the exemplar and transfer 
those traits to the target character.  On the other hand, social judgment researchers have long 
propounded that accessible knowledge has a natural tendency toward contextual comparison.  
In other words, when primed with an exemplar of particular traits, participants will 
contextualize those traits with those of the target and the resulting judgment will contrast the 
traits of the exemplar with those of the target character (Stapel & Koomen, 2001). The 
existing literature cites examples of extreme exemplars most likely producing contrast 
effects, while more moderate exemplars produce assimilation effects (Dijksterhuis et al. 
1998, Herr, 1986; Stapel, Koomen, & van der Pligt, 1997). 
If one looks at the exemplification literature, one may argue that it is rife with 
examples of moderate exemplars, even in cases where the extremity of the exemplars has 
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been manipulated (see Zillmann & Brosius, 2000, for a review). For example, Gibson and 
Zillmann (1994) manipulated the outcomes of carjacking stories that were used as 
supraliminal primes in their study. One may argue that the idea of being carjacked is so 
abstract to most individuals that being exposed to a story in an experiment may have been the 
very first time that many of the participants had taken stock of their perceptions of risk for 
this particular phenomenon. The stories were not about famous people or people they knew 
being carjacked, so it could be argued that they could not embody the risk as much as the 
pregnant women in this experiment could embody the risk of postpartum disorders. It can be 
argued that since many of those studies did not manipulate the self- concept, it is unknown 
what effects could have occurred if they had done so. 
The results of this experiment first illustrate, in terms of the non-extreme exemplar 
condition, a classic exemplification study and, second, in terms of the extreme exemplar 
condition, illustrate a classic social judgment study. This study explored the notion that an 
extreme exemplar of someone who has suffered from a postpartum disorder (e.g. postpartum 
psychosis) would either trigger assimilation of hostile traits of the exemplar (Andrea Yates) 
to the target character who had experienced the milder postpartum depression, or it would 
trigger a contrast effect whereby the hostile traits of Andrea Yates would result in a kinder 
assessment of the target’s traits. This study also investigated whether that same extreme 
exemplar would trigger assimilation or contrast effects in terms of well-being traits of the 
target character. In terms of triggering an exemplification effect, or the misperception of risk, 
the study also explored the influence of an extreme versus non-extreme exemplar of 
postpartum disorders. Finally, the study investigated how implicitly activated healthy goals 
may be mediating the effects of the primes on perceptions of risk and behavioral intentions. 
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Due to competing findings in the literature on accessible knowledge, it was not clear what the 
extreme and non-extreme exemplars would yield for a sample that was so closely invested in 
this topic. 
Individual differences were taken into account in order to parse out a true media 
effect. Possible moderating factors for this study included measures for education, income, 
age, race, sympathy, empathy, health locus of control, need for cognition, need for 
orientation, and depression. As such, these measures were controlled for in the regression 
analyses. Certainly, in the judgment of the target character, individual differences in 
empathic and sympathetic capacity can explain how participants in the experiment rate the 
target individual. Oliver (2002) acknowledges that while individual differences such as these 
are important in helping to clarify unexplained variance, they are inherently “messy” because 
it is difficult to account for all of the individual differences that serve as influences of a 
media effect (p. 507). However, Oliver (2002) points out that there are aspects of media 
audiences that “represent enduring dispositions, attitudes, or cognitions” (p. 507). As such, 
this study included measures for need for orientation (Matthes, 2005) in order to assess 
information-seeking dispositions as well as need for cognition measures (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984). It is these enduring traits that are useful to media researchers in predicting 
audience attitudes and behaviors. For example, many researchers have investigated how 
empathy influences audiences’ responses to entertainment (see Eisenberg, 2000; Zillmann, 
1991), particularly in terms of forming impressions about characters: 
Many studies of character perception, however, have focused on evaluative 
judgments about characters’ personal attributes, often with regard to social 
desirability (e.g., good or bad, nice or mean). This approach seems to reflect the 
assumptions of implicit personality theory (see Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 
1979), which contends that the content of impressions is organized around a few 
underlying dimensions. In other words, a person who possesses one specific attribute 
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is assumed to possess a variety of related characteristics as well. In fact, research has 
found that general evaluative dimension (favorable-unfavorable) accounts for the 
largest amount of variance in impressions of others  (Hoffner & Cantor, 1991, p. 63). 
 
In Zillmann’s (2006, 1991) explication of empathy, he notes that empathy is generally 
thought of as an affective state and differs greatly among individuals and so it “should be 
treated as an individual-difference variable” that influences a person’s ability to place himself 
or herself into others’ emotional state of being (p. 151). Often we experience these vivid 
emotions through media characters (like the target character who was presented on video), 
but the process is not that different from interpersonal empathic reactivity (Hoffner & Cantor, 
1991). Sympathy is an affective state that is less intense than empathy, where one may 
understand how someone else is feeling and feel compassion for that person, but the level of 
involvement just isn’t as strong. Research has shown that women tend to exhibit greater 
empathic capacity while men demonstrate greater sympathetic capacity (Myyry & Helkama, 
2001). 
Oliver (2002) points out that media effects researchers often deal with small to 
moderate main effects when manipulating an independent variable and that much of the 
variance in results can be explained by individual differences such as empathy or locus of 
control. As a concept, locus of control refers to one’s perception of power over something 
else. As an individual measure, people are divided into two camps, “internals,” who feel they 
have a great deal of control of the world around them, and “externals,” who tend to feel less 
control or believe more that powerful others or fate wields control in their world (Hoffman et 
al., 2003). More specifically, since the video presented in this experiment features a 
persuasive health appeal to pregnant mothers, this study assessed participants’ health locus of 
control (HLOC) status. The 11-item scale that was used still divides dispositions into 
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“internals” and “externals,” but in the context of the sense of control one has over one’s 
health (Walston et al., 1976). As such, the mean indicated that this sample had a slightly 
more “internal” disposition as a whole (M = 4.39, SD = 1.85). This study also sought to 
discover if HLOC, among other individual difference measures, influenced the behavioral 
intent toward the health communication video. Among other things, the participants were 
specifically asked if they would feel empowered to talk to their doctor if they are 
experiencing depressive symptoms, and/or postpone speaking to their doctor in order to 
avoid medication. Finally, the women were assessed for depressive symptoms using the 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). It is a 20-item measure that 
was developed for a general, non-psychiatric population and has been found to have high 
internal consistency (alphas of .85 to .90) (Radloff, 1977). It proved to be consistent in this 
study as well (α = .94).  
Priming perceptions of hostile traits. The results indicated that individuals in the 
extreme exemplar condition reacted differently to the target character than those in the non-
extreme condition in terms of assessing her hostile traits. In assessing her “selfishness,” there 
were no significant differences between prime conditions, and although the means varied 
(non-extreme exemplar condition: M = 3.95, SD = 1.731; extreme exemplar condition: M = 
4.50, SD = 1.147), a t-test confirmed that the difference was not significant. Participants’ 
need for cognition and depression measures made significant contributions to predicting the 
evaluation of the target character; however, there was no significant contribution made by the 
prime addition, nor was there a significant interaction between prime addition and exemplar 
condition. This may be because as it appears in Figure 1, a contrast effect seems to have 
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occurred in the extreme exemplar condition. A significant interaction would have provided 
proof that the prime manipulation alone worked to trigger the mental illness concept.  
For a second hostile trait measure, participants who were primed with the extreme 
exemplar were more likely to judge the target character more harshly in terms of whether 
they thought she was “a drama queen.” This determination was made from comparing the 
means of the two conditions. However, upon closer investigation, the results indicated that 
the participants reacted differently to the exemplars most likely due to significant 
contributions by the prime addition (the measure of sanity of the target character) as well as 
the participant’s age, although further regression analyses failed to parse out significant 
effects in terms of the two exemplar conditions. It does appear that the influence of the 
mental illness concept coupled with the nature of this hostile trait may be evoking a visceral 
reaction to Samantha — and a stronger reaction from participants in the extreme exemplar 
condition. Again, the prime manipulation failed to produce significant interaction so that, in 
terms of provoking judgment in terms of “selfish” and “drama queen” traits, this 
investigation wasn’t able to isolate the prime manipulation as the sole cause of the effect. It’s 
clear that there is much more at play here, and that in addition to the participants’ own pretest 
dispositions, their activated goals provided important influences in determining their 
judgments, perceptions of risk, and behavioral intentions. These interactions with activated 
goals also may provide the necessary proof to determine that the contrast effects that appear 
to be occurring in the extreme exemplar conditions are not simply corrections, or reflective 
of how one would react in a neutral condition. 
Priming perceptions of depressive traits. While the regression analyses testing for an 
interaction between the prime addition (sanity) and exemplar condition failed to produce 
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significant results, the regression analyses of the prime addition and activated “healthy” and 
“good mother” goals proved to be a fruitful investigation. As seen in Figures 4 and 5, an 
activated healthy goal is interacting with the mental illness concept (sanity) and is more 
likely to be causing participants to feel that the target character is more depressed. This effect 
was significant in the final model, and upon further analysis, was significant in the extreme 
exemplar condition. Although the small size of this sample provides clear limitations in terms 
of hierarchical regression analysis, and perhaps it can be argued that this is not enough power 
to definitively make the claim that the prime addition (sanity) and healthy goal interaction 
was truly significant in the extreme exemplar condition, it can be argued that this is a 
direction that the research needs to follow. It appears that there is an influence that goals and 
self-concepts are having on individuals’ interactions with media and may be determining 
what is occurring in their downstream behavior.  
The results of regression analyses done to address Hypotheses 2 and 2a provide more 
elucidation that the contrast effect that appears to be occurring in the extreme exemplar 
condition is not a simple correction, but is an actual effect that is being caused by the prime 
manipulation. The interaction between condition and prime addition was significant (see Figure 
6) in the full regression model predicting the evaluation of the target character’s stability. The 
results indicate that as the target’s character was evaluated to be less sane, those participants in 
the extreme condition who were triggered by memories of Andrea Yates countered those 
impressions of the extreme exemplar and judged the target character to be more stable than did 
those in the non-extreme exemplar condition. It appears that the non-extreme exemplar group are 
following a clear assimilation pattern, as the target character’s sanity is called into question, so 
was her stability. 
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When the activated “healthy” goal is included in the analyses, clearer assimilation and 
contrast results emerged that aligned with the non-extreme and exemplar conditions, 
respectively. In testing the influence that activated goals have on the evaluation of the target 
character’s overall well-being (30-item scale), the results produced significant exemplar 
condition and prime addition (sanity) interaction (Figure 7) as well as significant exemplar 
condition and healthy goal interaction (Figure 8). Participants in the extreme exemplar condition 
aligned their evaluations with the non-extreme cohort and evaluated the target character’s overall 
well-being as positively as they did her sanity when that mental illness concept was not called 
into question; however, as soon as the target’s sanity was negatively evaluated, the extreme 
group countered with a more positive evaluation of the target’s well-being. Interestingly, when 
the participants’ healthy goal was also activated, their judgment of the target’s overall well-being 
matched that of the non-extreme group; however, when their healthy goal was not activated, their 
judgment of the target character was harsher.  
It appears that triggering the self-concept in the extreme exemplar condition, as this 
experimental procedure has appeared to have done, also triggered a protective reaction — one 
that coincided with the contrast effect. It appears that the Andrea Yates exemplar may have 
triggered not only the “mentally ill” concept, but the “motherhood” concept as well. Perhaps this 
is increasing the empathetic capacity of those in the extreme group toward the target character. 
Once she is implicitly compared to Andrea Yates, the comparison is contextualized and a 
contrast effect occurs. Much like Djiksterhuis et al.’s (1998) Einstein exemplar tapped into the 
“intelligent” concept as well as the “stupid” concept, in that once participants were primed with 
the self-referent concept, they viewed themselves as less intelligent than the extreme exemplar 
that Einstein represents.  It may be that the target character tapped into each participant’s self-
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concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987). As they are pregnant themselves, they embody the risk that 
Andrea Yates, in the extreme sense, represents and as a result, those in that condition reacted 
with self-preservation. This was not an effect that was seen in a similar study conducted by 
Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009), where the stimulus material involving maternal mental 
illness clearly didn’t tap into the self-concept of the college students who served as participants. 
Similarly, the activated “healthy” goal may be offering a shield in that those whose 
goals were activated judged the target character’s overall well-being similarly in both 
conditions. However, participants whose goals were not activated and were in the extreme 
exemplar condition judged the target character more harshly than did those who were in the 
non-extreme condition. Automaticity researchers have long illustrated how implicit goals can 
influence behavior. As mentioned before, Fishbach and Dhar (2005) were able to prime 
health goals outside of their participants’ awareness and were able to distinguish differences 
in behavior based on those primed goals.  Participants would “borrow” from their weight-loss 
efforts if they were primed with a “progress” goal and thought that they were, indeed, 
making progress. This resulted in indulging in an unhealthy snack or meal. Chartrand et al. 
(2008) were able to prime “thrift” and “prestige” goals outside of participants’ awareness as 
well and were able to show that non-conscious goals behave much like consciously activated 
goals. In particular, once the non-conscious goal was satiated with a goal-congruent choice, 
the goal was no longer active. It would be interesting to see if, postpartum, these women’s 
goals are satiated somehow by the birth of a healthy baby and the activated healthy goal (in 
terms of themselves) is no longer active. Or does this healthy goal maintain its place and 
“shield” the mother from correcting her perceptions of risk (see Figure 14) and increase her 
tendency to engage in avoidance behavior? 
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The results indicated a similar pattern in the interactions between the prime addition 
(sanity) and exemplar condition as well as the condition and activated healthy goal for 
participants’ evaluation of the target character’s calm traits. The results also found a 
significant interaction between the healthy goal and prime addition in terms of predicting the 
evaluation of the target’s well-being traits related to control situations. Clearly, the activated 
healthy goal has emerged as an important contributor to this study’s findings. 
In terms of the exemplification effect, or misperception of risk, both an individual’s 
predisposition to risk as well as their prime condition were significant contributors to the 
posttest perception of risk. First, the results of an ANOVA and t-tests showed that those in 
the extreme exemplar condition had significantly lower perceptions of risk at the end of the 
experiment than those in the non-extreme condition. While the full regression model could 
not pinpoint the prime manipulation as being solely responsible for the difference, the file 
was split according to condition and further analyses revealed that the prime addition was a 
significant predictor in the outcome of the non-extreme group’s perception of risk. The 
assimilation effect that appears to have occurred in the non-extreme condition aligns these 
results with classic exemplification literature and with Holman and Dillman Carpentier’s 
(2009) previous findings with college students, where the exemplars may have been 
“moderate” by default. In other words, because previous participants of exemplification 
studies did not make the exemplars personal or tap into the self-concept, it was easier to 
assimilate or transfer traits and perceptions of risk to themselves or others. It appears that 
once the self-concept is threatened, contextual comparison occurs. In the case of this study’s 
non-extreme exemplar condition, the participants’ self-concept wasn’t threatened, so no 
contrast effect occurred. What is intriguing is that despite the strong predispositions in their 
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own perceptions of risk, it appears that the prime manipulation did have a significant 
influence after all, albeit in an unexpected way. What is fascinating are the results for the 
posttest perceptions of risk in terms of the influence of activated healthy and “good mother” 
goals as it appears that these two goals work in concert to predict higher perceptions of risk 
of developing postpartum disorders (see Figure 14). The activated healthy goal also 
interacted with the participants’ own depressive traits to predict increased perceptions of risk 
as well, a powerful result when one considers that taken alone, the more depressed 
participants were, the lower their perceptions of risk were. 
Finally, the results show that in terms of behavioral intentions, those in the extreme 
exemplar condition were more likely to postpone speaking with their doctor in order to avoid 
medication. This is despite having corrected their judgment over and over again when 
evaluating traits of the target character in conjunction with her sanity and evaluating her in a 
more positive light when her mental health was called into question. This intended avoidance 
behavior was expressed despite suppressing their perceptions of risk of developing 
postpartum disorders, and these results occurred despite exposure to a persuasive health 
communication video that was rated rather positively (M = 6.63, SD = 1.10). While the 
results of this study cannot to generalized to a larger population of pregnant women, these 
results do suggest support for Luce and her colleagues’ theory that highly emotional 
decision-making can result in avoidance behavior. These emotions can be induced implicitly, 
yet are potent influences in the decision-making process. Individuals who experience more 
emotion tend to avoid difficult choices by choosing avoidance behaviors instead as a coping 
mechanism (Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 2001; Luce, 2005). 
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Limitations 
While the results of this study show great potential, there are a number of limitations 
to this, and all, experimental research. As stated before, the results of experimental designs 
cannot be generalized to a larger population, and in this case, a larger population of pregnant 
women. Experimental designs are designed to explain phenomena on a micro level, by 
pointing out how different stimuli or individual differences explain variance in results (or 
how people react or behave toward the stimulus). While the power of experimental designs 
comes from the manipulation and control of what participants are exposed to and the 
subsequent claim of causality in their results, they lack the ability to extend those results 
beyond the experiment at hand. And while this experiment is more powerful than the 
experiment done by Holman and Dillman Carpentier (2009) in that this investigation 
triggered effects on a more externally valid sample, more and varied research of this 
particular population is needed to allow for extended generalizations to be made about how 
pregnant women react to media accounts of maternal mental illness. On that note, the most 
important limitation to this study was the sample size. The experiment had a low number of 
participants in both the extreme exemplar condition (n = 20) as well as the non-extreme 
condition (n = 20). The experiment should have had more participants; particularly to provide 
more power to support the regression analyses of additional factors of activated healthy and 
good mother goals. 
Another limitation was the risk of inflated Type 1 error. This possibility presents 
itself in data analyses when all of the hypotheses and research questions are tested at the .05 
level, and thus the results may have indicated an inflated Type 1 error. A Type 1 error occurs 
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when a study shows statistical evidence that allows for the rejection of a null hypothesis, 
when that hypothesis is indeed true. 
Another limitation of this study was the control of lag time between exposure to the 
pretest Web site and the prime manipulation. As this was essentially a field experiment, it 
was difficult to control when participants would choose to view the Web site after receiving 
the link at home as well as to control when they were available to meet with the researcher. 
Future research could address this issue with set appointments for pretest exposure as well. 
Another limitation was the failure to ask participants about their consumption of 
information about health information beyond what they seek out on the Internet. Participants 
were not asked about what they have read about in magazines, newspapers, or in books. This 
consumption of health information could have influenced the results, in that individuals who 
reported consuming more health information may have responded with lower perceptions of 
risk to developing postpartum disorders.  
Despite these limitations, the study showed a relationship between extremity of 
exemplars of maternal mental illness, individuals’ predispositions of depression and risk, 
among other individual differences, and the ability of the media to prime individuals in their 
evaluations of a target character and to possibly influence behavioral intentions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
CONCLUSION 
Findings 
Perinatal depression is a disorder that involves depressive episodes that occur either 
during pregnancy (prenatal depression) or within the first 12 months after the baby is born 
(postpartum depression). This disorder can have very serious consequences on the mother, as 
well as her child and her family. Research has shown that women who have postpartum 
depression have lower quality interactions with their children (Stein et al., 1991), which can 
lead to developmental delays in the children (Chewning, 2009). Perinatal depression has also 
been connected with greater use of emergency department services; more missed pediatric 
appointments, higher levels of psychiatric disturbances among children, and children feeling 
more insecure in attachment relationships (Gavin et al., 2005). 
Pregnant women in this sample were influenced by their predispositions of their 
perceived risk, enacted “healthy” and “good mother” goals, as well as the media triggering 
their implicit stereotypes of maternal mental illness in increasing their perceptions of risk of 
developing postpartum disorders. Interestingly, those who were triggered with the memory of 
the non-extreme, or more moderate, exemplar of postpartum disorders had higher perceptions 
of risk of developing postpartum depression. This result aligns itself with a plethora of other 
exemplification studies that, it can be argued, also used moderate exemplars (Zillmann & 
Brosius, 2000). On the other hand, those primed with memory of the extreme exemplar of 
postpartum disorders had lower posttest perceptions of risk than the non-extreme cohort. 
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Those same participants were also more likely to postpone speaking to their doctor in order 
to avoid medication if they thought they were experiencing depressive symptoms. This 
occurred even after being exposed to a health communication video designed to educate and 
persuade them to speak to their health care provider if they were to experience depressive 
symptoms. It appears that the extreme exemplar is triggering a self-preservation reaction. 
The results here indicate that the extremity of exemplars does influence how pregnant 
women — who clearly are embodying the risk after being informed that one in ten of them 
will likely develop postpartum depression — react in terms of their perceptions of risk of 
developing postpartum disorders and their likelihood of engaging in avoidance behavior. 
What this study has done in terms of contributing to automaticity and exemplification 
literature is that by tapping into the self-concept and activated goals of a group of individuals 
who embody a particular risk, this investigation has been able to determine more significant 
measures of attitudes and behavioral intentions in an important realm of health risk 
perception. In terms of simple media priming, this study was successful at parsing out the 
condition and prime addition (sanity) interaction as a significant contributor to how 
participants evaluated the target character’s stability; however, what is more important is this 
study’s contribution in parsing out how the media prime interacted with participants’ enacted 
goals in determining many other judgments, self-perceptions, and behavioral intentions.  
What this study has also pointed out for media exemplification scholars is that despite 
the consistent success with priming assimilation effects on perceptions of risk for different 
health and welfare issues, a key direction in this research is to assess participant goals in 
terms of health and how those goals help determine perceptions of risk. It is also important to 
assess possible behavioral intentions in terms of preventative or potential treatment options. 
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By testing this design in the realm of other health or welfare issues that also tap directly into 
the self-concept of the sample being used, it is likely that others will be able discover more 
significant interactions and behavioral intentions. In addition, exemplification scholars 
should test for a sleeper effect in order to determine not only if the risk perception grows over 
time in the moderate and/or extreme exemplar conditions, but if an activated goal contributes 
to the increase. Experimental designs could also investigate what occurs when these goals are 
satiated as opposed to not being satiated and perhaps what effect this has on behavioral 
intentions like avoidance. 
The takeaway lesson for journalists who report on health communication issues is that 
despite correcting for attitudes and risk perception, extreme exemplars of health phenomena 
may be leading to increased avoidance behavior by individuals in engaging their health care 
providers. Conversely, while stories about regular people who suffer from a particular 
disorder may, as predicted by exemplification theorists, increase perceptions of risk and, as 
predicted by social cognition theorists, assimilate traits to others who suffer from the disorder 
and lead to harsher judgments; it does appear to lead individuals to more engagement with 
their health care providers. So while reports of women who commit infanticide are deemed 
newsworthy, journalists should use those opportunities to provide a more comprehensive 
report on the issue. By speaking and citing medical experts about the statistical likelihood of 
extreme examples of a particular phenomenon, as well as contextualizing the story with 
other, more moderate examples, readers would perhaps be better served in terms of their own 
medical decision-making. Journalists need to make the effort in this type of medical reporting 
to report “both sides of the story,” so to speak: The newsworthy side, and the public service 
side. 
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Qualitatively, all the women in this study expressed gratitude over the fact that they 
had an outlet to discuss this issue. Many were surprised by how common postpartum 
depression was; and although a number of these women had known someone personally who 
had experienced postpartum depression, the results of this study suggest that they were still 
vulnerable to implicit media influence. The takeaway for pregnant women is that they should 
be aware of the influence that societal expectations, the media, the stressors of their jobs, 
partners, their children, and health care providers all have on their own realistic — and 
perhaps unrealistic — expectations of how a baby will change their lives. There is no doubt 
of the medical etiology of perinatal depression, but there are a number of other factors that 
also contribute to the onset and severity of these disorders. Pregnant women need to be aware 
of and share with their health care provider any personal or family history of depression, as 
well as any factors that may be adding stress to their pregnancy. They need to be advocates 
for their own health and welfare, and not avoid the subject of depression because they may 
feel shame or embarrassment, or feel that they don’t have a say in their treatment plan. 
Obstetricians and other providers of prenatal care need to be more proactive in their 
assessment of the mental health of their patients during their pregnancies and post partum. 
The Edinburgh Postpartum Depression Scale is a useful tool that should be utilized at 
intervals during the pregnancy as well as at the standard postpartum office visits. This allows 
women who may not feel compelled to speak up — or who simply are not aware that what 
they are experiencing does constitute depression — a chance to assess how they are feeling 
and share that with a medical professional. In addition, obstetricians should not only be 
prepared to offer medication in their treatment plan, but be plugged into what is available to 
new mothers in terms of mental health care and support groups. 
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Future studies 
This study is part of a stream of research into a highly emotional area of medical 
decision-making. While accepting the probably inevitability of automatically activating their 
implicit stereotypes (Bargh, 1999) against maternal mental illness and/or mental illness in 
general and subsequent evaluations of a target individual who has suffered from postpartum 
depression, we hope to better understand how the enacted dispositions of pregnant women 
could be affecting how treatment options are being evaluated and acted on. Also, by 
comparing intended behavioral results of the extreme prime and non-extreme prime 
conditions, and the interaction of activated goals, we hope to be able to distinguish 
differences in the effectiveness of different health communication videos. This effort could 
certainly lead to manipulations in argument strength in future experiments utilizing a health 
communication video of this nature. Studies that would compare risk learning models — 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983), and the health belief model (Becker, 
Haefner, Kasl, et al., 1977; Becker, Haefner, & Maiman, 1977; Rosenstock, 1974) — and the 
stereotype priming model (Bargh, 1989; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) would also lead to 
fruitful investigations in terms of health communication research (Pechmann, 2001). For 
example, much like Pechmann and Ratneshwar (1994) used stereotypes of smokers to enact 
increased behavioral intentions of participants not to smoke, testing messages or stories of 
women who suffered from postpartum depression and avoided treatment could instill positive 
behavioral intentions in pregnant women or women of child-bearing age to engage their 
health care providers on the issue of perinatal depression. Certainly, the results of this study 
would be strengthened by survey data gathered from pregnant women as well as obstetricians 
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in order to provide a record of the stressors they encounter as patients and health care 
practitioners respectively. This would provide greater generalization of results. 
Finally, there are a plethora of study ideas that could stem from the relationship that a 
pregnant woman has with her partner or spouse and how they influence her health choices. 
Future studies will take into account implementation intentions (see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 
2000) and reactance (see Chartrand et al., 2007) to assess how these predispositions could be 
influencing the treatment choices for the mother as well as joint decisions regarding the 
newborn. Ultimately, this stream of research aims to provide a comprehensive look at the 
interaction of media influence, interpersonal influence, and medical decision-making at a key 
point in the emergence and implementation of health goals. This is an important undertaking 
considering the possible outcomes in the lives of new mothers as well as the lives of their 
children. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
 
 M SD Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Empathy 6.75 0.88 3.85 -.625 -.018  
Sympathy 4.10 1.02 4.09 -.110  -.585 
Need for Cognition 6.21 0.76 3.85 .405  1.183 
Need for Orientation 3.23 1.65 6.20 .904  -.016 
Health Locus of Control 4.39 1.85 7.00 -.088  -.692 
Depression (CES-D Scale) 5.63 1.63 7.50 -.644  .461 
Sanity (target: Samantha) 5.74 0.84 3.07 .311  -.791 
Hostility 1 (target) 4.23 1.48 8.00 .597  1.725 
Hostility 2 (target) 4.27 1.20 5.00 -.848 .018 
Depression 2-item DV (target) 6.76 1.45 7.00 -.778  1.726 
 
Overall Well-being (target) 4.62 0.90 5.50 -.223  3.154 
Stability Score (target) 4.73 0.82 4.30 .026  1.707 
Happy Score (target) 4.41 1.04 6.00 .032  1.995 
Calm Score (target) 4.71 1.05 6.60 -1.034  4.155 
Wellscore1 (emotional control) 4.49 0.90 5.71 .886 5.052 
Wellscore2 (emotions/cognitions) 4.80 1.21 5.45 .100  .394 
Wellscore3 (emotional reactance) 4.58 1.21 5.40 -.866  .873 
Pretest Exemplification  3.25 2.42 9.00 1.085 .482 
Effect Score 
 
Posttest Exemplification 3.38 1.52 6.33 .370  -.282 
Effect Score 
 
Video Score 6.63 1.10 4.36 -.003  -.699  
 
Posttest Involvement 4.54 1.69 7.33 .281 .111 
in Postpartum Depression Issue 
 
Note: All measures are based on a nine-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) (n = 40) 
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Table 2:  Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
  
 
 
Table 2 Note: All items recorded on a 9-item Likert scale. 
* In the case of 2-item scales, the correlation coefficient is reported, otherwise alpha.  
a Correlations (r) significant at the 0.01 level. b Correlations (r) significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Showing the Total Variance Explained for the Analysis  
of the Well-being Traits of the Target Character “Samantha” 
                                                 Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 12.622 42.073 42.073 12.399 41.329 41.329 
2 3.632 12.107 54.180 3.397 11.323 52.652 
3 2.332 7.773 61.953 2.047 6.822 59.474 
4 1.863 6.209 68.163 1.639 5.463 64.936 
5 1.450 4.833 72.996 1.172 3.906 68.842 
6 1.278 4.260 77.256 1.022 3.407 72.249 
7 1.132 3.775 81.030 .885 2.949 75.199 
8 .918 3.061 84.091    
9 .773 2.577 86.668    
10 .621 2.069 88.736    
11 .502 1.673 90.409    
12 .447 1.490 91.899    
13 .409 1.362 93.261    
14 .316 1.054 94.315    
15 .302 1.005 95.320    
16 .293 .976 96.296    
17 .227 .755 97.051    
18 .166 .552 97.603    
19 .137 .455 98.058    
20 .110 .365 98.423    
21 .098 .325 98.749    
22 .090 .299 99.048    
23 .077 .256 99.304    
24 .073 .242 99.546    
25 .053 .178 99.724    
26 .027 .089 99.813    
27 .024 .078 99.891    
28 .022 .074 99.965    
29 .007 .022 99.987    
30 .004 .013 100.00    
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Table 4 
Exploratory Factor Analysis Showing the Factor Loadings for the Analysis  
of the Well-being Traits of the Target Character “Samantha” 
      Well-being Traits of “Samantha” 
 
Emotional 
Control 
Scale 
Emotion 
Related to 
Cognitions 
Emotional 
Reactance 
14. Looks at the bright side of life. .839   
19. Dislikes herself. (R) .808   
6. Gets stressed out easily. (R) .803   
23. Takes things as they come. .785   
29. Loses her temper. (R) .772   
25. Gets angry easily. (R) .707   
1. Seldom gets mad. .706   
16. Often feels blue. (R) .703   
27. Gets furious. (R) .647   
30. Has days when she is mad at the 
world. (R) 
.606   
4. Seldom takes offense. .602   
13. Adapts easily to new situations. .547   
12. Feels comfortable with herself. .350   
2. Is not easily bothered by things.  .130   
10. Gets caught up in her problems. (R)  -.921  
22. Is not easily annoyed.  -.822  
9. Changes her mood a lot. (R)  -.804  
15. Is sure of her ground.  -.800  
24. Accepts people as they are.  -.784  
21. Rarely gets irritated.  -.778  
3. Is not easily frustrated.  -.763  
26. Is often in a bad mood. (R)  -.734  
11. Seldom feels blue.  -.727  
8. Is easily disturbed. (R)  -.689  
5. Keeps her cool.  -.643  
18. Feels threatened easily. (R)   .753 
20. Is filled with doubts about things. (R)   .693 
28. Snaps at people. (R)   .684 
7. Gets upset easily. (R)   .658 
17. Worries about things. (R)   .396 
Eigenvalue 12.622 3.632 2.332 
Variance 42.073 12.107 7.773 
 
Note: Principal Axis factoring on three fixed factors with Direct Oblimin Rotation. 
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Table 5 
Principal Components Analysis Showing the Factor Loadings  
for the Pretest Perceptions of Risk of Developing Postpartum Disorders 
            Evaluation of Risk   
POSTPARTUM .770   
DEPRESSION  
vulnerability 
 
“BABY BLUES”  .911 
vulnerability 
 
POSTPARTUM .817 
PSYCHOSIS  
vulnerability 
 
I think it’s likely that  .820 
I will experience the  
“BABY BLUES”  
after giving birth. 
 
I think it’s likely  .922 
that I will experience  
POSTPARTUM  
DEPRESSION  
after giving birth. 
 
I think it’s likely  .805 
that I will experience  
POSTPARTUM  
PSYCHOSIS  
after giving birth. 
 
Eigenvalue 4.259 
 
Variance 70.989 
 
 Note: The KMO indicated that the evaluation of sanity of the target character was marginally 
factorable (KMO = .694). A Principal Components Analysis was completed that showed the 6 
statements strongly loaded on one factor (n = 40). Because of the high reliability (α = .905) the 
scale was kept intact for analyses.
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Table 6 
Principal Components Analysis Showing the Factor Loadings  
for the Posttest Perceptions of Risk of Developing Postpartum Disorders 
Evaluation of Risk      Component Matrix 
1 2 
 
POSTPARTUM .824 -.381   
DEPRESSION  
vulnerability 
 
“BABY BLUES”  .781 -.067 
vulnerability 
 
POSTPARTUM .753 .502 
PSYCHOSIS  
vulnerability 
 
I think it’s likely that  .660 -.546 
I will experience the  
“BABY BLUES”  
after giving birth. 
 
I think it’s likely  .875 -.055 
that I will experience  
POSTPARTUM  
DEPRESSION  
after giving birth. 
 
I think it’s likely  .659 .603 
that I will experience  
POSTPARTUM  
PSYCHOSIS  
after giving birth. 
 
Eigenvalue 3.490 1.065 
 
Cumulative Variance 58.174 75.930 
 
 Note: The KMO indicated that the evaluation of sanity of the target character was marginally 
factorable (KMO = .709). A Principal Components Analysis was completed that showed the 6 
statements loaded on two factors (n = 40). Because of the high reliability (α = .845) the scale 
was kept intact for analyses.
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Table 7 
Principal Components Analysis Showing the Factor Loadings  
for the Analysis of the Sanity (Prime Addition) of Target Character “Samantha” 
Evaluation of “Samantha”    Component Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 
Samantha is sane.
 
.678 .117 .127 -.290 
Samantha is competent.
 
.456 .282 .518 .257 
Samantha is loving.
 
.536 .441 .298 -.451 
Samantha is honest.
 
.457 .166 .172 .197 
Samantha is friendly.
 
.553 .257 -.380 .468 
Samantha is stable.
 
.781 -.276 .067 -.243 
Samantha is responsible.
 
.731 -.398 .282 .072 
Samantha is nurturing.
 
.586 .609 .063 .088 
Samantha is reliable.
 
.789 -.175 -.047 -.098 
Samantha is careful.
 
.719 -.237 -.215 -.145 
Samantha is expressive.
 
.251 .436 -.710 .160 
Samantha is safe.
 
.458 -.740 -.329 -.020 
Samantha is trustworthy.
 
.802 .053 -.181 .209 
Samantha is hopeful.
 
.055 -.308 .374 .752 
     
Eigenvalue
 5.014 1.909 
1.469
 
1.349
 Cumulative Variance
 35.811 49.447 
59.943
 
69.581
  
 Note: The KMO indicated that the evaluation of sanity of the target character was marginally 
factorable (KMO = .624). A Principal Components Analysis was completed that showed the 14 
statements loaded on four factors (n = 40). Because of the high reliability (α = .836) the scale 
was kept intact for analyses.
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Table 8 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting “Selfish” Trait of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  -.149 (.276) -.093 -.043 (.291) -.027 -.061 (.292)  -.038 
Empathy  -.017 (.328) -.010  -.011 (.338) -.007 -.136 (.360)  -.082 
Need for Cognition  -.414 (.141) -.503* -.426 (.143) -.519* -.410 (.144)  -.499* 
Depression -.441 (.144) -.543* -.412 (.145) -.507* -.442 (.145)  -.519* 
Need for Orientation  .032 (.132)  .046 .165 (.163)  .236 .149 (.164)  .213 
Health Locus     -.149 (.194) -.120 -.148 (.214) -.119 -.132 (.215)  -.106 
of Control 
Education Category .947 (.523)  .316 .703 (.552)  .244 .613 (.564)  .205 
Age Category .510 (.430)  .257 .647 (.483)  .326 .614 (.484)  .309 
Race Category  .146 (.614) .037 .628 (.703)  .159 .913 (.758)  .232 
Income Category  -.817 (.304) -.535* -.635 (.343) -.416 -.501 (.368)  -.328 
Block 2 
Condition    .200 (.486)  .079 3.899 (3.714) 1.536 
Sanity (prime addition)   -.446 (.315) -.291 -.217 (.390)  -.141 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      -.642 (.639) -1.413 
 Adj. R2 = .381 ∆R2 = .386 ∆R2 = .386 
 ( F(10, 23) = 3.028, ( F(12, 21) = 2.728, ( F(13,  20) = 2.597, 
 p = .014) * p = .021) * p = .027) * 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .386, F(13, 20) = 2.597, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.886 = low, .615 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.669, high = .547), Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.709, high = -.110), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.192, high = .491), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.580, external = .316), Depression (centered) (low = -.725, high = -.119), Age Category (1 = 
18-22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -1.687, high = -.566). Dependent variable is Assessment of a Hostile 
Trait (centered) to answer Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 34).
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Table 9 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting “Drama Queen” Trait of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  -.039 (.293) -.028 .245 (.259)  .179 .246 (.266)  .180 
Empathy  -.188 (.348) -.133  -.293 (.300) -.207 -.284 (.328)  -.201 
Need for Cognition  .215 (.149)  .306 .226 (.127) -.322 .225 (.131)  .320* 
Depression -.125 (.153) -.180 -.072 (.129) -.103 -.071 (.132)  -.102 
Need for Orientation  -.054 (.140) -.090 .245 (.145)  .409 .246 (.149)  .411 
Health Locus     -.164 (.206) -.154 -.289 (.191) -.272 -.290 (.196)  -.273 
of Control 
Education Category .629 (.555)  .246 .377 (.491)  .147 .385 (.515)  .151 
Age Category .479 (.456) .282 1.013 (.430)  .596* 1.015 (.442)  .598* 
Race Category  -.770 (.652) -.229 -.035 (.625) -.010 -.056 (.691)  -.016 
Income Category  -.551 (.323) -.421 -.353 (.305) -.271 -.363 (.336)  -.278 
Block 2 
Condition    -.259 (.432) .119 -.525 (3.386) -.242 
Sanity (prime addition)   -.961 (.281) -.733* -.978 (.355)  -.745* 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      .046 (.583)  .119 
 Adj. R2 = .046 ∆R2 = .335 ∆R2 = .302 
 ( F(10, 23) = 1.157, ( F(12, 21) = 2.387, ( F(13,  20) = 2.099, 
 p = .366)  p = .039) * p = .066)  
Note: Block 2 R2 = .335, F(12, 21) = 2.387, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.918 = low, .332 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.294, high = .784), Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.038, high = .490), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.057, high = .547), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.686, external = .107), Depression (centered) (low = -.340, high = .197), Age Category (1 = 
18-22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -1.545, high = -.378). Dependent variable is Assessment of a Hostile 
Trait (centered) to answer Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 34).
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Table 10 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Depressive Traits (2-Item Scale) of Target  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .034 (.339)  .021 -.222 (.320)  -.135 .059  (.282)  .036  .008  (.283)  .005 
Empathy  .633 (.456)  .333 .756 (.414)  .398 .567  (.354)  .298 .674  (.369) .355 
NFC  .172 (.193) -.194 -.260 (.172)  .293 -.179  (.135)  -.201 -.236  (.136) -.266 
Depression .080 (.183)  .091 .076 (.171)  .086 -.039  (.141)   -.045 -.032  (.142)  -.037 
NFO  -.124 (.165)  -.158 -.025 (.178)  -.032 -.076  (.141)  -.098 -.042  (.144)  -.053 
HLOC    -.066 (.256)  -.046 -.111 (.256)  -.078 -.101  (.217)  -.071 -.378  (.250)  -.266 
Age -.389 (.434) -.187 -.525 (.454) -.252 -.815  (.374)  -.391* -.819  (.394) -.393 
Block 2 
Condition  .491 (.500)  .172 -4.921  (3.021)-1.724  9.231 (9.968)  3.234 
Sanity -.310 (.311) -.181 -3.028   (.848)  -1.769* -2.751 (.933)   -1.607* 
“Healthy” Goal 1.155 (.543)  .350* -14.043  (5.768)-4.260* -16.219 (7.033)  -4.920* 
“Good Mother” Goal 1.017 (.520)  .356 -5.218  (2.957) 1.828   -25.721 (19.978) -9.010 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    .665  (.532)  1.316 -2.086 (1.898)  -4.125 
Condition * Healthy Goal   2.244  (1.426)   .770 -6.571 (11.235)  -2.255  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   -.971   (.785)    -.284 -6.706 (7.863)     -1.962 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   2.332   (.912)  4.232* 2.828 (1.142)      5.132* 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   1.027   (.514)    2.122 4.689 (3.494)     9.685 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   .589   (1.006)    .202 27.868 (19.583)   9.565 
Block 4 
Condition*Sanity*Good Mother Goal    1.800 (1.269) 2.928 
Condition*Sanity*Healthy Goal    1.707 (2.106) 3.406 
Condition*Healthy Goal*Good Mother Goal    -4.121 (3.885) -1.097 
Sanity*Healthy Goal*Good Mother Goal    -4.874 (3.414) -10.078 
Block 5 
Sanity*Healthy Goal*Good Mother Goal*Condition    no results 
 
  ∆R2 = -.074 ∆R2 = .166 ∆R2 = .510 ∆R2 = .544 
  ( F(7, 32) = .615, ( F(11,  28) = 1.708, ( F(17,  22) = 3.383, ( F(21,  18) = 3.215, 
  p = .739) p = .123) p = .004)* p = .008)* 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .510, F(17, 22) = 3.383, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Empathy (centered) (-.167 = low, 1.300 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.526, high = .644, Need for Cognition 
(centered) (low = -.459, high = .102), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.368, high = .216), Health Locus of Control 
(centered) (internal = -.551, external = .349), Depression (centered) (low = -.332, high = .254, Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 
23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -4.787, high = -1.268). Dependent variable is Assessment of Depressive 
Symptoms (centered) to answer Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 1a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 11 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Well-being Traits (30) of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .424 (.196)  .414* .347 (.197)  .339 .353 (.198)  .345 
Empathy  -.225 (.249) -.019  -.223 (.250) -.188 -.297 (.266)  -.251 
Need for Cognition  -.044 (.105) -.079 -.054 (.102) -.098 -.043 (.103)  -.078 
Depression -.062 (.099) -.113 -.047 (.097) -.086 -.048 (.098)  -.087 
Need for Orientation  .140 (.088)  .287 .042 (.101)  .086 .040 (.101)  .083 
Health Locus     -.004 (.139) -.004 -.015 (.144) -.017 -.018 (.144)  -.020 
of Control 
Education Category .701 (.274)  .495* .940 (.291)  .663* .891 (.299)  .629* 
Age Category -.024 (.277) -.019 -.203 (.301)  -.157 -.170 (.306)  -.131 
Race Category  -.583 (.351) -.273 -.835 (.364) -.392* -.742 (.383)  -.348 
Block 2 
Condition    -.193 (.299) -.108 1.509 (2.074)  .848 
Sanity (prime addition)   .353 (.198) .331 .466 (.241)  .437 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      -.302 (.364)  -.957 
 Adj. R2 = .220 ∆R2 = .279 ∆R2 = .270 
 ( F(9, 30) = 2.226, ( F(11, 28) = 2.369, ( F(12,  27) = 2.205, 
 p = .049) * p = .032) * p = .043) * 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .270, F(12, 27) = 2.205, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.843 = low, .250 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.054, high = .760, Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.255, high = .168), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.168, high = .248), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.315, external = .278), Depression (centered) (low = -.248, high = .153, Age Category (1 = 18-
22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -.029, high = .961). Dependent variable is Assessment of Wellness Traits 
(centered) to answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 12 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Stability Traits (10) of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .294 (.181)  .315 .176 (.164)  .189 .187 (.155)  .201 
Empathy  -.079 (.229) -.073  -.054 (.207) -.050 -.197 (.208)  -.183 
Need for Cognition  -.014 (.097) -.028 -.031 (.084) -.062 -.011 (.081)  -.021 
Depression -.033 (.091) -.067 -.018 (.081) -.036 -.019 (.076)  -.039 
Need for Orientation  .141 (.081)  .318 .000 (.084)  .000 -.004 (.079)  -.008 
Health Locus     .005 (.128)  .007 .006 (.119) .007 .000 (.113)  .000 
of Control 
Education Category .672 (.252)  .520* 1.012 (.242)  .783* .917 (.234)  .710* 
Age Category -.023 (.255) -.019 -.300 (.250)  -.254 -.235 (.239)  -.199 
Race Category  -.506 (.323) -.261 -.828 (.302) -.427* -.648 (.299)  -.334* 
Block 2 
Condition    -.172 (.248) -.106 3.127(1.622) 1.928 
Sanity (prime addition)   .511 (.165) .526* .730 (.189)  .751* 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      -.585 (.285) -2.036* 
 Adj. R2 = .202 ∆R2 = .400 ∆R2 = .462 
 ( F(9, 30) = 2.098, ( F(11, 28) = 3.362, ( F(12,  27) = 3.789, 
 p = .062)  p = .005) * p = .002) * 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .462, F(12, 27) = 2.205, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.625 = low, .230 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.131, high = .506, Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.176, high = .155), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.166, high = .159), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.232, external = .232), Depression (centered) (low = -.176, high = .137, Age Category (1 = 18-
22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = .343, high = 1.118). Dependent variable is Assessment of Stability Traits 
(centered) to answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40). 
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Table 13 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Calmness Traits (10) of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .513 (.218)  .429* .437 (.225)  .366 .443 (.228)  .371 
Empathy  -.182 (.277) -.131 -.167 (.286) -.121 -.239 (.306)  -.173 
Need for Cognition  -.113 (.117)  .007 -.125 (.116) -.193 -.114 (.118)  -.176 
Depression -.135 (.110) -.212 -.125 (.111) -.196 -.125 (.112)  -.197 
Need for Orientation  .135 (.098)  .237 .043 (.115)  .076 .041 (.116)  .073 
Health Locus     .031 (.155)  .030 .030 (.164)  .029 .027 (.166)  .026 
of Control 
Education Category .877 (.305)  .530* 1.099 (.333)  .664* 1.051 (.343)  .635* 
Age Category -.121 (.308) -.080 -.300 (.345)  -.198 -.267 (.351)  -.176 
Race Category  -.555 (.390) -.223 -.767 (.416  -.308 -.676 (.439)  -.272 
Block 2 
Condition    -.119 (.342) -.057 1.545(2.381)  .743 
Sanity (prime addition)   .332 (.227) .266 .442 (.277)  .355 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      -.295 (.417)  -.801 
 Adj. R2 = .292 ∆R2 = .307 ∆R2 = .295 
 ( F(9, 30) = 2.785, ( F(11, 28) = 2.572, ( F(12,  27) = 2.357, 
 p = .017) * p = .021) * p = .031) * 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .512, F(12, 27) = 2.357, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.867 = low, .388 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.024, high = .910, Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.357, high = .128), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.198, high = .280), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.313, external = .368), Depression (centered) (low = -.355, high = .105, Age Category (1 = 18-
22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -.126, high = 1.011). Dependent variable is Assessment of Calmness 
Traits (centered) to answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40). 
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Table 14 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Well-being Traits (14) Related to Control  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .398 (.206)  .390 .284 (.193)  .279 .283 (.196)  .278 
Empathy  -.227 (.261) -.192 -.217 (.244) -.184 -.205 (.263)  -.174 
Need for Cognition  -.008 (.110)  -.015 -.024 (.099) -.044 -.026 (.102)  -.047 
Depression -.012 (.104) -.021 .008 (.095)  .015 -.008 (.097)   .015 
Need for Orientation  .153 (.093)  .316 .011 (.099)  .022 .011 (.100)  .023 
Health Locus     -.142 (.146) -.161 -.153 (.140) -.174 -.153 (.143)  -.173 
of Control 
Education Category .538 (.287)  .382 .884 (.333)  .664* .892 (.296)  .632* 
Age Category .036 (.291) .028 -.230 (.345) -.198 -.235 (.302)  -.182 
Race Category  -.757 (.368) -.357 -1.110 (.356) -.523* -1.125 (.379)  -.530* 
Block 2110 
Condition    -.246 (.292) -.139 -.520 (2.051) -.293 
Sanity (prime addition)   .513 (.194)  .483* .495 (.239)  .466* 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      -.295 (.417)  -.801 
 Adj. R2 = .134 ∆R2 = .305 ∆R2 = .280 
 ( F(9, 30) = 1.671, ( F(11, 28) = 2.557, ( F(12,  27) = 2.263, 
 p = .140)  p = .022) * p = .038) * 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .512, F(12, 27) = 2.357, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.746 = low, .355 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.119, high = .686, Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.235, high = .183), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.195, high = .217), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.446, external = .140), Depression (centered) (low = -.190, high = .206, Age Category (1 = 18-
22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = .005, high = .985). Dependent variable is Assessment of Well-being 
Traits Related to Control (centered) to answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 15 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Well-being (30) Traits of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
   Model 1            Model 2                  Model 3            Model 4 
       B (SE B)      β         B (SE B)    β    B (SE B)     β        B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .424 (.196)  .414* .417 (.194)  .407* .318  (.261)  .310  .531 (.236)  .519* 
Empathy  -.225 (.249)  -.190 -.192 (.240)  -.162 -.236  (.292)  -.199 -.292 (.262) -.205 
NFC  -.044 (.105)  -.079 -.037 (.099)  -.067 -.030  (.108)  -.054 -.084 (.095) -.152 
Depression -.062 (.099)  -.113 -.092 (.096)  -.169 -.084  (.113)   -.154 -.135 (.102)  -.247 
NFO  .140 (.088)  .287 .302 (.102)  .198 .099  (.113)  .204 .140 (.108)  .288 
HLOC    -.004 (.139)  -.004 -.182 (.147)  -.102 .172  (.180)  .194 .103 (.184)  .116 
Education .701 (.274)  .495* .903 (.286)  .637* .875  (.352)  .617*  .612 (.379)  .431 
Age -.024 (.277) -.019 .007 (.311)  .006 .088  (.370)  .068 .364 (.414) .280 
Race -.583 (.351)  -.273 -.683 (.430)  -.320 -.390  (.607)  -.183 -.469 (.554)  -.220 
Block 2 
Condition  -.182 (.303) -.102 3.525  (2.471) 1.980  22.937 (7.122) 12.884* 
Sanity .302 (.192)  .283 1.290   (.758)  1.209 2.072 (.702)    1.941* 
“Healthy” Goal .073 (.361)  .036 5.892  (4.988) 2.866 11.090 (5.266)  5.395 
“Good Mother” Goal -.616 (.297) -.346* -.011  (2.437)  -.006 4.953 (13.932) 2.782 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    -.449 (.412) -1.423 -4.060 (1.368) -12.876* 
Condition * Healthy Goal   -1.122 (1.434)  -.618 -20.106 (7.909) -11.065*  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   -.051   (.641)   -.024 -6.143 (5.562)    -2.882 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   -.870   (.793) -2.530 -1.589 (.861)      -4.623 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   .015   (.413)     .050 -.696 (2.449)    -2.305 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   -.818   (.792)   -.450 -4.820 (13.843)  -2.653 
Block 4 
Condition * Sanity * Good Mother Goal    .663 (.911) 1.728 
Condition * Sanity * Healthy Goal    3.440 (1.482) 11.005* 
Condition * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    3.002 (2.645) 1.282 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    .463 (2.419)  1.536 
Block 5 
Sanity*Healthy Goal*Good Mother Goal*Condition    no results 
 
  ∆R2 = .220 ∆R2 = .334 ∆R2 = .252 ∆R2 = .457 
  ( F(9, 30) = 2.226, ( F(13,  26) = 2.506, ( F(19,  20) = 1.691, ( F(23,  16) = 2.426, 
  p = .049)* p = .022)*  p = .126) p = .036)* 
Note: Block 4 R2 = .457, F(23, 16) = 2.426, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Empathy (centered) (-.798 = low, .314 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = .031, high = 1.031, Need for Cognition 
(centered) (low = -.286, high = .117), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.090, high = .370), Health Locus of Control 
(centered) (internal = -.287, external = .492), Depression (centered) (low = -.351, high = .082, Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 
23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = .584, high = 3.560). Dependent variable is Assessment of Well-being Traits 
(centered) to answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 16 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Stability (10) Traits of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
   Model 1            Model 2                  Model 3             Model 4 
       B (SE B)      β         B (SE B)    β    B (SE B)     β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .294 (.181)  .315 .216 (.170)  .232 .193  (.218)  .207  .331  (.230)  .354 
Empathy  -.079 (.229)  -.073 -.039 (.210)  -.036 -.206  (.244)  -.191 -.205  (.256) -.190 
NFC  -.014 (.097) -.028 -.019 (.087)  -.037 .002  (.090)  .004 -.024  (.093) -.048 
Depression -.033 (.091)  -.067 -.035 (.085)  -.070 -.034  (.095)   -.069 -.067  (.100)  -.135 
NFO  .141 (.081)  .318 .019 (.089)  .044 .033  (.094)  .074 .064  (.106)  .145 
HLOC    .005 (.128)  .007 .056 (.129)  .069 .095  (.150)  .118 .080  (.179)  .099 
Education .672 (.252)  .520 .977 (.251)  .756* .928  (.294)  .719*  .723  (.370)  .560 
Age -.023 (.255) -.019 -.220 (.272) -.186 -.113  (.309)  -.095 .107  (.404) .090 
Race -.506 (.323)  -.261 -.683 (.377)  -.352 -.552  (.507)  -.284 -.536  (.540)  -.276 
Block 2 
Condition  -.137 (.266) -.085 4.137  (2.064) 2.551  15.028 (6.952)  9.266* 
Sanity .487 (.168)  .501* 1.153   (.633)  1.186 1.623 (.685)   1.670* 
“Healthy” Goal -.079 (.316) -.042 3.609  (4.166) 1.927 7.174 (5.141)  3.831 
“Good Mother” Goal -.288 (.260) -.177 -.715  (2.036)  -.441 6.185 (13.60) 3.813 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    -.662  (.344)  -2.304 -2.678 (1.335)  -9.324 
Condition * Healthy Goal   -.434  (1.198)   -.262 -11.346 (7.720)  -6.854*  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   -.131   (.535)    -.067 -4.201 (5.429)     -2.163 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   -.562   (.662)  -1.797 -1.080 (.841)       -3.449 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   .144   (.345)      .523 -.988 (2.391)     -3.593 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   -.382   (.661)    -.231 -7.213 (13.513)  -4.357 
Block 4 
Condition * Sanity * Good Mother Goal    .375 (.889) 1.074 
Condition * Sanity * Healthy Goal    1.970 (1.447) 6.918 
Condition * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   2.303 (2.582) 1.079 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    1.070 (2.361)  3.893 
Block 5 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal * Condition    no results 
 
  ∆R2 = .202 ∆R2 = .385 ∆R2 = .371 ∆R2 = .376 
  ( F(9, 30) = 2.098, ( F(13,  26) = 2.875, ( F(19,  20) = 2.212, ( F(23,  16) = 2.023, 
  p = .062) p = .011)*  p = .043)* p = .075) 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .371, F(19, 20) = 2.212, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Empathy (centered) (-.715 = low, .302 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.261, high = .647, Need for Cognition (centered) 
(low = -.186, high = .190), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.164, high = .230), Health Locus of Control (centered) 
(internal = -.219, external = .409), Depression (centered) (low = -.232, high = .163, Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 
32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -.168, high = 8.442). Dependent variable is Assessment of Stability (centered) to answer 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 17 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Calmness Traits (10) of Target Character  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
   Model 1            Model 2                  Model 3             Model 4 
       B (SE B)      β         B (SE B)    β    B (SE B)     β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .513 (.218)  .429 .507 (.220)  .424* .401  (.293)  .336  .635  (.245)  .531* 
Empathy  -.182 (.277)  -.131 -.130 (.272)  -.094 -.188  (.329)  -.136 -.214  (.272) -.154 
NFC  -.113 (.117) -.175 -.112 (.112)  -.173 -.100  (.121)  -.155 -.167  (.098) -.258 
Depression -.135 (.110)  -.212 -.185 (.109)  -.290 -.197  (.128)   -.310 -.244  (.106)  -.384* 
NFO  .135 (.098)  .237 .116 (.115)  .205 .117  (.127)  .206 .175  (.112)  .309 
HLOC    .031 (.155)  .030 .154 (.167)  .149 .253  (.203)  .244 .102  (.191)  .098 
Education .877 (.305)  .530 1.082 (.324)  .653* 1.067  (.397)  .645*  .788  (.392)  .476 
Age -.121 (.305) -.080 -.023 (.352) -.015 .104  (.416)  .069 .408  (.429) .269 
Race -.555 (.390)  -.223 -.703 (.487)  -.282 -.469  (.683)  -.188 -.645  (.574)  -.259 
Block 2 
Condition  -.155 (.343) -.074 4.068  (2.781) 1.957  27.053 (7.382) 13.014* 
Sanity .272 (.217)  .219 1.194   (.853)  .958 2.061 (.728)   1.654* 
“Healthy” Goal .264 (.408)  .110 4.939  (5.614) 2.058 9.445 (5.459)  3.935 
“Good Mother” Goal -.726 (.336) -.349* .428  (2.743)   .206 5.712 (14.441)2.747 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    -.594  (.464)  -1.612 -4.881 (1.418)  -13.257* 
Condition * Healthy Goal   -.866  (1.614)   -.408 -21.549 (8.198)  -10.157*  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   -.057   (.722)    -.023 -9.504 (5.765)     -3.818 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   -.641   (.892)  -1.598 -1.185 (.893)       -2.954 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   -.054   (.465)      -.153 -.774 (2.538)     -2.197 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   -1.130   (.891)    -.533 -3.387 (14.349)  -1.597 
Block 4 
Condition * Sanity * Good Mother Goal    1.239 (.944) 2.766 
Condition * Sanity * Healthy Goal    3.741 (1.536) 10.249* 
Condition * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   3.302 (2.741) 1.207 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    .093 (2.508)  .264 
Block 5 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal * Condition    no results 
 
  ∆R2 = .292 ∆R2 = .375 ∆R2 = .305 ∆R2 = .572 
  ( F(9, 30) = 2.785, ( F(13,  26) = 2.798, ( F(19,  20) = 1.901, ( F(23,  16) = 3.266, 
  p = .017)* p = .012)*  p = .081) p = .009)* 
Note: Block 4 R2 = .572, F(23, 16) = 3.266, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Empathy (centered) (-.790 = low, .363 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = .117, high = 1.154, Need for Cognition 
(centered) (low = -.375, high = .042), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.063, high = .414), Health Locus of Control 
(centered) (internal = -.302, external = .506), Depression (centered) (low = -.469, high = -.020, Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 
23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = .518, high = 3.603). Dependent variable is Assessment of Calmness (centered) to 
answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 18 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Well (14) Traits of Target Related to Control 
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
   Model 1            Model 2                  Model 3             Model 4 
       B (SE B)      β         B (SE B)    β    B (SE B)     β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .398 (.206)  .390 .340 (.190)  .333 .131  (.215)  .128  .293  (.214)  .287 
Empathy  -.227 (.261)  -.192 -.187 (.234)  -.159 .029  (.241)  .024 .005  (.238) .004 
NFC  -.008 (.110) -.015 -.014 (.097)  -.026 -.055  (.089)  -.100 -.081  (.086) -.147 
Depression -.012 (.104)  -.021 -.041 (.094)  -.075 -.005  (.094)   -.010 -.039  (.093)  -.072 
NFO  .153 (.093)  .316 .071 (.099)  .146 .078  (.093)  .160 .105  (.098)  .216 
HLOC    -.142 (.146)  -.161 -.054 (.144)  -.061 .049  (.149)  .056 .070  (.167)  .079 
Education .538 (.287)  .382 .872 (.279)  .618* .917  (.291)  .630*  .711  (.334)  .504 
Age .036 (.291) .028 -.005 (.303) -.004 .071  (.306)  .055 .288  (.375) .222 
Race -.757 (.368)  -.357 -1.063 (.420)  -.501* -.630  (.502)  -.297 -.603  (.503)  -.284 
Block 2 
Condition  -.277 (.296) -.156 1.975  (2.043) 1.114  13.029 (6.467)  7.350 
Sanity .465 (.187)  .438* 1.914   (.627)  1.801* 2.504 (.637)   2.356* 
“Healthy” Goal .221 (.352)  .108 8.522  (4.123) 4.163 13.301 (4.782)  6.498* 
“Good Mother” Goal -.586 (.289) -.331 2.620  (2.015) 1.478 14.745 (12.650)8.318 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    -.141  (.341)  -.448 -2.131 (1.242)  -6.788 
Condition * Healthy Goal   -1.732  (1.186)   -.957 -13.477 (7.181)  -7.449  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   .542   (.530)    .255 -3.794 (5.050)     -1.788 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   -1.225   (.655)  -3.581 -1.935 (.782)       -5.654* 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   -.447   (.342)    -1.487 -2.463 (2.224)     -8.192 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   -1.148   (.655)    -.635 -13.959 (12.570)  -7.715 
Block 4 
Condition * Sanity * Good Mother Goal    .167 (.827) .438 
Condition * Sanity * Healthy Goal    2.064 (1.346) 6.630 
Condition * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   3.811 (2.401) 1.634 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    2.078 (2.197)  6.918 
Block 5 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal * Condition    no results 
 
  ∆R2 = .134 ∆R2 = .361 ∆R2 = .484 ∆R2 = .548 
  ( F(9, 30) = 1.671, ( F(13,  26) = 2.691, ( F(19,  20) = 2.928, ( F(23,  16) = 3.059, 
  p = .140) p = .015)*  p = .011) p = .012)* 
Note: Block 4 R2 = .572, F(23, 16) = 3.266, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Empathy (centered) (-.500 = low, .510 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.161, high = .747, Need for Cognition (centered) 
(low = -.263, high = .102), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.104, high = .313), Health Locus of Control (centered) 
(internal = -.284, external = .424), Depression (centered) (low = -.236, high = .158, Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 
32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = 1.153, high = 3.855). Dependent variable is Assessment of Well-being Related to 
Emotional Control (centered) to answer Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 2a. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 40).
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Table 19 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Posttest Perceptions of Risk of Participants 
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .088 (.335)  .047 .111 (.327)  .059 .189 (.318)  .100 
Empathy  .398 (.489)  .195 -.057 (.485) -.028 .178 (.488)  .088 
Need for Cognition  -.066 (.163) -.067 .061 (.155) -.062 .023 (.150)  .023 
Depression -.065 (.198) -.064 -.132 (.181) -.130 -.121 (.173)  -.119 
Need for Orientation  .289 (.149)  .342 .109 (.185)  .129 .174 (.182)  .206 
Health Locus     -.027 (.232) -.019 -.231 (.228) -.161 -.253 (.219)  -.177 
of Control 
Pretest Risk .521 (.184)  .605* .669 (.177) -.778* .639 (.171)  .742* 
Education Category .358 (.655)  .099 .985 (.634)  .272 1.120 (.614)  .310 
Age Category -.448 (.536) -.174 -.128 (.589) -.050 -.081 (.566)  -.031 
Race Category  .362 (.737)  .080 -.638 (.777) -.142 -.943 (.769)  -.209 
Income Category .492 (.466)  .246 -.161 (.484) -.081 -.379 (.484)  -.189 
Block 3 
Condition    -1.060 (.514) -.350 -6.884 (3.713) -2.276 
Sanity (prime addition)   .536 (.343)  .303 .094 (.431)   .054 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity      1.013 (.640)  1.881 
 
 Adj. R2 = .503 ∆R2 = .607 ∆R2 = .639 
 ( F(11, 19) = 3.758, ( F(13, 17) = 4.569, ( F(14,  16) = 4.797, 
 p = .006)* p = .002)* p = .002)* 
 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .639, F(14, 16) = 4.797, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.856 = low, 1.213 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.484, high = .862, Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.296, high = .342), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.211, high = .559), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.718, external = .211), Depression (centered) (low = -.488, high = .247, Age Category (1 = 18-
22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -.820, high = 1.009). Dependent variable is Assessment of Posttest 
Perception of Risk (centered) to answer Hypothesis 3. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 31).
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Table 20 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Posttest Perceptions of Risk of Participants  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .388 (.293)  .231 .249 (.309)  .149 .192  (.347)  .115  .191  (.347)  .114 
Empathy  -.004 (.439)  -.002 -.044 (.431)  -.021 -.299  (.578)  -.143 -.425  (.592) -.203 
NFC  -.015 (.160) -.015 -.058 (.158)  -.057 .014  (.172)  .013 .086  (.175) .084 
Depression -.141 (.189)  -.146 -.067 (.197)  -.070 -.178  (.223)   -.184 -.039  (.235)  -.040 
NFO  .208 (.116)  .257 .255 (.132)  .315 .179  (.155)  .221 .209  (.156)  .258 
HLOC    .047 (.208)  .033 -.015 (.224)  -.011 .074  (.255)  .051 .057  (.314)  .040 
Pretest Risk .562 (.156) .650* .491 (.164) -.568* .665  (.218)  .769* .618  (.229) .715* 
Block 2 
Condition  -.596 (.448) -.198 .673  (4.604) .224  -13.865 (12.823) -4.612 
Sanity -.029 (.280) -.017 .464   (1.112)  .268 .159 (1.236)   .092 
“Healthy” Goal .846 (.471)  .254 5.603  (6.956) 1.685 2.968 (8.542)  .892 
“Good Mother” Goal .340 (.467)  .113 -1.789  (3.618)  -.593   46.627 (22.622)15.460 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    .280  (.702)  .523 3.092 (2.346)  5.787 
Condition * Healthy Goal   -2.389  (1.860)   -.768 15.650 (13.881)  5.033  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   -1.143   (1.080)   -.332 -14.170 (9.554)     -4.122 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   -.678   (1.087) -1.229 -.281 (1.364)      -.508* 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   .554   (.618)    1.092 -7.957 (3.937)   -15.674 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   -.686   (1.162)    -.226 -47.391 (22.111)-15.609 
Block 4 
Condition * Sanity * Good Mother Goal    1.032 (1.560) 1.669 
Condition * Sanity * Healthy Goal    -3.405 (2.558) -6.382 
Condition * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   6.833 (4.506) 1.819 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    8.255 (3.851)  16.523 
Block 5 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal * Condition    no results 
 
  ∆R2 = .412 ∆R2 = .444 ∆R2 = .443 ∆R2 = .477 
  ( F(7, 27) = 4.406, ( F(11, 23) = 3.471, ( F(17, 17) = 2.593, ( F(21, 13) = 2.477, 
  p = .002)* p = .006)*  p = .029)* p = .048)* 
Note: Block 4 R2 = .800, F(21, 13) = 2.477, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Empathy (centered) (-1.704 = low, .853= high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.559, high = .940, Need for Cognition 
(centered) (low = -.291, high = .463), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = -.127, high = .546), Health Locus of Control 
(centered) (internal = -.620, external = .735), Depression (centered) (low = -.547, high = .469, Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 
23-31, 3 = 32-36), Sanity (centered) (low = -2.510, high = 2.829). Dependent variable is Assessment of Risk Perception 
(centered) to answer Hypothesis 3. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 35).
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Table 21 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Posttest Perceptions of Risk of Participants 
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Sympathy  .101 (.325)  .054 -.031 (.336) -.016 -.266 (.325)  -.141 
Empathy  .364 (.467)  .179 .507 (.481)  .248 .632 (.443)  .310 
Need for Cognition  -.056 (.157) -.058 -.123 (.164) -.126 -.146 (.150)  -.149 
Need for Orientation  .288 (.146)  .342 .331 (.148)  .392 .309 (.135)  .365* 
Health Locus     -.035 (.225) -.025 .051 (.231)  .035 .235 (.228)  .163 
of Control 
Pretest Risk .494 (.161)  .573* .591 (.185)  .686* .514 (.173)  .597* 
Education Category .340 (.638)  .094 .234 (.642)  .065 .111 (.589)  .031 
Age Category -.465 (.521) -.181 -.469 (.521) -.182 -.494 (.475)  -.192 
Race Category  .418 (.701)  .093 -.796 (1.072)-.177 -1.230 (.998)  -.273 
Income Category .516 (.450)  .258 .767 (.491)  .383 .883 (.451)  .441 
Block 3 
Depression   -.136 (.198) -.134 -.838 (.373)  -.826* 
“Healthy” Goal   1.073 (.738)  .311 -1.409 (1.335)-.408 
Block 3 
Depression * “Healthy” Goal     .830 (.386)  .993* 
 
 Adj. R2 = .525 ∆R2 = .530 ∆R2 = .609 
 ( F(10, 20) = 4.315, ( F(12, 18) = 3.822, ( F(13,  17) = 4.243, 
 p = .003)* p = .005)* p = .002)* 
 
Note: Block 3 R2 = .639, F(13, 17) = 4.797, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme 
exemplar), Empathy (centered) (-.302 = low, 1.566 = high), Sympathy (centered) (low = -.951, high = .420), Need for 
Cognition (centered) (low = -.462, high = .170), Need for Orientation (centered) (low = .023, high = .594), Health Locus of 
Control (centered) (internal = -.246, external = .715), Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), and Depression 
(centered) (low = -1.625, high = -.051). Dependent variable is Assessment of Posttest Perception of Risk (centered) to answer 
Research Question 1. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 31).
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Table 22 
Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Intention of Avoiding Health Care Provider  
Independent Variable           Model Statistics 
Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          B (SE B)      β           B (SE B)    β          B (SE B)     β 
Block 1 
Education  -.367 (.603)  -.077 -.339 (.629)  -.071 -.023  (.347)  .115  .254  (.921)  .053 
Age  -.035 (.393)  -.011 -.212 (.428)  -.067 -.016  (.578)  -.143 -.183  (.659) -.058 
Race  .413 (.715) .066 .194 (1.204) .031 -.326  (.172)  .013 -4.282  (24.253) -.682 
Income -.309 (.323)  -.127 -.279 (.358)  -.115 -.760  (.223)   -.184 -.797  (.577)  -.327 
Video Score  -.554 (.209)  -.291* -.662 (.250)  -.347* -.602  (.155)  .221 -.556  (.387)  -.292 
Pretest    .734 (.106)  .732* .766 (.111)  .764* .772  (.255)  .051* .814  (.173)  .811* 
Intention 
Block 2 
Condition  .511 (.557)  .126 -6.782  (4.604) .224  -12.054 (8.520)  -2.981 
Sanity .485 (.353)  .198 .397   (1.112)  .268 .780 (3.130)   .319 
“Healthy” Goal -.006 (.755) -.001 1.037  (6.956) 1.685 6.066 (20.755)  1.273 
“Good Mother” Goal -.268 (.451) -.065 .748  (3.618)  -.593   5.166 (30.003) 1.258 
Block 3 
Condition * Sanity    1.197   (.702)  .523 1.630 (3.881)    2.252 
Condition * Healthy Goal     -----------------     --------------------  
Condition * Good Mother Goal   .559   (1.220)    .122 6.079 (11.823)    1.327 
Sanity * Healthy Goal   -.171   (1.646) -1.229 -1.034 (3.365)     -1.305 
Sanity * Good Mother Goal   -.129   (.643)    1.092 -.781 (5.262)     -1.125 
Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   -.481   (1.353)    -.226 -8.487 (28.920)   -2.095 
Block 4 
Condition * Sanity * Good Mother Goal    -1.519 (1.748) -1.843 
Condition * Sanity * Healthy Goal    .553 (4.185) .768 
Condition * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal   2.906 (6.201) .581 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal    1.324 (5.048)  1.973 
Block 5 
Sanity * Healthy Goal * Good Mother Goal * Condition    ---------------- 
 
  ∆R2 = .651 ∆R2 = .645 ∆R2 = .613 ∆R2 = .538 
  ( F(6, 27) = 11.273, ( F(10, 23) = 6.999, ( F(15, 18) = 4.482, ( F(19, 14) = 3.019, 
  p < .001)* p < .001)*  p = .002)* p = .020)* 
Note: Block 2 R2 = .645, F(10, 23) = 6.999, p < .05. Coding as follows: Condition (0 = non-extreme, 1 = extreme exemplar), 
Healthy Goal (0 = no goal, 1 = goal activated), Good Mother Goal (0 = no goal, 1 = goal activated), Education (1 =  up to some 
high school, 2 = up to some college, 3 = college or professional degree), Age Category (1 = 18-22, 2 = 23-31, 3 = 32-36), 
Race (other = 0, white = 1), Income (1 = $19,999 and below, 2 = $20,000 to $39,999, 3 = $40,000 and above), Video Score 
(centered) (low = -1.179, high = -.146), Pretest Avoidance Score (centered) (low = .536, high = .996), and Sanity (centered) 
(low = -.246, high = 1.216). Dependent variable is Likelihood of Postponing Speaking to a Doctor about Depressive 
Symptoms in Order to Avoid Medication (centered) to answer Research Question 3. *p<.05, **p<.001 (n = 34). 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Measure of Primed Mental 
Illness Concept on Evaluation of Target Character Hostile Trait (“Samantha is Selfish”)  
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Figure 2: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Measure of Primed Mental 
Illness Concept on Evaluation of Target Character Hostile Trait (“Samantha is a Drama 
Queen”) 
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Figure 3: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Participant Age on 
Evaluation of Target Character Hostile Trait (“Samantha is a Drama Queen”) 
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Figure 4: The Interaction Between Healthy Goal and Measure of Primed Mental Illness 
Concept on Evaluation of Target Character Depressive Traits 
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Figure 5: The Interaction Between Healthy Goal and Measure of Primed Mental Illness 
Concept on Evaluation of Target Character Depressive Traits in Extreme Exemplar Condition 
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Figure 6: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Posttest Measures  
of Perceptions of Target Character’s Stability 
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Figure 7: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Prime Addition and Posttest 
Measures of Perceptions of Target Character’s Well-being Traits  
 
 
  141 
Figure 8: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Activated Healthy Goal and 
Posttest Measures of Perceptions of Target Character’s Well-being Traits  
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Figure 9: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Prime Addition and Posttest 
Measures of Perceptions of Target Character’s Calm Traits  
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Figure 10: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Activated Healthy Goal and 
Posttest Measures of Perceptions of Target Character’s Calm Traits  
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Figure 11: The Interaction Between Activated Healthy Goal and Prime Addition and Posttest 
Measures of Perceptions of Target’s Well-being Traits Related to Control 
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Figure 12: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Posttest Measures  
of Perceptions of Risk of Developing Postpartum Disorders 
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Figure 13: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Measure of Primed Mental 
Illness Concept on Posttest Measures of Perceptions of Risk of Developing Postpartum 
Disorders 
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Figure 14: The Interaction Between Activated “Healthy” and “Good Mother” Goals and 
Posttest Measures of Perceptions of Risk of Developing Postpartum Disorders 
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Figure 15: The Interaction Between Depression Category of Participant and Activated Healthy 
Goal and Posttest Perceptions of Risk of Developing Postpartum Disorders 
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Figure 16: The Interaction Between Exemplification Condition and Measure of Primed Mental 
Illness Concept on Behavioral Intention to Postpone Talking to Doctor in Order  
to Avoid Medication 
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APPENDIX A: PRETEST AND POSTTEST MEASURES 
Pretest — Section 1 — Edinburgh Postpartum Depression Scale  
               (the scale is scored from 0-30; score values are next to each answer) 
We would like to know how your are feeling. Please click on the answer that comes closest 
to how you have felt IN THE PAST 7 DAYS, not just to how you feel today. For example, “I 
have felt happy: Yes, most of the time” would mean “I have felt happy most of the time 
during the past week.” Please complete the other questions in the same way. In the past 7 
days: 
 
1. I have been able to laugh and see the funny side of things. 
o As much as I always could (0) 
o Not quite as much now (1) 
o Definitely not so much now (2) 
o Not at all (3) 
 
2. I have looked forward with enjoyment to things. 
o As much as I ever did (0) 
o Rather less than I used to (1) 
o Definitely less than I used to (2) 
o Hardly at all (3) 
 
3. I have blamed myself unnecessarily when things went wrong. 
 
o Yes, most of the time (3) 
o Yes, some of the time (1) 
o Not very often (2) 
o No, never (3) 
 
4. I have been anxious or worried for no good reason. 
 
o No, not at all (0) 
o Hardly ever (1) 
o Yes, sometimes (2) 
o Yes, very often (3) 
 
5. I have felt scared or panicky for no very good reason. 
 
o Yes, quite a lot (3) 
o Yes, sometimes (2) 
o No, not much (1) 
o No, not at all (0) 
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6. Things have been getting on top of me. 
o Yes, most of the time I haven’t been able to cope at all (3) 
o Yes, sometimes I haven’t been coping as well as usual (2) 
o No, most of the time I have coped quite well (1) 
o No, I have been coping as well as ever (0) 
 
7. I have been so unhappy that I have had difficulty sleeping. 
 
o Yes, most of the time (3) 
o Yes, sometimes (2) 
o Not very often (1) 
o No, not at all (0) 
 
8. I have felt sad or miserable. 
 
o Yes, most of the time (3) 
o Yes, sometimes (2) 
o Not very often (1) 
o No, not at all (0) 
 
9. I have been so unhappy that I have been crying. 
 
o Yes, most of the time (3) 
o Yes, sometimes (2) 
o Not very often (1) 
o No, not at all (0) 
 
10. The thought of harming myself has occurred to me. 
 
o Yes, quite often (3) 
o Sometimes (2) 
o Hardly ever (1) 
o Never (0) 
 
Pretest — Section 2 — Health Locus of Control Measures 
Please click on the number that best represents your opinion, where “1” means you 
“strongly disagree” and “9” means you “strongly agree.” 
 
1. If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness.  
2. Whenever I get sick it is because of something I’ve done or not done.  
3. Good health is largely a matter of good fortune.  
4. No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick I will get sick.  
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Strongly Agree 
  152 
5. Most people do not realize the extent to which their illnesses are controlled by 
accidental happenings.  
6. I can only do what my doctor tells me to do.  
7. There are so many strange diseases around that you can never know how or when you 
might pick one up.  
8. When I feel ill, I know it’s because I have not been getting the proper exercise or 
eating right.  
9. People who never get sick are just plain lucky.  
10. People’s ill health results from their own carelessness.  
11. I am directly responsible for my health.  
 
Pretest — Section 3 — Empathy and Sympathy Measures 
Please click on the number that best represents your opinion, where “1” means you 
“strongly disagree” and “9” means you “strongly agree. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Strongly Agree 
 
1. I am concerned about others.  
2. I am deeply moved by others’ misfortunes. 
3. I feel sympathy for those who are worse off than myself.  
4. I take an interest in other people’s lives. 
5. I like to do things for others. 
6. I reassure others.  
7. I demand a lot from others.  
8. I don’t fall for sob-stories. 
9. I listen to my brain rather than my heart.  
10. I tend to dislike soft-hearted people. 
11. I try not to think about the needy. 
12. I look down on any weakness.  
13. I believe people should fend for themselves.  
14. I cannot continue to feel okay if others around me are feeling depressed.  
15. I don’t become upset just because a friend is acting upset. 
16. I become nervous if others around me seem nervous. 
17. The people around me have a great influence on my moods. 
18. Before criticizing someone, I try to imagine how I would feel in their place. 
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19. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining things from their 
perspective.  
20. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from another’s perspective.  
21. I try to look at everyone’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
22. When I am upset with someone, I usually try to put myself in his or her shoes for a 
while. 
23. I am the type of person who is concerned when other people are unhappy. 
24. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. 
25. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than myself.  
26. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
27. I sometimes don’t feel very sorry for people when they are having problems. 
28. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
29. I am often touched by the things that I see happen. 
30. I am the type of person who can say the right thing at the right time. 
31. Even though I often try to console someone who is feeling bad, I never seem to be 
able to say the right thing. 
32. I usually respond appropriately to the feelings of others. 
33. Others think of me as an empathetic person. 
34. My friends come to me with their problems because I am a good listener. 
35. I really get involved with the feelings and characters in a novel or film. 
36. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events were to happen to me. 
37. After acting in a play or seeing a play or a movie, I have felt partly as though I was 
one of the characters. 
38. When I watch a good movie, I can easily put myself in the place of the lead character. 
39. I become very involved when I watch a movie. 
 
Pretest — Section 4 — Need for Cognition 
Instruction: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the 
statement is characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you 
(not at all like you) please click a "1"; if the statement is extremely characteristic of 
you (very much like you) please click a "9”. Of course, a statement may be neither 
extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely characteristic of you; if so, please use the 
number in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit. Please keep the following 
scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below: 1 = extremely 
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uncharacteristic; 3 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 5 = uncertain; 7 = somewhat 
characteristic; 9 = extremely characteristic. 
 
Extremely 
Uncharacteristic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely 
Characteristic 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.  
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.  
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something.  
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.  
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.  
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.  
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.  
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to 
one that is somewhat important but does not require much 
thought.  
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort.  
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care 
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how or why it works.  
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
 
Pretest — Section 5 — CES-D Depression Scale 
We are interested in learning about your feelings more generally. The following is a 
list of ways you may have felt or behaved in the past month. Please indicate how 
often you have felt this way during the past month. Please click on the number that 
best represents your opinion, where “1” means you “strongly disagree” and “9” 
means you “strongly agree.” 
 
1. In the past month, I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 
2. In the past month, I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
3. I have felt that I could not shake off the blues even with the help from my family or 
friends. 
4. I felt that I was just as good as other people. 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
6. I felt depressed. 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
9. I thought my life had been a failure. 
10. I felt fearful. 
11. My sleep was restless. 
12. I was happy. 
13. I talked less than usual. 
14. I felt lonely. 
15. People were unfriendly. 
16. I enjoyed life. 
17. I had crying spells. 
18. I felt sad. 
19. I felt that people disliked me. 
20. I could not get “going.” 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Strongly Agree 
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Pretest — Section 6 — Need for Orientation 
Please think about the media coverage on the issue of postpartum depression. The 
following statements deal with what you generally expect from media coverage on 
postpartum depression. Please click on the number that best represents your opinion, 
where “1” means you “strongly disagree” and “9” means you “strongly agree.” 
 
1. I want to be instantly informed about recent developments. 
2. It is important for me to observe this issue constantly. 
3. I would like to hear something about the issue every day. 
4. I want to know many different sides about that topic. 
5. I would like to be thoroughly informed about specific details. 
6. For this topic, I expect detailed background information. 
7. I attach great importance to commentaries on this topic. 
8. It is interesting to see how several journalists comment on that issue. 
9. Whenever appropriate, journalists should state their opinions. 
 
Pretest — Section 7 — Baseline Measures for Persuasive Effect of Stimulus Video 
Please click on the number that best represents your opinion, where “1” means you 
“strongly disagree” and “9” means you “strongly agree.” (“10” means you don’t 
know what it is). 
1. I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing the “BABY BLUES” after giving birth.  
2. I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION after 
giving birth. 
3. I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS after giving 
birth. 
4. I think it’s likely that I will experience “BABY BLUES” after giving birth. 
5. I think it’s likely that I will experience POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION after giving 
birth. 
6. I think it’s likely that I will experience POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS after giving 
birth. 
7. I would feel empowered to talk to my doctor if I was experiencing depressive symptoms 
after the birth of my baby. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Strongly Agree 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Strongly Agree 
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8. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would postpone 
telling my doctor so I could avoid medication.  
9. I feel that my doctor would recommend medication to treat my depressive symptoms. 
10. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by exercising more.  
11. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by seeking counseling and/or a support group. 
12. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by talking to my friends? 
13. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by talking to my partner.   (N/A) 
14. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by by talking to a parent(s).     (N/A) 
15. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by seeking out an Internet support group?     (N/A) 
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POSTTEST — Section 1 — Sanity Scale 
Please provide an overall evaluation of the woman featured in the video clip you have 
just viewed by clicking the number that best represents you opinion, where “1” means 
you “strongly disagree” that the term describes “Samantha” and “9” means you 
“strongly agree” that the term describes “Samantha.” 
 
“Samantha,” the woman featured in the health communication video, is: 
 
 Strongly                                                                                    Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                       Agree 
 
Competent 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Loving 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sane 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Careful 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Honest 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Trustworthy 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Responsible 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Reliable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Safe 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Nurturing 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Hopeful 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Stable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Friendly 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Expressive 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Posttest — Section 2 — Trait Measures for Overall Well-being, Depression and Hostility 
Please provide an overall evaluation of the woman featured in the video clip you have 
just viewed by clicking the number that best represents you opinion, where “1” means 
you “strongly disagree” that the term describes “Samantha” and “9” means you 
“strongly agree” that the term describes “Samantha.” 
 
“Samantha,” the woman featured in the health communication video… 
 
 Strongly                                                                    Strongly 
Disagree                                                                       Agree 
 
1. Seldom gets mad. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2. Is not easily bothered by 
things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
3. Is not easily frustrated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
4. Seldom takes offense. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5. Keeps her cool. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
6. Gets stressed out easily. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
7. Gets upset easily. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
8. Is easily disturbed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9. Changes her mood a lot. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10. Gets caught up in her 
problems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
11. Seldom feels blue. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
12. Feels comfortable with 
herself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
13. Adapts easily to new 
situations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
14. Looks at the bright side 
of life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
15. Is sure of her ground. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
16. Often feels blue. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
17. Worries about things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
18. Feels threatened easily. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
19. Dislikes herself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
20. Is filled with doubts 
about things. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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21. Rarely gets irritated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
22. Is not easily annoyed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
23. Takes things as they 
come. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
24. Accepts people as they 
are. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
25. Gets angry easily. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
26. Is often in a bad mood. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
27. Gets furious. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
28. Snaps at people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
29. Loses her temper. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
30. Has days when she is 
mad at the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
31. Is selfish. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
32. Is a drama queen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
33. Is depressed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
34. Is overwhelmed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
Posttest — Section 3: Video Evaluation Measures Derived from Sundar & Kalyanaraman 
Please provide an overall evaluation of the health communication video you have just 
viewed by circling the number that best represents you opinion, where “1” means you 
“strongly disagree” that the term describes the video and “9” means you “strongly 
agree” that the term describes the video. 
 
The health communication video you have just viewed was: 
 
 Strongly                                                                                      Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                         Agree 
 
Appealing 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Useful 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Positive 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Good 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Favorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Attractive 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Exciting 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Pleasant 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Likeable 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
High Quality 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Interesting 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sophisticated 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Informative 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
I would 
recommend  
to a friend 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Posttest — Section 4 — Measures of Involvement and Behavioral Intentions 
Please click on the number that best represents your opinion, where “1” means you “strongly 
disagree” and “9” means you “strongly agree.” 
 
1. I am not worried about postpartum depression. 
2. I am very familiar with the content of the health communication video I just saw. 
3. I am very interested in topics related to the health of new mothers. 
4. I am very concerned about postpartum depression. 
5. Postpartum depression will have a direct effect on me. 
6. Postpartum depression is a very important issue to me. 
7. I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing the “BABY BLUES” after giving birth.  
8. I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION after 
giving birth. 
9. I feel vulnerable to possibly experiencing POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS after giving 
birth. 
10. I think it’s likely that I will experience “BABY BLUES” after giving birth. 
11. I think it’s likely that I will experience POSTPARTUM DEPRESSION after giving 
birth. 
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12. I think it’s likely that I will experience POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS after giving 
birth. 
13. I would feel empowered to talk to my doctor if I was experiencing depressive symptoms 
after the birth of my baby. 
14. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would postpone 
telling my doctor so I could avoid medication.  
15. I feel that my doctor would recommend medication to treat my depressive symptoms. 
16. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by exercising more.  
17. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by seeking counseling and/or a support group. 
18. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by talking to my friends. 
19. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by talking to my partner.   (N/A) 
20. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by by talking to a parent(s).     (N/A) 
21. If I was experiencing depressive symptoms after giving birth, I would manage my 
symptoms by seeking out an Internet support group.    (N/A) 
22. Most people who are important to me think I should take care of my emotional well-
being.  
 
Posttest — Section 5 — Demographic Questions 
1. Which Internet site do you most turn to for information about health? 
__________________________ 
2. Do you know anyone who has experienced postpartum depression? Yes   No 
3. Did that woman share her experience with you?   Yes   No 
Please elaborate: __________________________________________________ 
4. You are how old?: __________________ 
5. How many weeks pregnant are you? __________________ 
6. Is this your first pregnancy? 
7. If this isn’t your first pregnancy, how many children have you given birth to? 
__________________ 
8. Are you Hispanic or Latino? (Choose only one) 
a. No, not Hispanic or Latino 
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b. Yes, Hispanic or Latino (a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South or 
Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.)  
9. What is your race? (Regardless of how you answered the first question, choose one or 
more) 
a. American Indian or Alaska Native (A person having origins in any of the 
original peoples of North and South America, including Central America, and 
who maintains tribal affiliation or community attachment.) 
b. Asian (a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, 
Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, 
China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, 
Thailand, and Vietnam) 
c. Black or African American (a person having origins in any of the black racial 
groups of Africa) 
d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (a person having origins in any of 
the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands.) 
e. White (A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the 
Middle East, or North Africa) 
 
10. What is your relationship status (choose one or more)? 
a. Married 
b. Separated 
c. In a relationship 
d. Single 
e. Divorced 
 
11. What is your annual household income? 
a. $100,000 and above 
b. $50,000 - $99,999 
c. $40,000 - $49,999 
d. $30,000 - $39,999 
e. $20,000 - $29,999 
f. $10,000 - $19,999 
g. $9,999 and below 
 
12. How many persons live in your household? 
 
13. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. 9th grade or below 
b. Some high school (10th grade and above), no diploma 
c. High school graduate 
d. Some college, no degree 
e. Associate degree 
f. Bachelor’s degree 
g. Graduate or professional degree 
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14. Please write down whatever you remember from the health communication video 
(spelling and grammar are not important). 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15. Please write down what you know about the woman named Andrea Yates. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Please write down what you know about the woman named Heather Harrison. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Posttest — Section 6 — Assessment of Implicit Goal Activation 
Healthy Goal 
 
Healthy     __ __ __ LTHY 
 
Fitness      __ __ __ NESS 
 
Medical  __ __ __ ICAL 
 
Doctor      __ __ __ TOR 
 
Nurse       __ __ __SE 
 
Exercise   __ __ __ __ CISE 
 
Diet          __ __ ET 
 
Vitamins  __ __ __ AMINS 
 
Nutrition   __ __ __ __ITION 
 
Well   __ __ LL 
Good Mother Goal 
 
Mother        __ __ THER 
 
Maternity    __ __ __ __ __ NITY 
 
Nurture       __ __ __ TURE 
  
Baby           __ __ BY 
 
Care           __ __ RE 
 
Breastfeed __ __ __ __ __ __ __EED 
 
Protect      __ __ __ TECT 
 
Nursing    __ __ __ SING 
 
Love         __ __ VE 
 
Bonding    __ __ __ DING 
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APPENDIX B: STIMULUS MATERIALS 
WEBSITE SCREEN SHOT 
Online at http://www.multigraphy.org/stimulus/postpartumnet/postpartumnet.html 
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HEALTH COMMUNICATION VIDEO SCREEN SHOT 
Online at www.multigraphy.org/stimulus/movieb.html 
 
Participants watched this video clip with a male voiceover and then evaluated the character 
“Samantha” featured in the presentation. They then watched the entire health communication 
video. 
 
Video script (voiceover): 
 
Pregnant women and their friends, families, and clinicians expect the postpartum period to be 
a happy time, characterized by the joyful homecoming of the newborn. Unfortunately, many 
women will experience short- or long-term mood disturbances postpartum. One such woman 
is Samantha, a mother of three who was diagnosed with postpartum depression after the birth 
of her third child. Studies have shown that the effects of untreated postpartum depression 
have an impact on the development of infants. Postpartum depression often goes 
unrecognized because many of the usual discomforts that new mothers experience are similar 
to symptoms of depression. If a new mother experiences the following symptoms, 
particularly if they persist two weeks after the birth of her baby, she should contact her 
doctor. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 800,000 women will develop one of several types of perinatal mood disorders each year — that’s about 20% 
of new mothers (WebMD). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Depressed mothers tend to have a higher risk of premature delivery. In addition, if a woman has prenatal 
depression, she has a 50 percent chance of developing postpartum mood disorder. After birth, babies have 
higher levels of stress hormones such as cortisol and norepinephrine and lower levels of mood-enhancing 
neurotransmitters such as serotonin and dopamine. Babies, like their depressed mothers, experience greater 
activity in the right frontal lobe, which processes emotional stimuli. These effects often lead to more irritable 
and less attentive and animated infants (Colino, 2004). 
 
4 Some pediatricians recommend avoiding breastfeeding when taking certain medications, like Prozac, as they 
aren’t tolerated by the infant as well as other medications. Many new mothers worry about taking 
antidepressants, especially if they are nursing, because medication does get into breast milk. But most experts 
say such fears are generally exaggerated. “Though nothing is ever 100% risk-free, we do have studies that show 
no long-term adverse effects from taking antidepressants while breastfeeding,” says Birdie Gunyon Meyer, RN, 
MA, CLC, coordinator of the Perinatal Mood Disorders Program at Clarian Health in Indianapolis and president 
of Postpartum Support International (WebMD). 
 
5 “Goal-priming effects (a) involve value, (b) involve postattainment decrements in motivation, (c) involve 
gradients as a function of distance to the goal, (d) are proportional to the product of expectancy and value, (e) 
involve inhibition of conflicting goals, (f) involve self-control, and (g) are moderated by equifinality and 
multifinality” (Forster, Liberman, & Friedman). 
2 A 2005 study published in The Lancet, a major British medical journal, uncovered 93 cases of seizures in 
infants whose mothers had been taking selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants, most 
commonly Paxil (paroxetine), during pregnancy. However, Ian Holzman, professor of pediatrics and chief of 
newborn medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, points out that this study is too speculative to be 
applied to clinical practice but that more longitudinal research is needed. 
